NATIONAL POLITICS
Yogendra Yadav's Exit Poll Analysis, 1996
The eleventh Lok Sabha Elections saw the eclipse of the National Constituency syndrome which had emerged in the past two decades. Gone are the days when the entire country was like a single constituency which spoke in one, or at the most two, voices to generate the nationwide electoral waves of the '70s and '80s. The reconfiguration of Indian politics in the last decade has shifted the effective arena of electoral confrontation to the states. For an overwhelming majority of underprivileged voters, the Lok Sabha elections have become no more than countrywide state-level elections.
What looks like an unclear verdict at the national level is an artificial summation of fairly clear verdicts at the state level. It may take more than a single general election for this transition to be completed.
BJP:
The BJP had added 40 seats to its kitty without having increased its vote share last time. It has emerged as the single largest party this time although its all-India vote share is 8% lower than its nearest rival, the Congress (1). What accounts for this?
In part, the party garnered more than 23% share of the popular vote, a swing of 2.7% from 1991. In multi- cornered contests, these deftly worked out alliances enabled the BJP to convert its own old votes into seats.
But the main explanation lies in the fact that BJP's entire support is concentrated in a belt which now extends from Bihar to Karnataka (north and central Bihar and Haryana were added to it this time). So its average national vote share of 20% is deceptive. In the belt, the BJP and its allies have an average vote share of 36%, compared to 23% of the Congress (I). And what is more, the BJP and allies have added 5% votes to their share in this belt since 1991. That is what enables the party to get more seats here than the Congress(I).
In the non-BJP coastal belt, it lost about 2% votes this time. The loss was of no consequence in terms of seats. But it may prove crucial to the BJP's long-term expansion plans.
Congress(I):
What distinguished the Congress(T) from all the other political formations was its famous rainbow coalition of social communities. It has always enjoyed the same level of support across various sections of society. The exit poll data shows that the Cong (1)'s worst-ever electoral drubbing has not altered this basic character of the party. Barring tribal and Christian voters, the support for the Cong (1) still falls within a 10% band (plus or minus 5%) around its average vote.
The BJP's suppo.t base is much narrower - both in regional as well as social terms. Its vote share among marginalized groups like the unlettered. Dalits, tribals and, above all, Muslims is significantly lower than its own average. Whatever its share of seats in Parliament, the BJP has a long way to go before it can claim that the people of India have given a verdict in its favor.
Vote Share by Religion
If one needed evidence to prove that December 6, 1992, was a turning point in the political orientation of the Indian Muslims, it is here. At the all-India level, the Congress(1) managed to get a seemingly decent share of 28% of the Muslim votes. But it is 18% less than even its 1991 share.
Besides, much of it came from states where the Muslims did not have an effective non-Congress(1) option. In Maharashtra 66 per cent, and in Rajasthan 86 per cent, of the Muslims voted for the Congress(1). Wherever they had an option, they went for it.
State-wise Break-up of Muslim Vote (%)
State Cong(I) TDP (N) L.F JD JD+ Allies JD+SP
A.P 35 52 - - - -
W. Bengal 35 - 63 - - - -
Karnataka 22 - - 65 - -
Bihar 27 - - 59 -
U.P 5 - - - - - 83
The NF-LF now has a greater share of Muslim votes than the Cong(I). The consolidation of Muslim votes achieved by the SP-JD combine in UP is of a level un- known in the history of Indian elections. With the Sikhs also voting against the Cong (1). Christians are now the only minority community whose confidence the Cong(I) enjoys.
All India Average (%)
Religion Cong (I) BJP NF-LF BSP State Parties Others
Hindu 29 27 18 4 14 8
Muslim 28 3 48 2 10 9
Christian 46 3 12 1 23 15
Sikh 29 10 7 8 36 10
Vote Share by Education
Edu. Level Cong (I) BJP NF-LF BSP State Parties Others
Unlettered 32 17 24 6 13 7
Middle 29 22 21 4 16 8
H/School 27 30 18 2 13 1
Graduate 25 36 16 3 10 10
Vote Share by Caste
Caste Cong (I) BJP NF-LF BSP State Parties Others
Forward 29 33 17 1 10 10
OBC 25 23 25 2 18 7
SC 31 11 21 16 14 7
ST 47 17 15 2 7 12
There is a neat relationship between the level of education and the voting pattern. For the Congress (1), NF-LF and the BSP, the lower the level of education, the higher the vote share. This correlation is the strongest in the case of the JD-SP combine. It is the other way round for the BJP. Its vote share is rather low among the unlettered and exceptionally high among graduates. The tilt of the educated classes towards the BJP gives it an edge in opinion formation.
If the level of education is interpreted as a sign of social privileges, greater vote share among the highly educated does not look like a sign of political strength. The BJP still has to win the confidence of the socially underprivileged, whose vote tends to be more stable than the rest.
