Why has the frequency and intensity of communal riots increased from late '70s is a question to be posed and answered. Just like in Punjab and the development of intermediate communities and SC/ST, new social groups in the Muslim community were gaining economic strength and trying to gain social and political strength. The Jabalpur riots in 1961, Bhiwandi riots of 1970, Moradabad and Meerut killings of 1980 and 1987, Bhagalpur riots of October 1989 and many other riots had economic and political undercurrents. ... The increase in the number of communal riots during the 1980s could be co-related to the increased competition from the Muslims threatening the traditional economic social and political domination of caste Hindus.
Another important factor is that the artisans who produce the goods in areas where the communal riots are common, are mostly from the minority community and manufacture and trade are controlled by Banias and caste Hindus. The artisans were like bonded labour at the mercy of the manufacturer, trader and the money-lender. The condition of the artisans has changed slightly from bonded labour to contract labour. This change makes it difficult for the businessmen to keep the artisans under their thumb ... There (has been) no scheme worth the name for the development of Muslim community after Independence ... As in the case of SC/ST, even the slightest change in the condition of the artisans is considered a major threat by those who have economic and political supremacy. Economic strength and political power are the major factors in social mobility ...
The upper castes who were having all the powers and resources feel threatened from all sides. The political mobilisation of intermediate communities, the Sikhs demanding their rights in Punjab, a section of the Muslim middle class trying to enter services and others developing political interests as a result of economic strength, and the growing awareness among scheduled castes and tribes are considered a danger to the caste hegemony and economic supremacy of the higher castes. Communalisation is found to be the easiest and best weapon to mobilise people against assumed dangers they are facing. The emphasis of the Hindutva forces is on cultural level for achieving Hindu unity against Muslims. Their economic programmes are not clearly defined so that the upper caste programme at the expense of the lower castes may not be exposed. Fascism can only function when an 'ethnic other' has been antagonistically identified. It becomes active when the majority is made to believe that as a group they do not control the reins of economic and social power. Prem Shankar Jha wrote that the leaders and cadres of BJP and VHP are drawn by and large from the threatened small business classes as were these European fascist and French Pondajists (The Hindu, 17 November, 1990). The anti-South Indian stand propelled Shiv Sena in the beginning; then it became anti-communist, anti-Muslim, anti-Dalit, and then part of Hindutva. Once fascism is internally energised, it can go to heinous extension committing brutality to the ethnic other. This is evident in the communal riots that took place in recent years ..
Even in a state like Kerala, where communal riots are not common, there were 71 communal riots till 1990 out of which 46 were in the predominantly Hindu districts of Trivandrum (19), Quilon (11), Ernakulam (10) and Alleppey (6) while predominantly Muslim districts had only 16 riots - 5 in Calicut, 4 in Malappuram, 4 in Cannore, and 3 in Kasargode. To resist this kind of development, some new Muslim organisations have come upto oppose violence with violenice.
The CPM is the ruling party in two states. It appears that they too have abandoned the idea of the "State being an instrument of liberation and emancipation of the masses". Under their rule also the forward communities advanced at a faster rate than the backward communities which need faster development. The party does not have a programme for empowerment of SC/ST and backward communities or development of the minorities. In Kerala, their stand in returning the tribal land to its original owners and in the case of the reservation for backward communities is clearly not on the side of downtrodden. Their education policy is restricted to some positions in the senate and syndicate. The party did not even react to the government of India's Education Policy of 1986 which advocated the non-functioning non-formal education for giving supposedly quality education for the downtrodden.
The Marxist official view is that class struggle will eliminate casteism and communalism. This view is not supported by historical evidences in multi-ethnic societies. Unless ethnic equality has been achieved, the workers of the dominant group will not stand in confrontation with the elite. The elimination of ethnic inequalities becomes a pre-requisite for the emergence of cross-cutting. Interest group activities (N.C. Saxena, Religion, State and Politics, p. 158). In a communist party report, G. Sardesai stated that it was not possible to organise labourers of different castes working in the same factory earning the same wages, as a class. (G. Sardesai, Class Struggle and Caste Conflict; 1982, p. 12). The trade unions participated in the killings in Bombay after the demolition of Babari Masjid (The Peoples Verdict, p. 9) shows that their affiliation is with caste and religion and not with class. The BMS, the trade union wing of the Hindutva forces, has the largest membership ...
If class struggle is to be strengthened, the class enemy is to be identified. In India, industry, land, jobs, wealth, political and social power are all in the hands of caste Hindus and caste factor is the major force that is being used to suppress the lower castes. To assume that caste is a factor not to be considered is only a method to divert the nature of the struggle.
The constitutional provision of allowing reservation to socially and educationally backward classes in government services is meant to ensure the participation of such classes in the governance of the country. The Marxist party considers it as an employment problem or poverty elimination problem and argues for reservation for the forward communities also. The rule which sanctions reservation for the backward communities is being violated to favour the forward communities and the communist-led government in Kerala is not even prepared to implement the existing rule in full.
The access to higher education for backward communities is also restricted by sanctioning a disproportionate number of schools and colleges to forward communities and reserving 40 per cent of the admissions to that community as management and community quotas. Permission to start new colleges and schools by backward communities are not sanctioned by procedural methods. It is becoming more and more clear that the Marxists in power in Kerala have almost abandoned the principle to use the state as an instrument to establish social justice.
West Bengal is another state where Marxist party is in power. The Muslim representation in West Bengal services is given in Table I and Table II gives the Muslim representation in Central services, other State services and public undertakings.
The figures in Table I and II show that there is practically no difference between Marxist-ruled states and states ruled by other parties as far as minority representation in government services is concerned. It is also an indication of the socio-economic policies of the governments. But that the West Bengal government prevented communal riots is an important factor to their credit. West Bengal and the Bihar government have proved that communal riots can be prevented if set-up in power really wants it.
Table I
Muslim Representation in West Bengal Government Services
Service Total Muslims %age
IAS and IPS 468 6 1.28
W. Bengal Civil Services (Executive and Judiciary) 1993 51 2.59
Calcutta Corporation 33146 3440 10.38
W. Bengal Police Deptt. 66103 4236 6.41
Table Il
Percentage of Muslims in Various Categories in West Bengal
Employer Classes
I II III IV
Central Government 1.61 3.00 4.41 5.12
State Government 3.30 4.48 4.68 6.35
Public Undertakings (State & Centre) 3.19 4.43 12.14 10.46
(Source: The Nation and the World, 16 July, 1999)
