Prem Bhasin on the Origin of the Kashmir Imbroglio


 

'It was well-known that some of the tallest in the Congress had actually cried "never again" during their last detention in 1942 ... And so they took important decisions without consulting or even informing him (Gandhiji). The alternative was again to go into the wilderness. This was the genesis of the Congress Working Committee's passing its resolution for partition of the Punjab into Muslim majority and Hindu-majority zones, in the first week of March, 1947. Without consulting Gandhiji. No communication followed from the Congress High Command after the resolution for nearly a fortnight. On the 20h March, in a letter to Pandit Nehru, Gandhiji wrote "I would like to know the reason behind it ... I had (no) opportunity (to) give my own view which was against any partition based on communal grounds and the two-nation theory" (Mahatma Gandhi, the Last Phase, by Pyarelal, Volume 2, pp 32/34-35). The above ... quotation gives us the genesis of the Kashmir imbroglio.

Anxious to come to power at the earliest, the Congress leadership, led by Nehru and Patel, accepted all the conditions imposed by the British Government for transfer of power. Perhaps the most pernicious of that conditions was the power given to the individual rules (not the people) of Indian States to decide whether the States concerned would accede to India or Pakistan, or assume complete independence and sovereignty. If this a power had been given to the people instead, independent India would not have had to face problems of Hyderabad. Junagadh and Kashmir. India had ultimately to use force to compel Hyderabad and Junagadh to accede to India. Jammu and Kashmir, however, was a different proposition altogether.

78 per cent Muslims (were) ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, It bordered not only on both India and Pakistan, hut on Russia and China as well. This gave an opportunity to the ... Maharaja to dream of an independent, sovereign State of Jammu and Kashmir, with himself as its absolute ruler. So he did not accede either to India or Pakistan, and concluded a "stand Skill" agreement with both.

The Maharaja's army was not able to repel the tribals, and the Maharaja ran away to Jammu with all his riches, leaving the valley to its fate. Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference workers stepped into the breach and they did not allow any communal flare up in the valley. Not a single Hindu or Sikh was touched by any Muslim, fate or criminal. Ultimately, the Maharaja sought Aversion to India. Sheikh Abdullah supported it, and Indian military successfully repelled the invaders. On the other hand, Muslim evacuees from Jammu were attacked by the locai Hindus, often led by the RSS. The Maharaja's army stood by. if it did not actually help the Hindu mobs!

Nehiru, conscious of the fact that the Congress had ... Iueitly avcepting the two-nation theory, to stipulated that a palliative to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir  inilit be held after peace had been restored.

The British had insisted on a referendum in the North Western Frontier Province, although a Congress Ministry led by Dr. Khan Sahib had not only absolute majority in the Assembly but also had a majority of Muslim MLAs with it. And the Congress had accepted it! Why! Why did it not, then, insist on similar referendums in Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir? If a referendum had been held in Kashmir at that time. there was every possibility of Kashmiris opting for India. But even if they did not, there would have been no Kashmir problem on our hands all these years. That, however, was not to be.

So far as Kashmir was concerned, there was agreement on ascertaining the wishes of the people, but there was no agreement on how to ascertain these wishes. Since India and Pakistan did not reach any agreement on this issue. Attlee, Prime Minister of UK, suggested to Mountbatten that the matter be referred to the United  Nations Organisation. Mountbatten advised Nehru and Nehru, accepting the advice, filed India's complaint against Pak aggression with the UNO.

Gandhiji was against going to the UNO, where, he was sure, India would get only "Monkey Justice". Addressing a prayer gathering on December 25, 1947; he asked: "Why could not Pakistan and Union representatives sit down and thrash out the 'Kashmir Affairs'? (Pyarelal,Vol. II).

