NATIONAL POLITICS
Vidya Subrahmaniam on Risks for UF in Embracing Congress
The cracks in the UF are showing, and not merely because Laloo Yadav has invaded the struts Indira Gandhi-style. Mr Yadav's indictment in the fodder case is a worry but only one of a succession of worries the Front looks about to act in its current weekend and compromised state. Like any organisation left depleted after a bitter power struggle, the Front, too, must face rebellion; indeed, much more so from someone predisposed to theatric as Yadav is. Even if he goes, the front will have become vulnerable to exploitation.
Current Affliction
The Front's current affliction is a post-natal complication arising from its difficult rebirth as a Congress-friendly organism. The Front may have settle for a life of bliss with the Congress, but that has been at the cost both of its cohesion and its trademark distinctiveness. The new reorientation has caught its constituents in an identity crisis that threatens to undermine equally the Front's unity and the sense of purpose that informed its previous birth. The reincarnate has none of the zeal or singlemindedness that saw the original through a difficult period of uncertainty, that drove it to resist external inducements, that persuaded it to collective goal larger than the immediate aims of the individuals.
It came to represent an all-new idea, an experiment worth carrying on. The UF had 15 constituents to the National Front's four. In other words, 15 parties had come together on one uncertain platform, rejecting the more alluring option of aligning with one or the other mainstream party. The significance of this can be judged from the participation in the Front experiment of the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP), originally an ally of the BJP.
Indeed, there was a certain something that held the constituents together, which was more than their secular outlook, more than just anti-BJPism. This was a commonly felt need to develop an identity distinct from that of the Congress and the BJP, both of which concentrated on the mainstream to the exclusion of the marginal. It was this sense of alienation from the mainstream but oneness with each other that bound the AGP with the TDP, the DMK with the MGP and even the Congress-breakaway TMC, largely because of its strong regional roots, with all others. The Federal Front formed by the four dominant regional parties was a consciously worked out gameplan to LPN a voice to regional aspirations, to give marginalities satraps a decisive say in decision-making at the Centre. Which explains why Chandrababu Naidu it was who go to oversee the leadership selection rounds in Delhi.
Witness the contrast between then and now. Ten months ago, the constituents competed to renounce the Prime-ministerial post. V.P. Singh fled underground, the CPM vetoed Jyoti Basu's elevation and GK Moopanar said a polite but firm No to the idea. Post-April 11 this year, not only did the aspirants multiply by the hour, each did the other in, leaving Mr. Gujral to romp home as the least opposed of the lot. By the end to it all, survival had become the endgame and the Front had split into two separate factions-those favouring closer relations with the Congress, indeed, even its inclusion in governance, and those wanting only its support. Into the former fell all those who didn't have to fight the Congress on the ground, such as Laloo Yadav, Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav, Moopanar and to an extent, Gujral himself and into the latter those under compulsion to view the Congress as an adversary - all of the Left, the TDP's Chaudarababu Naidu and the AGP's Prafulla Mahanta.
This polarization is ominous as much for its potential to destabilise the Front as for driving the constituents away from the objective of preserving themselves as a loose coalition-each autonomous in its own territory and yet a valuable part of central power-sharing. The pro-Congress faction is keen on inviting the Congress abroad, in order apparently to prevent a second bid for power by that party. But does a Congress inside the coalition guarantee stability? Unlikely. Because ideology can become flexible, ground compulsions cannot. Which means a disunited Front. In other words, instability loss of identity for the Front and goodbye to federal governance. What is left can only be a Congress government by proxy. (Source: Times of India, May 3,1997)
Kuldip Nayar on Deve Gowda's Fall
Deve Gowda would have gone down better in the country if he had asked the Front to elect another leader after losing the confidence vote. He stuck on to power and position. This nearly jeopardized the future of the Front. He had to be told in clear terms that the Front would break up if he were to insist to stay on. He is far from reconciled to a position where he has not the leader.
Events seem to take shape in a manner which suggests another UF-type government. In other words, the different elements, believing in the country's ethos of unity and pluralism, will be together to defend the polity. It it heartening to see that the BJP has also realised that only federal structure can make the Centre strong. Were it to shed its anti-Muslim bias, the BJP would be more acceptable to the country than many other political parties.
(Sources: Mainstream, 3 May, 1997)
Saeed Naqvi On the Fall and Rise of the Congress
The Congress has been in general decline since, 1967, at least, when eight states returned non-Congress governments. But after the Bangladesh war, Indira Gandhi superimposed her charism on carefully shepherded vote banks, including backwards, harijans and, above all, Muslims.
This phase also coincided with her having to strengthen her leftist affiliations. An impatient opposition sought to negotiate her charisma by resurrecting another charismatic leader, Jaya Prakash Narayan. This clash led to the imposition of Emergency, but in 1977 the JP movement bore fruit when the Janata Party came to power. The coalition failed and Indira Gandhi bounced back to power in 1980. Now she had to be sensitive to a saffron sentiment awakened by the Jana Sangh as part of the Janata Government. It was this communal politics she lost control of when she was dragged into Blue Star.
