UP ELECTIONS

Ajit Kumar Jha on the Saffron Surge in UP

Despite the Hindutva wave sweeping north India, the party failed to get beyond 20% of the popular vote in the country between the 1991 and 1996 Lok Sabha elections. A four per cent additional support came by only because of allies such as the Samata Party in Bihar and others. Although its vote percentage in UP increased marginally from 32 in 1991 to 34 in the 1993 assembly elections, its share of seats fell from 217 to 175. But what is much more worrying for it is that in the 1996 Lok Sabha polls the BJP once again failed to go beyond its one-third popular vote in what many consider as the country's bell-whether state.

The fact that the BJP commanded a lead in almost 236 assembly segments of the Lok Sabha polls in UP is hardly a comforting thought today what with the new equations prevailing in the state. Consider this: if the Congress-BSP votes polled during the Lok Sabha are added up by assembly segments given the recent alliance between the two, 45 of those leads disappear. This also includes the damage done to the party in the Upper Doab region by the recent formation of the Bharatiya Kisan Kamgar Party (BKKP) under the leadership of Ajit Singh and Mahendra Singh Tikait. Even considering that the Lok Sabha strongholds of the BJP are more or less intact, given the new permutations and combinations in UP, the party commands a lead in only 191 assembly constituencies. The only way out for the BJP is to concentrate on a second surge... After being reduced to an "untouchable" following the Lok Sabha polls, the BJP leaders have resisted the VHP's exhortations to exploit the Jalabhishek campaign around the Gyanvapi Mosque in Varanasi.

Therefore, the party efforts are all geared towards increasing popular support in UP through innovative strategics. Towards this end, the BJP has come up with a definitive plan: of fighting the dominant with the decisive. Both the SP and the BSP are essentially coalitions of dominant castes, whereas the BJP has relied on a coalition of decisive castes. The BJP hopes to use the same strategy by which Lord Ram defeated the mighty forces of Ravana with the help of the tiny but well-organized Vanar Sena, and the five Pandavas overcame the Kauravas in the battle of Kurukshetra, according to some RSS leaders in Lucknow.

On the one hand, Prime Minister Deve Gowda has been attempting to revive Cha udhury Charan Singh's classic Ahir-Jat-Gujjar-Rajput (JGAR) coalition with an election plank, empowering the peasant proprietors in UP. Muslim support has been roped in with the help of the SP leader, Mulayam Singh Yadav. On the other hand, Ms. Mayawati of the BSP has united all scheduled castes under the leadership of the numerically dominant Jatavs The BJP on a poll plank of skimming the creamy layer has made fresh inroads among the decisive "most. backward castes" (MBCs) from Rajbhars to Chauhans, from Nishads to Kushwahas, from Kurmis to Lodhs.

The BIP has relied on the slogan of Jaldar. Taking its cue from the anti-zamindari campaigns launched in favor of the Bhumidars which attracted the small peasants to the Left parties, the BJP has concentrated on the Jaljivi campaign for building cooperatives for fishermen. This has attracted the support of the Kevats, the Mallahs and the Nishads. Coupled with the support of a majority of the Brahmins, Bhumihars, Rajputs and Vaishyas, and progress with the MBCs has the potential of becoming a winning combination.

This combination, however, will suffer owing to a traditionally low electoral turn-out. The turn-out among upper caste women is generically low and a large number of upper caste males migrate in search of employment. To overcome this, the BJP has chalked out a comprehensive poll management strategy. For the purpose of keeping a close tab on all potential votes, a single constituency has been divided into 37 sectors. Each sector consists of three polling stations, which are further sub-divided into three to four polling booths. On an average, a single polling booth has about 1,000 voters. Teams of two to three workers have been assigned to take care of 100 voters cach, to explain the intricacies of the ballot paper, the significance of a high turn-out rate and other poll-related matters. The trouble with the "dedicated team" campaigning for the BJP in UP is that it is predominantly from the upper castes. The impact of such savarna campaign managers on the more backward castes is extremely limited.

The BJP's new strategy faces a greater challenge from the BSP than the SP. Although backyard empowerment led by the Yadavs in the 1970s and 1980s has been vibrant, it has also been exclusivist. They have risen at the cost of the MBCs and other deprived castes. The rise of the Dalits is much more recent and now encompasses the MBCs too. While the BJP is attempting to penetrate from the top downwards among the MBCS, the BSP is launching a bottom-up incursion into those groups. Although the broad battlelines in UP seem to be drawn between the BJP and the UF coalition, the competition at the ground level is between the BJP and the BSP. While the turn-out rates for the BSP is high, those for the BJP is low. The answer to whether the BJP can cross the Rubicon lics in its ability to increase the electoral turn-out rates.