Incidentally, this was exactly the suggestion jointly made by the Socialists of India and Pakistan when their representatives met separately in Rangoon at the first Asian Socialist Conference ... in January 1953. Jayaprakash Narayan, Asoka Mehta and Prem Bhasin represented the Praja Socialist Party, while Mohammed Yusuf and Mubarak Saghar represented the Socialist Party of Pakistan. In a joint statement issued by them they "agreed that the dispute on Kashmir was the most vital issue that was seriously affecting not only the relations between the two countries but also causing incalculable harm to both. Force could never settle the issue ... a peaceful solution must be found. The basis of such a solution already existed in that both India and Pakistan  recognized he right of the people of Kashmir to decide their future through a free plebiscite ... Instead of talking to each other through the medium of the UNO the leaders of the two countries must sit together and settle among themselves the terms of the plebiscite". (Press Release, Asian Socialist Conference, Rangoon, January, 1953).

This was about seven months before Sheikh Abdullah was arrested and the launching of the "Plebiscite Front" by his followers.

In the meantime, India and Kashmir had reached an agreement in July 1952. Signed by Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah on July 24, 1953, it provided that: The head of the State of J&K shall be recognized by the President on the recommendation of the legislative assembly of the State.

Residuary Powers would vest with the State as provided in Article.370;

The State Legislature would have the power to regulate the rights and privileges of permanent residents.

Exceptions and modifications to the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Indian Constitution, in the State.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would extend to the state.

The National Flag will enjoy the same status as in other parts of India. The State Flag, however, would be retained for historical and sentimental reasons.

Article 352 of the Indian Constitution be modified to provide for promulgation of Emergency in case of external aggression; in case of internal disturbance only at the request of or with the concurrence of the State Government:

The Election Commission would conduct elections to Parliament, and of the President and the Vice-President.

A financial arrangement between the Union and the State would be evolved.

It is difficult to say with certainty about what went  wrong between July 1952 and August 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah was summarily dismissed and arrested. But one thing seems to be certain. There was a certain amount of mistrust about the Sheikh in influential quarters in Delhi, to whom a Hindu Prince appeared to be a better bet (for India) than a Muslim leader enjoying popular support among the Muslims in the Valley. One report has it that the Intelligence Bureau ... was asked by Home Minister Patel, to thoroughly investigate the Sheikh's nationalist credentials as well as possible personal ambition. When the IB gave the Sheikh a clean chit, he was asked to re-investigate more thoroughly. And the IB's second report contained enough material to implicate the Sheikh and justify his arrest.

For another, the Praja Parishad, the cover under which the RSS operated in the state, had started a campaign for full and immediate integration of the State ... with India, and for scrapping Articie 370. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherji, the founder of the Jana Saugh, decided to lead the campaign. He reached Jammu from where he proceeded towards Srinagar. He was arrested midway! His unfortunate death while still in custody, inflamed Hindu feelings. The Hindu backlash was fully exploited by elements opposed to the Sheikh, in India and, perhaps, he felf cornered. He had unreservedly supported J&K's accession to India in the belief that Hindu communalism could never take control of India ... This conviction was now shaken and the Sheikh, perhaps, began to apprehend that a Muslim majority J&K may not be treated fairly in India of not far-off tomorrow. And further that, Article 370 might be scrapped, and, instead of the J&K enjoying a special position, it might be pushed to complete sub-mergence in India. This apprehension might have led him to initiate moves which had the potential of separation from India and establishment of an independent State of J&K, with full support and guarantee of Western powers.

It was a sort of vicious circle, feeding suspicion on both sides - and Nehru was prevailed upon to take action before it was too late. The rest is history.

The pro-integration elements in India now had a field day and, with the meek concurrence of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and his successors, who were put in Sheikh Abdullah's place after the Sheikh's arrest, the Delhi Agreement of 1952 was negatived in practice. For all practical purposes ... Jammu & Kashmir now became one of the many States of India. Article 370 was not touched for tactical reasons. But it remained more or less a façade hiding the reality of full integration.

