NATIONAL POLITICS
Ajit Kumar Jha on the Myth of the Hindutva Mandate
The BJP was not the best team but the most prepared for the match. Emerging as the single largest party with about one-fifth of the total votes polled... The BJP has formed a government in New Delhi. But does it enjoy the mandate to rule, notwithstanding Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee's popularity and the frantic efforts to muster a majority in Parliament?
Consider the following: The BJP's seat tally has gone up from 119 in 1991 to 160 in 1996, but, as unpublished official figures show, its vote performance has stayed stagnant at 20 per cent. Therefore, the gain of nearly 40 seats is neither a result of a positive swing for the party, nor the effect of any popular wave for the Hindutva brigade. Its number one status stems purely from political arithmetic of votes: the BJP did not win as much as its main rival, the Congress, lost the polls.
Lowest Record
The Congress has, indeed, been decimated in this elections with a lowest ever record of votes and seats. With a nine per cent swing against it, the Congress has won only 136 seats. However, its all-time low of 28 per cent vote is still much higher than the BJP's best of 20 per cent.
In fact, the BJP could not even convert the negative swing for the Congress into 'catches'. What stumped the Congress was good fielding by the regional formations and the Third Force. The NF-LF by itself polled 20 per cent while the regional parties, excluding the BJP allies, managed an additional 25 per cent - a total then of close to 45 per cent for the Third Force. Surely the 1996 mandate was for the federal forces.
The paradox of a team with merely a fifth of the total vote performing better than others with well over a quarter of votes is often blamed on the unfairness of the first-past-the-post electoral system. The BJP sympathizers argue that the Congress was until now the main beneficiary of this system in the country; that the Janata Dal and the CPM emerged as winners in Bihar and West Bengal essentially with a minority vote, and that there are several such instances in the other states. Therefore, they ask, how could, in principle, anyone castigate the electoral system when the Hindutva brigade benefits from it?
Fair enough. But other political parties only emerged as winners after crossing a minimum threshold. The Congress, for instance, only formed governments with votes ranging from 37 to 49 per cent. Whenever it reached closer to one-third mark, it sat in the opposition, as in 1977 and in 1989. For the BJP to claim a mandate with only one-fifth is like coveting a prize without really sweating for it.
BJP lacks Mandate
The BJP lacks not only the popular mandate but the required social mandate as well. Preliminary analysis of available exit poll data indicates that it received only three per cent of the Muslim votes, an equally low percentage of Christian votes and just 11 per cent of the Dalit votes of the country. With such a narrow social base, a BJP-led government sends a wrong signal to the minorities despite its "uncle Sikandar Bakhts". Although broad social acceptability amongst all sections of society is not a constitutional requirement to run a government, the lack of it certainly defeats the very purpose of a multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-lingual India.
The Congress and the NF-LF combine stand in stark contrast to the Sangh Parivar in this respect. The Congress's social dominance for nearly half a century is explained by its widespread support across communities. Even after losing a major chunk of its minority vote, the Congress has the backing of all communities, the fluctuations being within two to 3% of its national aver of 28%. In fact, its support base among Christians and tribals is substantially high hovering just below 50%. Similarly, the NF-LF receives a fair share of all the minority votes, but is especially popular with the Muslims, receiving 48% of their support.
Similar to its narrow social support base is the limited geographical spread of the BJP. Although the Suraaj Rath yatra of the BJP President, L.K. Advani, originated from Ernakulam in Kerala, the BJP continues to essentially remain a north-western phenomenon. Its average support in the south continues to be below five per cent. This explains why the prime-ministerial candidature, of the CM of Karnataka, Mr. Deve Gowda, galvanized the southern regional formations even while sending jitters in the Hindutva camp. The fear amongst the southern leaders of a Hindi-Hindu invasion from the basically northern Sangh Parivar, might prove to be the Achilles' heel for the BJP.
Even in its Hindi heartland stronghold, the BJP seems to have reached its limit in terms of mobilization. In U.P., for instance, the BJP did not improve upon its last record of one-third votes and, therefore, despite the division of non-BJP votes it only maintained its previous tally of 52 seats. In fact, the Samajwadi Party is reported to have received 22% of the votes and the BSP, contrary to all predictions, polled 20% of the votes in the state...