(Source: The Times of India, 4 October, 1996)

Ahtesham Qureshy on UP Assembly Polls

The election results clearly bring out the fact that Muslim voters, who constituted 18% of the electorate, have missed the opportunity of asserting their position as a decisive factor in tilting the balance in favor of a political party.

Before the polls were held, it was estimated that the Muslim voters would be able to determine the fortune of the candidates in at least 130 out of the 435 assembly seats Based on this calculation, the SP, the BSP, the Congress and the JD adopted strategies to secure the support of this minority vote. It was also that the choice was mainly between the Samajwadi and the BSP nominee. But two poll results in Muslim dominated areas like Moradabad, Rampur and Meerut showed that they lost the position of being a determining factor. Far from influencing the fortunes, they were at some places reduced to the position of being inconsequential.

In concrete terms, only about 35 Muslim candidates have made it to the coveted Vidhan Sabha in Lucknow. Of this, 21 belong to the Samajwadi Party and 12 to the rival Bahujan Samaj Party. But it is not just the question of how many Muslims have been successful in the battle. The real issue is in how many constituencies they exercised their voting strength in a manner to decide who will win? It is here that they showed political immaturity in making the choice. The fell into the trap of those skillful pull managers in various parties whose main aim was to divide the Muslim vote bank and nullify its strength. The best way was to get it divided by putting up Muslim candidates on rival tickets in the same constituency.

It is in this context that we find the Bharatiya Janata Party easily securing seven out of 12 assembly seats in Moradabad district. Bareilly is another Muslim dominated district. But the BJP won in six out of nine constituencies. In places like Rampur, Bijnor and Muzaffar Nagar, the fight was mainly between a Muslim candidate on SP ticket and another one on the BSP front. Interestingly, the split in the Muslim vote was not so sharp in constituencies like Jahanabad and Gangwar where the rival on the BJP or BSP ticket was not a Muslim.

Another clear lesson of the UP elections is the failure of religious leaders like Abdullah Bukhari to carry influence among the Muslim voters. It is not only. Bukhari whose appeal for Kanshi Ram's Bahujan Samaj Party did not carry much weight, but the "advice" of others including those in the Milli Council or the Barelivi Dargah was rejected by those to whom it was addressed. These appeals only added to the confusion and succeeded in causing split in the Muslim vote.

Generally, Muslims in UP did not trust Kanshi Ram, notwithstanding his poll eve assurances that the BSP would not seek the BJP's support in Government formation after the polls. But (Bukhari) made people believe otherwise during the election campaign. As against this, Mulayam Singh retained his position as a dependable preference in the Muslim eye.

The minority community was divided on the basis of "biradaris"- Ansaris and Quroshic are two influential and rich communities in UP, and the Lok Sabha as well as the Assembly elections this year generated animosity between these two "biradaris" in western UP. It is the equivalent of the caste factor among the Hindus so far as election strategies go.

While the elections have produced only a hung state assembly reflecting the uncertain or indecisive mind of the people, the margin of victories or defeats of candidates in Muslim-dominated constituencies has been decisively large. This is irrespective of the fact that the winner was the BJP or the SP.

 (Source: The Pioneer)

Sayeed Naqvi on Muslim Voting in UP

Should elections take place (in Bihar) who stands to gain? The fodder scam has debilitated Laloo. He has performed poorly in the general as well as the State Assembly by-elections. The Muslims are disenchanted with him. So, the JD is a declining force in Bihar. It has been reduced to rubble in UP. It won six out of 60 seats.

By contract, Mulayam has zoomed ahead with 110 seats in the total UF tally of 134.

In this acutely personalized politics, the real message of the UP verdict is in danger of being lost. And it is an important message.

Mandir and Mandal agitations brought communalism into a head-on clash with casteism. The BJP emerged as the flag bearer of the communal forces with an upper caste Congress playing second fiddle. Mulayam and Kanshi Ram surfaced as OBC and Harijan leaders.

Since the 1960s Harijans have had an 18 per cent reserved quota in Government jobs. Kanshi Ram's politics has so far consisted in using electoral gains, in alliance with whoever is available, to enlarge Harijan control in the Secretariat and the key districts.

Reservations for OBCs has just begun. There is, therefore, fierce hostility built into the Mulayam-Kanshi equation on this count quite independent of the personality clash. But Mulayam has risen above his Yadav base and moved a larger coalition with Thakurs and Muslims. Amar Singh, a Thakur leader on the rise, persuaded Mulayam to field 25 Thakurs and 17 have been returned. Muslims, on the other hand, rejected the pretensions of Imam Bukhari  and C.M. Ibrahim as "Muslim leaders". They have an overwhelming number voted for Mulayam, a Hindu they perceived to be secular. Not since the days of Nehru has the Muslim vote been so secularized. This is the message Kesri must recognize. Kesri is a Congressman Muslims could turn to. In this scheme of things Mulayam is his natural ally.