"The recent ruling by the Supreme Court on the Muslim Child's right to maintenance by the father has been widely trumpeted as a departure from the Muslim personal law. However, the Supreme Court's essential ruling is fully in accordance with the Shariat. It has correctly ruled that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is limited to the rights of Muslim divorces and does not cover the rights of children under Muslim Law. It is gratifying to note that the Supreme Court has given this ruling a universal dimension. The objection raised by the Muslim community to Section 125 of Cr.P.C. was basically on account of the definition of 'wife' to include 'divorces'. This was sought to be clarified by the legislature by inserting Section 127(3)(b) but this was ignored by the Supreme Court in the Shah Bano case. This led to the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

In this case the Supreme Court has, however, ruled that the father has to maintain his minor children till they attain majority and in the case of females till they get married, notwithstanding the fact that the minor children are living with divorced wife.

Under the Muslim Personal law, the father may exercise the option of custody, in the case of a son, after the age of 7 and in the case of a daughter, if the mother remarries. This aspect also has been covered by the Supreme Court by leaving it open to the father to seek custody under the relevant laws. In any case, Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. is silent on the question of custody.

Unfortunately there is a tendency to confuse three separate issues: social reform in the Muslim society, the codification of Muslim personal law and the introduction of a uniform civil code - optional or otherwise. Once this confusion is removed, it will be seen that even the much-maligned Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is much more beneficial to Muslim divorces than the common dispensation under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.

Those who would like a uniform civil code to be introduced through the judicial backdoor, must appreciate the bigger issues involved: the sanctity of the principle of the supremacy of the legislature and the violation of the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom."