In 1998 General Election, the Muslim Indian noted to his dismay that neither in the Congress, nor in the UF or LF, nor in any of the other secular parties, a Muslim face was to be seen at the policy-and-decision making level, that no secular party fielded adequate number of Muslim candidates in all, or even from the so-called Muslim concentration constituencies, and that many of those nominated for the record were unknown characters and unlikely to win, that the secular parties have also taken care not to put up as candidates Muslim Indians, whom the leadership may find it difficult to control or manage. Thus generally 'wrong' Muslim have been put up from 'wrong' constituencies. Muslim Indians have once again less than 5.4% representation in the Lok Sabha, 28 in all and that too from only 8 States/UTs, a Deprivation Rate of nearly 60% and find that they are virtually without any effective presence in the Lok Sabha.
Even an analysis of the Manifestos of the secular parties shows that Muslim problems and issues of Muslim concern have been glossed over. It must be added to the credit of the INC (even though many accuse it of hypocrisy) that its manifesto gives maximum expression to Muslim aspirations. Even so, on the question of Babari Masjid, having apologised for its government failing to prevent its destruction the Congress Manifesto fails to state what it propose to do to undo the illegalities - the occupation and the demolition and the construction of a temporary mandir on the site.
Muslim Indians stand marginalised politically, indeed they stand outside the political arena. But even if they are not subject of politics, with 1/8 of the population, they continue to be its object. In 1998, they have moved a step or two towards tactical voting constituency-wise, for the strongest candidate of a secular party or the other. Had there been an alliance or adjustment among the secular parties and had the secular party, assigned a Muslim concentration constituency, fielded a suitable Muslim candidate, the division of secular votes (including the Muslim votes) would have been avoided. This would have added substantially to the strength of the secular forces in the Lok Sabha. As it is, the BJP and its allies have won, ironically, most of the Muslim concentration seats in the country. Unless there is a secular alliance or a strong secular party emerges which is equally strong all over the country, both of which appear to be impossible in the foreseeable future, or unless all secular parties enter into a limited understanding with each other on Muslim concentration seats and permit each other to field one Muslim candidate in each of them or alternatively unless the Muslim Indians evolve a political command - it may not be a political party - which commands the confidence of the entire community, which negotiates with the secular parties on their policy, programme and candidatures, specially in respect of the constituencies of Muslim concentration, the Muslim Indian shall remain a politically deprived, under-represented community, with all its dire consequences for the Nation and for themselves.
The General Election, 1998, has once again resulted in a hung Parliament and in a fractured mandate but with the BJP and its allies as the largest formation. They have formed the central government but it will neither be stable nor durable. For one thing, the BJP and its allies may not reach the magic figure of 273; they are presently struck at 264. Supposing the TDP sticks to its stance of neutrality and its new-found ideology of 'equidistance between the secular and the Hindutva formation', that will give it what Pramod Mahajan has called a 'working majority'. In the likely event of all constituent parties, 17 in all, and the independents participating in the Government, this will give the Vajpayee government not only a safe-passage across the vote of confidence barrier but a lease of life of reasonable duration but if some of them like the TC of West Bengal and the BJD of Orissa choose to stay out and extend support from outside, the stability and durability, longevity and credibility of the Vajpayee government will be as doubtful as his own popularity and ability are not. Every party, nay, every legislator, independent or belonging to a party with strength of 3 or less, shall have a veto and make increasing demand on the central government, whatever the National Agenda.
Already rumblings are audible within the Sangh Parivar and who knows the hard core of the Sangh Parivar may find it a matter of conscience to pressurize the Vajpayee government to throw up the towel or even have itself voted out, rather than permit its ideology and its true vision of Hindu India be sullied or eroded. It is argued that since the BJP has dropped Muslim-baiting as a political tactic and jettisoned, some of its old favourites - the construction of Ram Janambhoomi Mandir on the Babari Masjid site, the introduction of a uniform civil code and the deletion of Article 370 of the Constitution it now belongs to the mainstream. Such tactical reversal to relieve the pangs of secular conscience troubling the Samata Party, the BJD, the Shiromani Akali Dal, the AIADMK etc. should not be a matter of comfort and happiness or satisfaction to the secular forces. As Bhandari, the Vice President of the BJP and a Pracharak of the RSS since 1946, stated in a TV interview, these objectives have not been abandoned; they have been put on the back-burner to accommodate and take the allies along, form the government and implement other important objectives and policies enshrined in its Manifesto. The underlying idea is that if, by virtue of its performance in office, the BJP will secure a majority of its own in the next round, then these 'abandoned' objectives can be taken up and implemented. Thus it is clear that while the BJP may have changed its 'chehra' and 'chal' there is no change either in its 'chintan' or 'charitra'. The BJP as the political front of the RSS remains wedded to the concepts of Hindutva, of Cultural Nationalism, of Hindu Nationalism; the leopard has not changed its spots, whatever the allies may like to believe and try to make others believe.
