(An) exceptional synergy has developed between two processes in this society: the hardening of a rabidly anti-Pakistani sentiment among policy-makers and shapers, itself duly reflected in the Indian media; and secondly, the growing takeover of the security discourses in India by rank communalists.
One only has to browse through Organiser and Panchajanya to find evidence for the second process and see how pathologically obsessed the Sangh Parivar is with nuclearism. And even a cursory glance at the thoughtless anti-Pakistan pronouncements of most of India's strategic affairs "experts" should convince one of the first process. Usually, the "experts" provide "secular" grist - of the anti-Pakistan, even seemingly anti-imperialist", variety - to the communalists' mill. Typically, they. suppress the link between ethnic exclusivism and jingoistic nationalism. Remarkably, none of them speaks out against the communal inspiration behind the BJP's nuclear policy ... Only very rarely the ideological-political continuum between nuclearism and communal nationalism comes into full evidence.
This has now happened. Under the combined influence of the Pakistan-bashing by the security 'experts', the Sangh Parivar's viciously anti-Muslim agenda, and the "proactive" policy pursued since January 17. in Kashmir, there is a real danger that India and Pakistan will move towards another military . confrontation ... Clinton's overtures to New Delhi, his hyperbolic statements about Indo-US "strategic partnership", and his tough talking in Islamabad, have generated a terrible smugness which can only aggravate matters further.
Amidst this comes India's forceful rejection of Pakistan's March 30 formal offer of unconditional resumption of talks, at any time, any place, any level – the first such offer since the October 12, 1999 coup. In response, New Delhi only reiterated its condition of "cessation of Pakistan's cross-border terrorism" ... It also added another condition: namely, that Pakistan abandon its "vicious propaganda". And for good measure, it wants the dialogue to be "composite", that it, include seven unresolved issues, besides Kashmir.
This is the toughest anti-Pakistan posture adopted in peacetime by an Indian government, just when India- Pakistan diplomatic relations plumb the abyss. The content of their mutual exchanges- "loudspeaker diplomacy" of abuse and bellicosity - has never fallen to a iower level. Nor has public apathy ... Vajpayee casually delivers a serious threat (at Jalandhar, February 5) to Pakistan that India sNo First Use policy does not mean that "we'll wait and watch while Pakistan destroys us with its nuclear wapons ... " And George Fernandes recklessly advocates the doctrine of "limited war", which India can fight and win "at a time and place of Pakistan's choosing". But few people raise an alarm.
New Delhi is more to blame than. Islamabad for this unacceptable situation. Not only has it used tougher and more reckless language, but it has done so sanctimoniously on "principled" grounds – opposing military rule - when in reality it has routinely broken bread with a range of military rulers. This is not to claim that Pakistan does not support militant groups in Kashmir. Many of its policy-makers lack a rational, unobsessed view of the Kashmir problem. But such support, going by India's allegations and other evidence, is not new. Nor has it been greatly stepped up post-Kargil ...
The reason for India's refusal to engage, even properly recognise, the Musharraf regime has more to do with its pique over Kargil ... embarrassment at its own mishandling of the Kandahar hijacking, and its growing fears over the rapidly deteriorating situation in Kashmir, for which it expediently blames "cross-border terrorism". This last is itself related to two factors: the Central and State governments' ineptitude, which has increased popular alienation in the valley, reviving the militancy, and the larger reordering of US-India-Pakistan relation., which Clinton's visit carried forward and formalised. New Delhi's effective alignment with the US has given it a certain false confidence that it can counter international pressure on human rights violations in the valley and thus operate with a virtual licence to commit excesses against the civilian population to crush the militancy.
That is the precise meaning of the "pro-active policy" launched three months ago ... This strategy has led to the harassment of innocent civilians through intensive cordon-and-search operations, disruption of economic activity, "collective punishment" of villages, and increasing "disappearances". In effects were demonstrated on March 25 when the security forces gunned down five men in Anantnag district, claiming that they wee militants responsible for the Chittisinghpura massacre. This caused a huge uproar. Local residents charged that the five were not militants, but innocent civilians. (A judicial magistrate has ordered a full inquiry). A series of bandhs and demonstrations followed. Then, on April 3, a Special Operation Group unit, composed of (typically criminalised "surrendered militants"), opened fire on a peaceful march, killing seven-people. This has outraged the public in the valley.
Clearly the "pro-active" strategy has failed to contain the militancy ... By all indications, the number and level of activity of the militants have increased, with audacious attacks being made on army units. The ordinary people's
