NATIONAL POLITICS

Tactical Voting by Muslims in UP Elections, 1996

Paul R. Brass on General Elections 1996 in Uttar Pradesh

The exit poll and (an) MLA's remarks suggest that Muslims in UP did not follow the tactical voting strategy recommended by Syed Shahabuddin who, for many years, has been advising Muslims to adopt a three-pronged strategy. First, they should be sure to demonstrate their importance by voting. Second, they should avoid dividing their votes, especially for "little parties speaking in the name of Muslims and Islam and what not". Third, they should unite in any constituency where there is a BJP, candidate behind the party that appears to have the best chance of defeating the BJP.

This strategy also implies that the aggregate Muslim vote should be divided in the state as a whole, with the Muslims uniting in some constituencies behind the SP, in others behind the BSP or the Congress. In the absence of a constituency-by-constituency analysis, it cannot be said unequivocally that the Muslims did or did not follow the Shahabuddin strategy, especially since the Congress was rarely in a position to hold forth as the best bet against the BJP. All that can be said for certain is that Muslims voted overwhelmingly for the SP and its allies in the UF - that is, the JD and the Congress(T) – in the Lok Sabha elections and that very few Muslims voted for the Congress. Moreover, estimates of the projected Muslim votes for the principal political parties in the succeeding legislative assembly elections indicated that Muslims intended to vote overwhelmingly for the SP and that hardly any intended to vote for either the BSP or the Congress. It is no doubt true that the antipathy of Muslims to the Congress and their identification with Mulayam Singh Yadav in UP emerged largely as a consequence of the different stances of these parties and leaders to the dispute over the mosque in Ayodhya and that what has followed from it is a considerable polarisation of upper caste Hindu and Muslim voting. However, it is a mistake to interpret either Muslim or upper caste voting exclusively in these terms. On the contrary, as I have previously pointed out, the switch of upper castes and many jats from Congress to the BJP has had as much to do with the Mandal controversy - that is, with the fear of loss of privileges or failure to gain access to privileges - as with the Babari Masjid-Ram Janmabhumi issue. Muslim response to Mulayam is (that) Mulayam - and whatever party with which he is associated - who has done something for Muslims.

On both sides of this communal divide, therefore, we see something completely secular: the material and physical concerns of people about their and their children's life chances, security and general well-being. In this respect, what has followed for Muslims in the aftermath of Ayodhya is integration into the political process in the same manner as for other groups, through the scramble for advantage, preference, and favour. For Muslims to follow the Shahabuddin strategy, therefore, is to move in a different direction: towards isolation from the political process through the acting out of a negative strategy in a narrow focus upon the communal issue, thereby feeding into the BJP design to polarise voters around communal antagonisms, to single out and separate Muslims from all political parties, and thereby to nullify Muslim political effectiveness.

(Source: The Economic and Political Weekly, 20 September, 1997)

Shahabuddin's Letter to The Economic and Political Weekly, 25 October, 1997

Prof. Paul R. Brass has made a reference to the tactical voting strategy proposed by me to the Muslim community in his article "General Elections, 1996 in Uttar Pradesh (September 20, 1997). He has correctly indicated that the proposed strategy has to be operationalised at the constituency level, particularly in those constituencies where the Muslim voters are in a position to influence the result. Prof. Brass has himself stated that "in the absence of a constituency-by-constituency analysis, it cannot be said unequivocally that the Muslims did or did not follow the Shahabuddin strategy". Yet without any analysis, he approvingly quotes an MLA's remarks and the results of the exit poll to conclude that Muslims in UP did not follow this strategy. He also seems to feel that this strategy was formulated with the Congress in mind.

Even if the conclusion that the Muslims voted overwhelmingly for the SP and its allies in the UP, is correct as it appears to be, their voting pattern in Muslim-concentration Constituencies (say 25% and above of the electorate) can be discussed only by co-relating their "united and massive" voting and the party affiliation of the candidates who won. Their total support for the SP in a given constituency may be partly due to the SP's wisdom in putting up a strong candidate (if a Muslim, one generally acceptable to the Muslim voters; if a non-Muslim, one with a generally secular track record coupled with his own strong social base). The BSP bluffed Muslims once by giving half its tickets to Muslim candidates, who were generally put up with a view not to win but to drain away some Muslim votes into its 4 Percent target to fulfill the recognition criterion. This divided the Muslim votes and made them ineffective in some constituencies. Only a Constituency-by- Constituency analysis of Muslim voting pattern in Muslim concentration constituencies will indicate whether the Muslim support was instrumental in the victory of the winner and the party to which he belonged.

The strategy does cover the situation, as obtains statewide in Maharashtra, Gujarat, MP, Rajasthan, Haryana and Delhi where the only effective anti-BJP force generally is the Congress. In that event, despite Narasimha Rao and Ayodhya, the Muslim votes has no option but to support the Congress, except in isolated constituencies where a non-Congress candidate, by virtue of his social base and personal standing and record, appears to be the strongest to take the field against the BJP and its allies. In a given constituency, the Muslim voters and the Muslim-supported candidate will undoubtedly rationalise their choice or their victory on the basis of 'something' which the winner and his party have done for them. This is the way of politics.

