The Central government has several options before it in Kashmir. One is simply to ignore the resolution passed by the State Assembly (on) autonomy ... A better one is to accept the principle of autonomy but refuse to take any action on the State Assembly's resolution till the report has been discussed in a wider forum of representatives from all parts of Kashmir. But for reasons explained below the simplest and best course will be to announce that the Centre will only take cognizance of the report when it has been endorsed by a freshly elected Kashmir Assembly and government.
The one thing it must not do is to change the status of J&K on the basis of a resolution passed by a National Conference Government in its fourth year in office, when its popularity is perceptibly on the decline. The reason is not what many Indians fear - that this could start a domino effect that would further weaken the Centre and bring the country closer to disintegration. If India stays united it is for powerful reasons - reasons that, incidentally, apply to Kashmir as well. The autonomy resolution is neither inherently unreasonable nor ultra vires of the India constitution.
All it involves is restoring an Article of the Constitution (Article 370, which gave a special status to Kashmir), and not changing it to weaken its existing federal features. But the NC no longer has the moral authority to demand such a major change. It fought the 1996 elections squarely on the issue of a return to the pre-1953 situation in Kashmir. Almost 50 per cent of the people of J&K cast their vote in that election. In view of the Hurriyat's boycott and the militants' threats this was a pretty high turnout.
But no sooner had. the party come to power than autonomy' suddenly lost its urgency. Dr. Abdullah conveniently forgot that ... his father, Sheikh Abdullah, had gone through all the extensions of Central jurisdiction to Kashmir since he was imprisoned, in the weeks before he came back to power in 1975 and had been unhappy with only two enactments - the one extending Article 356, which vests the right to dismiss the State government with the President of India, to Kashmir, and one that gave took away the right to elect the governor of the State (Sadr-e Riyasat) from the Kashmir Assembly and vested it with the President.
Had he been serious about living up to his promise of autonomy, he would have taken up these two issues with the Centre within days of coming to power. But he did no such thing. In December 1996, in response to a direct query, Satish Chandran, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Deve Gowda, told me that Delhi had been waiting for Abdullah's proposals and was prepared to go to virtually any length to accommodate him, but had heard nothing. Instead, Dr Abdullah set up the Autonomy Committee to go into the finer issues of how to safeguard further the autonomy of the various regions of Kashmir in relation to each other.
The Committee took three years to perform its task, . Dr Abdullah chose to table the report only when the NC began to feel seriously threatened, first by its own sliding popularity and then by New Delhi's willingness to hold peace talks with the leaders of Hurriyat.
The decline in its popularity is not entirely the NC's fault ... Niggardliness by Delhi in releasing funds to the State government and writing off security related expenses, (as Prime Minister Inder Gujral did for Punjab), and inordinate delays by the Planning Commission in releasing even the Plan funds ... have frustrated Dr Abdullah's efforts to consolidate his support base through development spending.
The continued incursion of terrorists and ... militants from Pakistan has made it impossible to reduce the military presence in the Valley and Jammu. This has led to a steady trickle of human rights violations, made all the worse by the fact that most of the excesses have been committed by the Special Operations Group of Kashmir's own Police. Add to this the normal quota of corruption and nepotism .... and Dr. Abdullah's whimsical style of government, and all the cards have been stacked against the party.
Autonomy was its ace in the hole. When Delhi began to mutter about talking to the Hurriyat, the NC decided to play it. In any other State this would have been normal, indeed astute politics. But in Kashmir it spells disaster. If the NC Government is allowed to appropriate the autonomy platform for itself, the Hurriyat will be left with no option but to harden its demand for cither full independence for Kashmir or the status of an international protectorate. Thus, if New Delhi accepts the NC's demand it will play into Pakistan's hands.
... As Kashmiris look for an alternative to the NC, the pressure on the Hurriyat to enter into talks that can end the internal strife in Kashmir is rising steadily ...
To them talks between Hurriyat and New Delhi are a beacon in the darkness ... Farooq's ... MLAs know that the Hurriyat is responding to the pressure from the Kashmiri people. The real meaning of the NC's move is that peace is possible in Kashmir. All Advani has to do to is set the ball rolling, turn (his) back on the NC and announce that he is willing to hold talks without pre-conditions with the Hurriyat leaders.
In the coming days, as Delhi 'considers' the J&K Assembly resolution, the NC is likely to turn up the pressure upon it. Its MLAs will make more and more seditious statements as they pose as the real champions of Kashmiri 'independence'. They may exhort Dr Abdullah to break his links with the NDA. Dr Abdullah will beg the Prime Minister to make some concessions that will save him from his awful dilemma. If Vajpayee caves in, the Hurriyat will up the ante to full independence.
The 31,000 dormant militants in the Valley and Jammu will in all probability support them and become active once again. They may then strike a Faustian pact with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Lashkar ... Only a firm refusal to discuss so important a subject with a four-year-old government whose popularity is on the wane, can arrest the slide into this abyss. (Source: The Hindustan Times, 30 June, 2000)