The BJP is not living in a dream world; nor its aging leaders - long steeled in the fire of struggle fcr a cause - have become power hungry. Nor are they practicing real politic, as in UP and may be later in the Centre, merely to capture and stay in power by inducing splits and defections in other parties, by offering ministership as the price and by admitting criminals to their ranks, by cohabiting with the corrupt, without a hidden agenda.
The hidden agenda has always been the real agenda since their first induction into the power structure in 1977 and they have learnt that one day in power is more valuable than a year in the wilderness to promote the Cause, and even to compromise the innocent so that they can never leave the charmed circle without a visible mark of recognition, with the consciousness that having supped with the devil, they have found it tasteful.
Let me make one more point: In adopting the tactical retreat on the ideological front, the BJP has indeed taken to politics of deception; it stands convicted of having deceived and betrayed those who voted for it in 1998 on the basis of its manifesto. Secondly, it has launched Operation Deception to secure the 'honourable' support of many of its allies who have perhaps willingly entered the parlour, knowing what it entails and acquiesced in playing the role assigned to them, with a 'clear conscience' through the device of 'National Agenda The BJP will also be deceiving the electorate in the next election, which, as V.P. Singh pointed out, may be held in not to distant in future, by appealing to them on their record in office but committed to implement what they have apparently abandoned during their term in office.
To placate its willing allies as well as its unwilling core-cadre, the BJP has to practise double-speak which it has mastered. It has gone beyond it; to say one thing in public to its allies and another to political supporters and absolutely another to its core-cadres and to its 'mother' in private. The BJP has indeed made a fine art of the ancient principles of governance; it is using 'sam, dam, dand, bhed' - persuassion, purchase, stick and deceit -all in good cause; each as the situation demands, and as the interlocutor deserves.
No surprise that many people still regard the BJP not a national mainstream party but a political party under the distant control of the RSS which has a 'civilising' mission and which is prepared to work and wait for the new dawn. No surprise that some people still consider the BJP as essentially anti-democratic, semi-fascist, anti- secular and communal, narrow-minded, revanchist, chauvinist and obscurantist, committed to Hindu Rashtra and Brahminwad.
The 'Hidden Agenda' of the BJP is the total Hinduisation of the Indian society and polity – the assimilation of all non-Hindu religious identities, the submergence of all linguistic and cultural diversities, the transformation of the Indian State into a Hindu state.
Hinduisation of the Indian state and society will be achieved not by declaration of India as a Hindu state but by gradual and steady subversion of secular norms, by introduction of Hindu symbols, by re-writing of the textbooks, by elimination of Urdu from the school system, by non-recognition of minority institutions, by depriving non-Hindu from due and proportionate share in distribution of investment inputs and the output of development process, by limiting their representation in the legislatures, the judiciary and the executive, by applying majoritarian pressures through the administrative machinery on non-Hindu masses, by utilising official mass media for the propagation of Hindu religion and culture and for brain washing of the people, specially the young.
This explains why, despite the protestations of loud- mouths like Katiyar or Singhal or even Uma Bharati, behind the scene there is a meeting of mind between the RSS hierarchy and the BJP leadership. First they form the government, make the necessary concessions, even take U-turns, then they use state power to change the shape and order of things gradually and steadily. After all in a developing society, the state is the most effective instrument of change and pressure through its financial resources and control of intelligence, education and information and the bureaucracy. That is why the Vajpayee government will hold or to the Ministries of Finance, Home, Education, Information and Broadcasting.
The Vajpayee government would have served its purpose, as the 1977-79 record of integration of the erstwhile BJS in JP and participation. in the JP government shows, if it succeeds in infiltrating the administration and the judicial machinery and the mass media and the security forces, in placing its trusted people in critical positions, in giving a majoritarian and communal twist to school education, in Hinduising Muslim children through the introduction of worship of Bharat Mata, Ishwar Vandana, Sanskrit and 'moral' instruction, by widening the gap between the educational and economic level of the Muslim Indians and most of the people, by psychologically conditioning them into docile surrender to the seemingly unstoppable wave of Hindutva. Thus they would have promoted the RSS vision, even if, after a year or two, when the contradiction between the BJP and its allies become unmanageable they demit office. The foundations built will remain to be further built upon by their sympathisers within the administration and in the rank of their successors, till they win the 'final' and take charge of the country, with no one to stand in their way.
New Delhi,
1 April, 1998