An isolated player aiming o come to power on its own, the BJP had approached these elections with a Chanakya like Rana niti (strategy of war) to quote RSS strongman Kailash Sarang. "In UP, in Atalji's words, we used a thorn to pull out a thorn," explained Mr. Sarang. It was the same strategy of breaking marriage alliances of the opponents by seducing one of the partners, which contributed to its fresh incursions in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and even Maharashtra.
Division of Votes
In other words, the puritanical Sangh Parivar was not averse to philandering as a means to a larger end. In Bihar, its romance with the Samata Party yielded a rich harvest with 18 seats for the BJP and six for their allies, a record four-fold increase. The BJP swept southern Bihar and penetrated the state's central and northern areas for the first time in its history. In MP it widened the divide between the Rao Congress and the rebels by flirting with Madhav Rao Scindia. As a result the BJP gained from 12 to 27 seats. In Maharashtra its job was made easier by the division of secular votes between the Congress and the Third Force including the eight factions of the RPI.
Will the BJP remain a loner or will it succeed in consummating its various alliances?
S. Balakrishnan and Milind Kokje on Third Force Experiment in Maharashtra
The Shiv Sena-Bharatiya Janata Party alliance has humbled the Congress in 19 of Maharashtra's 48 constituencies because of a division in the anti-Hindutva vote the alliance has scored an absolute victory in only 14 constituencies.
The alliance is reported to ha noted only 2% more than the Congress which has won 35% of the votes.
The third force, which broadly represents Dalits, Muslims and scheduled tribes, got 24 per cent of the votes. In past Lok Sabha elections, the Congress was able to win the support of the Dalits, Muslims and scheduled tribes. But over the years, these sections have been alienated.
Political observers feel that while the Congress has largely retained the support of the Marathas, the Sena- BJP has secured a strong base among the other backward castes (OBCs) and non-Maratha upper castes who roughly comprise about 35 per cent of the population.
The shift of the Dalits, Muslims and scheduled tribes away from the Congress appears to have titled the scales against the party. Last year, all factions of the Republican Party of India came together and formed the Purogami Lokshahi Morcha (PLM) along with the Janata Dal, the Bahujan Mahasangh and the left parties.
Despite the fact that the PLM was able to work out seat adjustments only on the eve of the polls, it was able has not been translated into a single victory since its to secure an impressive 24% of the votes. This, however, support was spread over virtually all 48 constituencies.
The division in votes has worked to the advantage of the alliance in as many as 20 constituencies. Congress leader Sharad Pawar had said on Thursday that the PLM, which is broadly referred to as the third force, "paved the way for the alliance's victory". C.M. Manohar Joshi, however, disagreed with Mr. Pawar's view. "Our votes are our votes and they have come to us", he said. When asked what would have happened if the Congress and the third front had come together, he replied: "Even in that situation, our votes would have increased and the final outcome would have remained the same."
(Source: The Times of India, 11 May, 1996)
Uttar Pradesh: BJP - Support by High Castes and some OBC's
Till Charan Singh left the Congress to form the Bharatiya Kranti Dal, Brahmins dominated. Singh cast up an Ahir-Jat-Gujjar-Rajput coalition. Sanjay Gandhi, propping up such Rajputs as V.P. Singh, took away the Rajputs from Charan Singh. And with Charan Singh's death, assorted Ahirs, like the Yadavs, Kurmis and so on broke away from Jat hegemony. This forms the backdrop to the rise of Mulayam Singh Yadav,
"But the Yadavs could not retain their hegemony," says Anand Kumar, a sociologist of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, "because they would not share real power with the other backward castes." This happened both during Mulayam Singh's first spell beginning December 1989 and in his second stint four years on.
In this election Mulayam Singh's Samajwadi Party won 16 seats and Kanshi Ram's Bahujan Samaj Party got 6 seats fighting as rivals. While the BJP won the bulk of the remaining-52 seats in the final tally.
Even so, in as many as 46 seats, the SP and the BSP finished either second or third. The Congress, in all these places, came fourth or fifth in the race.