Since Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh body guards, there was a strong Hindu sentiment in the wave that brought Rajiv Gandhi to power by an unprecedented margin. Rajiv's advisers like Arun Nehru thought the Congress could have its cake and eat it too: open the locks of the Ram Janmabhoomi to consolidate Hindu support and upturn the Shah Bano judgement to please the Muslims. It is between these two stools that the party subsequently fell.
The minorities had already started walking out on the party after the shilanyas or brick laying ceremony for the Ram temple in Ayodhya under Congress auspices. By the time P.V. Narasimha Rao stumbled upon power by accident, the assessment of the Congress Party managers was that "there is widespread feeling in the country that Muslims are being pampered". Muslim support had become uncertain. A fear gripped the Congress leaders that the majority community was also recoiling on the party.
But which majority? Mandalisation was institutionalising and solidifying caste vote banks. Hindu consolidation at this stage also implied retention of upper caste supremacy. By obvious inaction during the demolition of the Babari Masjid, Rao aimed at both: Hindu consolidation as well as upper caste supremacy.
He failed Lower caste forces gained in states like UP and Bihar and Muslims abandoned the party altogether, particularly after the Bombay riots where, again, inaction of leaders like Sharad Pawar was pronounced. In fact, a sample survey among the minorities showed the disliked Rao, Sharad Pawar and S.B. Chavan (for his TADA excesses) in that order. BJP came lower down in their list of pet hates. When the United Front, consisting of 13 regional parties came to power, each one of the constituents had identified two untouchables: BJP and the Congress led by Rao. With Rao's departure from leadership the situation changed radically. It is symptomatic of the Congress death - wish that outsiders were able to spot possibilities of recovery but not the members of the Congress working committee. The infighting in the CWC, the promotion of Sharad Pawar as the leader of the CPP inspite of his losing every possible election in Maharashtra in recent months, defeat in Chindwara, rout in Punjab and total confusion in UP has reduced Kesri exactly to the stature the CWC members (each one of them incapable of winning a seat anywhere) are comfortable with. Who cares about the party's future. Well, Kesri does not have too much time. He must circumvent the CWC. Had he projected a collective leadership consisting of Madhavrao Scindia, A.K. Antony, Naval Kishore Sharma he can bestow on the, party something resembling in future - a party which can play the link role in future coalitions at the Centre.
(Source: The Pioneer, 23 March,1997).
Sandhya Jain On the Congress Heritage
The Bofors payoff, which led to Rajiv Gandhi's ignominious defeat in 1989, cannot be equated with other corruption scandals that have rocked the body politic from time to time: What makes the Bofors scandal unique is that a deal negotiated directly between heads of government for a critical national institution such as the army, should have involved controversial persons and embroiled the then Prime Minister himself in a controversy.
Bofors is a sorry instance of the misuse of the highest executive office and public funds for private gain. What is worse, this breach of trust was executed in an international arena, compromising the country's dignity. The then Prime Minister himself commandeered the contract, and there is no fig leaf of anonymous faces in the PMO taking "an interest in the matter" Rajiv Gandhi could not escape from the shadow of Bofors in his lifetime and it has continued to dog him and his family even after his death.
The Bofors investigation has put the issue of public accountability on the national agenda forcefully. And it is just as well that it has come at a time when MPs, ministers and ex-ministers, under pressure from the judiciary and the investigating agencies, are uniting across party lines in an attempt to amend the law to put themselves virtually beyond its reach. The truth about Bofors will have important lessons for all of us. It will serve as a salutary reminder that howsoever heady may serve as a salutary reminder that howsoever heady may be the experience with power, one is ultimately accountable to the people, to the law, and above all, to history. It is now only a matter of time before the findings of the investigation are made public. The Congress, which is complicit in Bofors and a host of corruption scandals, would be well advised to use the interregnum to introspect on its past and ponder its future. Will it continue to hold itself hostage to "vote-catchers", or will it take meaningful steps to create inner party democracy? Or is it merely heading towards further discord and disunity?
Rajesh Pilot's demand to make the probe public indicates that the Narasimha Rao group is unreconciled to its graceless eclipse. Trouble for Kesri will come immediately with the expected rout of the Congress in Punjab, and the growing chasm with the BSP in Uttar Pradesh. At the same time, the decision to "permit" Sharad Pawar to have an alliance with the Samajwadi Party in Maharashtra while cold shouldering in UP, is only likely to land the Congress between two stools.
This would also be an appropriate time for the Congress to settle the issue of Sonia Gandhi's status. Is she in politics or not; why does she take such a keen interest in Congress affairs if she is not politically inclined; and what was her role during her husband's lifetime? Given the tenacity with which she has maintained a presence in the party after Rajiv Gandhi's death, one cannot maintain the fiction that she was only his wife. Certainly, her role in the run-up to the formation of the Congress-T the return of Arjun Singh and ND Tiwari, Rao's virtual dismissal from the leadership of the CPP, and Kesri's tough line with the Deve Gowda Government, is a matter of public concern. Congress cannot treat it as a party matter.
(Source: The Pioneer, 7 February, 1997)