Assuming that there was a secular alliance and there was only one notable candidate against the BJP in a constituency, the Muslim votes will definitely go to him, irrespective of his religion, caste or party label.

I do not understand how Prof. Brass sees "tactical voting" as dissociation from the political or the electoral process or as a negative strategy to separate Muslims from all political parties or as nullification of their political effectiveness. What it does is to make the Muslim community use its vote to achieve a political objective, defined in the interest of the country and the community, as he sees it, without making any absolute, total or irreversible commitment to any one secular party There are many practical difficulties in fine-tuning their electoral response to allow for variation from one constituency and the next, but if indeed operationalised, the strategy will, far from nullifying the political effectiveness, shall reinforce it and transform them from a passive object to an active subject of the political and electoral process. Indeed, either the secular parties will then stop under-cutting each other in Muslim concentration constituencies or vie with each other in putting up strong candidates, acceptable to the Muslim voters. And the Muslim votes in UP have long proved that they do not vote for Muslim parties or even for Muslim candidates but for secular parties and will continue to do so.

Milli Jamhoori Mahaz, Delhi, 18 September, 1997

A joint meeting of the Indian Union Muslim League, All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and All India Muslim Majlis was held in Delhi on Wednesday, 17 September, 1997. Those who attended the meeting included Mr. G.M. Banatwala, MP and President, Indian Union Muslim League; Mr. Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi, MP and President, Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen; Mr. Mohamed Samiullah, President, All India Muslim Majlis and Mr. E. Ahamed, MP.

The Meeting expressed serious concern over the growing strength of the anti-democratic and anti-secular Hindutva forces. These forces pose an increasing threat to democratic and secular polity of the country. The Meeting also expressed its deep disappointment and dismay at the lack of effective efforts by the various political parties to face the fascist forces as to promote an equitable society with justice to all the sections of the multiple society and particularly the Muslims.

The three parties decided to come together in a political front under the name and style of "Milli Jamhoori Mahaz" to protect secular democracy, safeguard minority rights, defend cultural pluralism, promote communal amity and national unity and to work for the balanced development with justice to all sections, particularly the Muslims.

The Meeting set up a Steering Committee of the Milli Jamhoori Mahaz under the chairmanship of Mr. Banatwala. The Steering Committee will include Mr. Owaisi, Mr. Samiullah and three members from each of the constituent parties.

G.M. Banatwala Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi Mohamed Samiullah

Asghar Ali Engineer On Shia-Sunni Reconciliation

The Shia-Sunni problem  has festered in the subcontinent since it flared up in Lucknow in the beginning of this century. The dispute essentially relates to what is called tabarra and madh-e-sahabah. What is tabarra and what is madh-e-sahabah ?.

The Shias  consider the companions who became the (first three Caliphs) as 'usurpers' and curse them. This cursing is called tabarra. The Sunnis, on the other hand, (uphold and praise them) This praise of the Companions is called madh-e-sahabah. Lucknow and some areas of UP have a large population of Shia Muslims. This dispute flared up in 1905 due to provocative speeches delivered by Maulana Abdus Shakur, a Sunni Alim, on one hand, and Maulana Maqbul Ahmad, a Shia Alim, on the other.

It was on the 10th day of Muharram that Prophet's grandson Hazrat Imam Husain was martyred in Karbala. Both Shia and Sunni Muslims solemnly observe and mourn the tragedy on that day. The Sunnis began reciting madh-e-sahaba and the Shias, in retaliation began reciting tabarra. There were quarrels on this question in 1907-8, and in 1909 a ban was imposed on madh-e-sahabah. But the Shias continued to recite tabarra. When Govind Ballabh Pant (was the Prime Minister of UP) the Sunnis (got) permission to take out their procession and recite madh-e-sahabah and they got it on March 30, 1939. The Shias continued to recite tabarra and there were violent clashes in 1940. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad intervened and persuaded the Sunnis not to recite madh-e-sahabah. It again took a serious form in 1969 when the then chief minister C.B. Gupta persuaded both the sides to observe restraint. Both sides complied. But violent clashes broke out between the parties in 1974 when the Shia procession was attacked. The then chief minister H.N. Bahuguna appointed a commission of inquiry.

But the dispute could not be sorted out as both sides stuck to their respective demands. The Janata Party government in 1977 also could not sort out the problem. The matter went to the extent of police firing and both processions were banned. For more than 20 years no processions have been permitted either by Sunnis or Shias.

In 1983 the SC ordered that the administration should bring the two parties together, hear them and find some way out, if possible. But nothing has happened so far. 2 Shia youths committed suicide recently by burning themselves. Several parts of old Lucknow came under curfew. In Mumbai, too, the Bohra High Priest Syedna Md. Burhanuddin recited tabarra in 1988 on a public address system provoking strong reaction among the Sunnis. Riots broke out. The High Priest had to tender a public apology in the presence of the then CM Sharad Pawar. The disturbance subsided after two days of violence. It must be asserted here that the moderate sections of both the communities would like to see the dispute resolved in a spirit of reconciliation.

There is great need for an ecumenical movement in Islam.                                                  

 (Source: The Times of India, 20 August, 1997)