Most concede that Mayawati bullied Mulayam and that Kanshi Ram made too many financial demands. "But Mulayam Singh also tried to break the BSP by engineering elections," said Rajni Kothari, eminent social scientist, "and this gave the BSP an opportunity to tell the Dalits that he couldn't be trusted." Besides this, Mulayam Singh also promoted Yadav interests over and above that of other backward groups. This would seem suicidal.
Kalyan Singh, the BJP chief minister from June 1991 to December, 1992, is a Lodh, a backward caste. And Vinay Katiyar, the chief of the Bajrang Dal is a Kurmi, Kurmis are found in large numbers in UP. Mulayam Singh's strength, nevertheless, is derived from the Muslims who have been voting en bloc for him since his first term as chief minister, during which he had ordered firing on kar sevaks who tried to storm the Babari Masjid. But since then, Muslim voting for him has been forced.
The BJP's base is more evenly spread. Its vote share, rising from 7.6% in the 1989 general elections to 32.8% in 1991 is now 33.43%, and this is not restricted to any particular region of the state.
And support for the BJP is not restricted to the Brahmins and the Rajputs (who deserted the Congress, after seeing that it couldn't give them power) or the richer and religious Ram-bhakt Kurmis (who formed a large section of the Babari Masjid demolition squad) or even the Lodhs.
In this election, such castes as Binds, Kushawahas and some Nishads voted for the BJP. A small section of Yadavs too backed it. Certainly, the Congress can do little about this just now. Its vote share dropped from 31.8% in 1989 to 18.3% in 1991 and has now touched an all-time low at 8.14%.
(Source: The Sunday, 2-8 June, 1996)
Bihar: JD's Loss Due to Excessive Yadavisation
The Janata Dal managed 22 seats while its splinter group, the Samata Party, led by Nitish Kumar, wrested six constituencies and the BJP, Samata's ally, won an astonishing 18 seats. (1991 tally: JD 34, CPI 8, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha(S) 6, BJP 5 and Congress 1).
How did this happen?
One person is that Laloo's backward caste vote-bank broke down. There have been fissures in it since he became chief minister in 1990 mainly with Yadav support (12 per cent of the population). While the Kurmis (3.6 per cent) and Koeris (4.1 per cent) have been gradually alienated from him because of extensive Yadavisation.
Excessive Yadavisation is not the only reason for Kurmi or Keeri alienation. The Kurmis, in particular, have been repulsed by Laloo Yadav's disdain for development and the lawlessness in the state in which prosperous doctors, engineers and lawyers are becoming the targets of kidnappers.
Besides, backward politics no more suits them. Like Bhumihars and Rajputs, they have come into huge new money from investments in such para-banks as Sahara and Peerless which give handsome returns. So, in the fight against Laloo, Nitish Kumar's Kurmi brethren felt it made better economic and political sense to be with the forward castes. The Koeris naturally went with the Kurmis.
Did the Dalits also vote for the BJP-Samata combine? Not of their own, reckons Rajni Kothari. He thinks such upper caste private senas as the Rashtravadi Kisan Mahasangh (new name for the private army of Bhumihars), the Bhumi Sena of the Kurmis, the Sunlight Sena of the Palamu landlords and the Kunwar Sena of the Rajputs - all banned - coerced the Dalits into voting for the BJP-Samata combine.
Says Nitish Kumar in the Assembly elections, he got 27.78 per cent of the votes and now he has got 32.5 per cent votes. So his voters have not decreased in number. Still, the Yadav-Kurmi/Koeri fracture is complete.
And Laloo, who has steadily been losing the tribal votes, has seen the BJP picking them up more and more. Much of the work among the tribals has been done quietly by the Sangh parivar affiliate, the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram. And the BJP is reaping the benefits of it.
So, then Laloo Prasad Yadav is left with the Yadavs, the Dalits and then the Muslims. This is still considerable support. But the Muslims are turned off by him because like Mulayam Singh Yadav, he can offer them little apart from the security of their lives. Even this they are a little uncertain about since his failure to punish Hindu officers connected with the Bhagalpur riots. in which a large number of Muslims were killed. But, as in UP, they have no one else to go to.
(Souce: The Suriday, 2-6 June, 1996)