The people of the Valley were particularly alienated and antagonized. They had to be dealt with a strong hand, and periodic elections brazenly rigged to give the ruling National Conference overwhelming majority. H.V. Kamath and I were deputed by the National Executive of the PSP to go to Srinagar and study the situation. I not only met Sheikh Abdullah there but also the Governor. I asked the Governor about the rigging of elections. He was frank enough to tell me that he was expected to ensure comfortable majority for the ruling party. Free and fair elections did not square with.it. The rigging of elections was inevitable under the circumstances!

But let that be. Nehru tried to right the wrong but it was too late. He died while Sheikh Abdullah was still on his way to Pakistan on a mission assigned to him by Nehru.

Almost a decade later, his daughter Indira Gandhi picked up the thread again. Tortuous negotiations between her emissaries, on the one hand, and Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg, on the other, resulted in what is known as "Kashmir Accord" of February 24, 1975. The "Accord" enabled Sheikh Abdullah to come back to power and become the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.

Terms of the "Accord" includes:

Continuation of Article 370.

Residuary powers of legislation to remain with the State.

Parliament would continue, to have power to make laws pertaining to prevention of activities detrimental to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, secessionist activities and insult to the Constitution or the National Flag.

Where any provision of the Constitution of India has been applied to the State with adaptations and modifications, it would be altered or repealed by the President under Article 370. But provisions of the Constitution of India already applied to the State without adaptation on modification are unalterable.

The State can have its own legislation on money matters.

No agreement was possible on the question of nomenclature of Governor and Chief Minister.

... 1977 saw a sea change in Indian politics. Indira Gandhi was ousted from power and a Janata Party government led by Morarji Desai took over. 1977 elections in Kashmir were the first really free and fair elections in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Janata split and subsequent events (into which we need not go here), however, allowed Indira Gandhi to bounce back to power. She and President Giani Zail Singh rushed to Srinagar when Sheikh Abdullah died, and saw to it that Dr. Farooq Abdullah was installed as a Chief Minister, although D.D. Thakur was number two in Sheikh Abdullah's cabinet and Farooq lived in London more than in Kashmir.

But Farooq Abdullah, it seems did not feel unduly obliged and soon chalked out an independent course for himself. There was near consternation in Delhi when he began hobnobbing with the Opposition and attended some of their conclaves.

He had to be subdued! Governor Jagmohan was at hand. He manoeuvred a split in the National Conference Legislative Party and, installed a government of defectors in 1984. Sheikh Abdullah's son-in-law (who always believed that he had a better right to succeed Sheikh Abdullah), G.M. Shah was sworn in as Chief Minister.

... G.M. Shah's government fell not long after and Farooq Abdullah returned to power.

By 1987 (when Rajiv Gandhi was in power in Delhi), Farooq Abdullah had been properly subdued. He was literally forced into an alliance with the J&K Congress in the elections held that year. Farooq's inefficient and corrupt administration had alienated the people from the National Conference and Farooq. This alliance alienated them further. Kashmiri youth was looking forward to 1987 elections to register its protest, defeat the NC-Congress alliance and usher in a basic change in the State's power equation.

The Alliance was not unaware of its unpopularity and of the distinct probability of its defeat at the hands of the new emerging forces. So it (again) resorted to brazen rigging ...

It did win. But its consequences were disastrous. The people lost confidence in the democratic process (and) opted for undemocratic and violent means. And militancy was born! Before that there was hardly any instance of militant action in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan, naturally, saw an opportunity for itself in this situation and began to play its part in sustaining and fanning it. Militancy grew with every attempt by security forces to curb it, because the methods employed by the insensitive security forces and the administration alienated the people further.Militancy; much of it funded and equipped from across the border, now knew no bounds and became almost uncontrollable.

It is too early to say if anything concrete or worthwhile would emerge out of the current moves and counter moves and initiatives on the chessboard of Kashmir ... (No) serious observer (can) be sanguine (but) there are some hopeful signs ... (Source: The Janata, Deepavali Special Number, 2000)





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