If all the three divides - caste, religion and level of education - are brought together, we get to see the section of society which was the strongest supporter of the BJP. In this small group of forward caste and highly educated Hindus, the BJP and its allies secured 52 percent of votes.
Conclusion:
The CSDS exit poll reveals that behind this dramatic electoral verdict is a slow but decisive movement in the social basis of Indian politics. The rainbow of social communities brought together by the Congress (1) in the era of one-party dominance has not disappeared from the political horizon, but its slices are beginning to fall apart.
(Source: The India Today, 31 May, 1996)
Percentage of Votes
Party 1991 1996 All India Swing
Congress(I) 36.5 28.1 -8.4
BJP 20.8 23.5 +2.7
NF-LF 24.9 20.2 -4.7
BJP’s Vote Percentage
All India 20.8 23.5
BJP Belt 30.7 36.0
Non-BJP Belt 8.5 6.8
Lok Sabha: BJS/BJP - 1952-1996
Bharatiya Jana Sangh Bharatiya Janata Party
1952 3(94) 1984 2(229)
1957 4(130) 1989 86(226)
1962 14(196) 1991 120(468)
1967 35(251) 1996 160(461)
1971 22(160)
(Figure in bracket shows No. of candidate)
Congress (1): Resolution on 11th Lok Sabha Election Results
Despite the unclear nature of verdict the rejection of communal ideology by the Indian people is ... unambiguous. The people's verdict is clearly for secular polity. The parties which are committed to secular democracy have received eighty percent of the votes despite differences between such parties. The formation of a BJP government will be a threat to the secular foundations of the Indian Republic. The country needs a of a BJP government will be a threat to e secular stable and viable government committed to the foundational principles of the Indian Constitution. The Congress Party, therefore, has decided to take positive steps in support of the process of the formation of a government by political parties which are totally committed to secular democracy, communal harmony, welfare of the socially and economically weaker sections and minorities and rapid growth of our economy as well as to the values enshrined in our Constitution.
Sachidananda Murthy.
On Electoral Verdict, 1996
Another trend is the development of narrower vote banks which resort more and more to tactical voting, both in a negative and in a positive fashion. Thus the BJP and the Congress found themselves in the same boat as far as Muslims were concerned. If Muslims in Maharashtra went with the third front, in Karnataka and Bihar they went with the Janata Dal, in U.P. with the SP and the BSP, and in A.P. with the T.D. 3 years have gone by, but the Ayodhya demolition still rankled in their hearts.
In several states new parties came up representing the specific vote banks and they witnessed a vote surge even though they stood little chance of victory. Over one- third of the country's voters did not vote for the three major formations - the Congress, BJP or NF-LF combine - but preferred parties meant for specific vote banks or regional outfits. The growth of the Akali Dal representing Sikhs, the BSP for Dalits and the Samata Party in Bihar for Kurmis meant that national parties have to respect the aspirations of these groups if they have to forge successful social coalitions. Their old social coalitions have collapsed or have become enfeebled.
(Source: The Week, 19 May, 1996)
Lok Sabha: Muslim Representation
1952-1996
Year MPs Year MPs
1952 22 1980 46
1958 26 1985 41
1962 23 1989 33
1967 30 1991 28
1971 30 1996 23
1977 32
Lok Sabha 1996: Party -wise and State-wise Results
Party Total A.P Assam Bihar Delhi Gujarat Haryana Karnataka Kerala M.P Maharashtra Orissa Punjab Rajasthan T.N U.P West Bengal J&K Others
BJP 161 NIL 1 18 5 16 4 6 NIL 27 18 NIL NIL 12 NIL 52 NIL 1 1
Cong(I) 140 22 5 2 2 10 2 5 7 15 16 2 12 NIL 5 9 4 14
JD 44 NIL NIL 21 NIL NIL NIL 16 1 NIL NIL 4 NIL NIL NIL 2 NIL 1 NIL
CPM 33 1 1 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 5 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 23 NIL 3
TMC 20 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 20 NIL NIL NIL NIL
DMK 17 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 17 NIL NIL NIL NIL
SP 17 NIL NIL 1 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 16 NIL NIL NIL
TDP(N) 16 16 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
SS 15 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 15 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
CPI 13 2 NIL 3 NIL NIL NIL NIL 2 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 2 NIL 3 NIL 1
BSP 11 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 2 NIL NIL 3 NIL NIL 6 NIL NIL NIL
A.Dal 8 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 8 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
Samata 8 NIL NIL 6 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 1 NIL NIL NIL 1 NIL NIL NIL
RSP 5 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 1 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 4 NIL NIL
AGP 5 NIL 5 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
Ind./Others 25 1 2 1 NIL NIL 4 1 4 3 NIL NIL NIL 1 NIL 3 3 NIL 2
TOTAL 538 42 14 52 7 26 10 27 20 40 48 21 13 25 39 85 42 6 21
