The cultural, social and religious differences between Hindus and Muslims, their relative economic conditions and the political situation of the country make the Hindu-Muslim fertility differentials a contentious issue. The present Hindu-Muslim fertility and population growth rate differentials are not large and are likely to narrow down in future. If the present growth differentials continue without change over a long period, the question arises whether Muslims can even become a numerically dominant community in a reasonable time span in India. To find whether a minority can become dominant numerically we have simulated a model. This model demonstrates that a minority can become a majority only when three conditions are jointly met: The minority constitutes a significant proportion of the total population, the population growth rate differential is large and the duration is long.

An observation of the Indian scene reveals that the differential annual growth rate of Muslims and Hindus is around 0.005 currently, at national level Muslims constituted only 11.4 percent of India's population (excluding Assam) in 1981 and the pockets in which Muslims constitute 25 per cent or more, whether rural or urban, are few. The model shows that, at the country level, Muslims cannot attain numerical dominance in the near or far future. In certain areas, they may become numerically equal to Hindus after 200 years if the present growth differential persists. But 200 years is a long period of time and already changes are taking place in the country towards a reduction in the difference between Hindu and Muslim growth rates and a convergence of the growth rates.

The Indian census figures for the period 1881 to 1941 show that in 1941, Muslim constituted 24.3 per cent of total population of undivided India and 20 per cent in 1881. Thus over a period of 60 years, the proportion of Muslims in undivided India increased by 4.3 percentage points. This would correspond to an average annual Hindu-Muslim growth differential of 0.0046 over this period. In post-Partition India (excluding the State of Assam where the 1981 Census was not taken), Muslims were 11.4 per cent of the total population in 1981 and in 1951 they were 9.6 per cent. During these 30 years, the percentage of Muslim population had increased by 1.8 and the annual growth differential has been 0.0067. Even if the differential does not decline (an unlikely contingency), Muslims cannot become a dominant group in India in the foreseeable future.

The recent growth differentials between Hindu and Muslim populations show a declining trend. If this trend continues the Hindu-Muslim growth differential may be expected to narrow down in future. Also an analysis of the long term growth differentials between Muslim and non-Muslim populations suggests a narrowing trend in growth differentials.

6.2. Demographic Transition of Different Religious Groups in India

In India, religious groups are undergoing the demographic transition at varying paces. Mortality has declined significantly for all religious groups whereas fertility decline is in different stages.

Parsis with low death and birth rates are already in the final stage of establishing a new demographic equilibrium. The Christian community is reaching this stage. Fertility of urban Hindus too has fallen significantly. Likewise Muslims would reach the final regime of demographic transition with low levels of fertility, mortality and population growth so as to adapt themselves to a modern industrial society.

6.3 Hindu-Muslim Fertility Differentials

There is no data on Indian fertility before 1872. Both Hindu and Muslim fertility behaviour was normative. We have concluded that historically there might have existed no significant fertility differentials between these two communities.

Kingsley Davis examined Hindu-Muslims fertility differentials for the period 1891-1941, using the child-woman ratio as no other fertility rate was available for this period. This was the only study based on census data which showed that Muslim fertility was somewhat higher than Hindu fertility. In the post-Independence period, only from 1971, information on fertility was collected. The fertility data available from the Censuses of 1971 and 1981 show that Muslims had higher fertility than Hindus. In 1971, Muslim fertility exceeded Hindu fertility by 11 per cent in rural areas and by 20 per cent in urban areas. Even when controlled for education, Muslims showed higher fertility than Hindus.According to 1981 Census data the adjusted fertility differential increased to 21 per cent.

A number of fertility surveys were conducted in different parts of the country from 1950 onwards. Religion was one of the variables considered. A review of these survey results reveals that the religious differentials in fertility were not strong upto 1960s. We may conclude that Hindu-Muslim fertility differentials were weak before Independence or even upto late 1960s as the Indian fertility remained at a stable but high level. Increasing Hindu-Muslim fertility differential is a result of fertility decline in India as Hindus have entered the demographic transition earlier.

