NATIONAL POLITICS
The Real Face of BJP
Meraj Ahmad, Department of Sociology, Lucknow University
The BJP is fascist in its outlook, approach and ideology The BJP.
i. has taken recourse to "politics of emotions" instead of rational politics.
ii. has been guilty of extending and mixing religion (the Ayodhya issue) in politics, thus throwing to winds the Constitutional norms and ideals of secular states, secular politics and secular democracy.
iii. has been motivated by a narrow concept of nationalism, that is, "Hindutva" defined by it as "cultural nationalism" (which comes dangerously close to fascism (of Italy) and Nazism (of Germany). In the ultimate analysis, the BJP wants to convert the Indian state into a theocratic one.
iv. has been unable to appreciate and digest the time- old cultural diversity (pluralism) of India. Hence it wants to impose a common culture, a common way of life (Hindutva) and a common civil code on the people of India. The BJP has been deplorably blind and averse to the modern and enlightened perspectives like cultural and sociological relativism. It has been a victim of ethnocentrism.
v. has been a covert believer in Machiavellian politics hinging upon "end justified means". For capturing political power, it has instigated the religious feelings of the people, divided them along communal lines and shattered to pieces communal goodwill and harmony and national integration.
vi. has been responsible for creating the Frankenstein's Monster which brought the most tragic disaster to the nation in the post-demolition days of the Babari Mosque. The Frankenstein's Monster is bound to turn towards, and eat its creator ultimately.
vii. has been the most unprincipled political outfit.
a) Vociferous about protecting and promoting cultural nationalism (Hindutva) and Swadeshi it upheld, when the occasion arrived, the new economic policy of the previous government to open the economy for ever- easy entry of foreign firms and companies.
b) The contentious issues promoted (and given top priority) by BJP in its manifesto and election campaign were forgotten as soon as it saw the chance of assuming power. They did not figure (even symbolically) in the President's address to Parliament prepared hastily. Obviously to show a 'secular' and 'tolerant' face (persona) to other political parties and woo their support for remaining in power.
(Source: The Azad Academy Journal, 1-31 August, 1996)
E.P.W. Da Costa's Analysis of BJP's Votes 1991-1996
The popular vote of the BJP, even with its allies, was less than 25 per cent, and for the BJP alone, less than 21 per cent, just 0.6 per cent above its 1991 figure. There was virtually no "swing" in the popular vote of the BJP between 1991 and 1996.
With its low popular vote against the Congress and much lower vote against the UF, the belief that the BJP can defeat the UF in an election seems seriously in error. This is true for a Central election. In State elections such as in UP and Maharashtra, however, the BJP remains, with allies, particularly in Maharashtra, a powerful force likely to be dominant for a long period of time.
BJP: Vote Share %
|
State
|
1991 Lok Sabha |
Intervening Assembly elections (1991-95) |
1996 Lok Sabha |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
9.6 |
3.9 |
5.2 |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
6.1 |
3.4 |
17.6 |
|
Assam |
9.6 |
9.6 |
16.5 |
|
Bihar |
16.0 |
12.9 |
21.6 |
|
Goa |
15.6 |
9.1 |
13.9 |
|
Gujarat |
50.4 |
42.5 |
50.7 |
|
Haryana |
10.2 |
9.4 |
21.5 |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
42.8 |
35.8 |
39.9 |
|
Karnataka |
28.8 |
17.0 |
25.0 |
|
Kerala |
4.6 |
4.7 |
5.7 |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
41.9 |
38.7 |
42.6 |
|
Maharashtra |
20.2 |
12.6 |
22.2 |
|
Manipur |
8.1 |
3.7 |
5.3 |
|
Meghalaya |
6.9 |
– |
9.3 |
|
Nagaland |
3.0 |
0.3 |
– |
|
Orissa |
9.5 |
8.0 |
13.3 |
|
Punjab |
17.0 |
16.5 |
6.6 |
|
Rajasthan |
40.9 |
38.4 |
43.1 |
|
Tamil Nadu |
1.7 |
1.7 |
3.1 |
|
Tripura |
3.0 |
NA |
6.6 |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
32.8 |
33.4 |
34.3 |
|
West Bengal |
11.7 |
11.3 |
6.9 |
|
Delhi |
40.2 |
42.8 |
54.2 |
|
Union Territories |
12.7 |
– |
20.8 |
|
All Indi |
A |
21.8 |
– |
(Source: The Indian Currents, 4 July, 1996)