6.4 Hindu-Muslim Differentials in Nuptiality Patterns

Two major proximate determinants of fertility are nuptiality and contraception. Contraception has an impact on marital fertility level of the population. Socio-economic factors such as education, income and status of woman affect fertility directly, and indirectly by affecting nuptiality patterns and contraception.

Among Hindus in north India, an essential condition for marriage is that the bride and groom should not be blood relatives.. The practice of polygamy is rare. Child and adolescent marriages are also observed. Divorce is rare but becoming more frequent in urban areas. Remarriage of widows and divorcees is not common.

Among Muslims cousin endogamy and group endogamy is practised to some extent.Practice of polygyny is rare among Muslims and there is no evidence that the percentage of polygynous marriages is larger than for Hindus. Child and adolescent marriages are present but less prevalent than for Hindus. Divorce and remarriage of widows and divorcees are present but the extent is not known.

Age at marriage does not differ much between Hindu and Muslim women. In 1981 there was not an appreciable difference in the mean or median age at marriage of Hindu and Muslim women.

The proportion of currently married women in reproductive ages did not differ much between Hindu and Muslim women in 1981. The ratio of currently married to ever married women in 1981 for the two communities, both in urban and rural areas, does not vary much...

Modernization, education and the secular forces are similarly affecting the family system of Hindus and Muslims. Among Indian Muslims, an educated middle class is as yet minuscule and so the Muslim family size and functions continue largely unchanged. On the whole, nuptiality patterns do not adequately account for the differences in fertility except that relatively easier divorce and widow remarriage among Muslims may result in a slightly higher fertility level than for Hindus.

6.5 Hindu-Muslim Differentials in Family Planning

Differences in family planning use between Hindus and Muslims are important in explaining the marital fertility differentials between the two communities.

The first all-India (1970-71) and the second all-India (1980-81) family planning surveys conducted by Operations Research Group, Baroda, found that the ideal number of children was higher, son preference lower and the proportion disapproving family planning was higher for Muslims compared to Hindus. The practice of family planning was lower among Muslims largely due to the relatively low acceptance rate for terminal methods. Between the two surveys the proportion approving and practising family planning had increased but the percentage point increase was greater for Hindus.

Data on sterilization and IUD acceptance for India by religion from official sources from 1968-69 to 1979-80 reveal that family planning practice was proportionately less among Muslims. Terminal methods have been less popular and spacing methods more popular among Muslims as compared to Hindus Some studies have found that the levels of education and socio-economic status have a positive association with family planning practice among both communities.

A lower educational level, lower socio-economic status, lower female work participation and Purdah, besides some degree of opposition on the grounds of religion and less acceptance of sterilization are the main factors accounting for a lower acceptance rate of family planning among Indian Muslims. The resistance to family planning on the grounds of religion is declining among the younger generation of Muslims. Compared to Muslims in most other countries, Muslims in India have relatively higher sterilization and abortion rates.

 6.6 Socio-Economic Conditions and Status of Muslim Woman in India

The family planning programme alone cannot bring about a decline in fertility though it is an important component of a wider spectrum of measures embracing many programmes for ameliorating difficult social and economic conditions. Socio-economic conditions and the status of woman among both Hindus and Muslims have to be improved.

Educationally Muslims are three to four times behind other communities according to some indicators. More than 80 per cent of Muslims are small and marginal farmers, artisans and related workers. The lower status of Muslim woman in India is due to her lower educational level, consequent lower participation in economic and social activities and observance of Purdah. Unless socioeconomic conditions and the status of woman improve among Muslims, their family planning practice will not increase and marital fertility will not fall. Therefore, general welfare programme to raise the socioeconomic status of Muslims should also be emphasized.

6.8 Prospects for Hindu and Muslim Population Stabilization

The family planning programme alone cannot bring about a decline in fertility. Socio-economic conditions, especially of women, among both Hindus and Muslims, have to be improved. Changes in social institutions such as marriage and the status of woman have to be brought about in a sustained and cumulative manner. Then only will all the communities of this pluralistic society complete the demographic transition, attain population stabilization and adapt themselves to technological changes.