Cordiality and respectful attention greeted my group of five retired Indian diplomats in the media, at political meetings and social gatherings, in artistic and academic circles, and in private homes in Islamabad and Lahore between July 31 and August 7. At the people's level there is widespread desire for peace and friendship with India, strong feelings on the Kashmir question in some quarters notwithstanding.
Perhaps there is growing awareness of a new trajectory of risk inherent in relentless tension and conflict between two nuclear-armed neighbours. They want the nuclear menace contained through cooperative management of mutual deterrence. They want resumption of dialogue with India to avert the danger of war.
We freely aired our view that terrorist violence would not lead to a solution of the complex Kashmir problem and India will not be coerced into talks under threat of violence. This was not contested, and few gave credence to the myth propagated by Islamabad—that Pakistan's support for the "Kashmiri's struggle" is merely moral, political and diplomatic. Among thoughtful people there is some worry about the likely effects, on their own society, of their state's sponsorship of violence in its neighbourhood.
The press in Pakistan is free, and eminent intellectuals do, now and then, commend peaceful and pragmatic approaches to the Kashmir problem.
Pakistan's economy is in shambles. There is growing scepticism about the military's ability to restore economic health. Drastic reduction in military expenditure, peace, and multi-faceted economic cooperation with India could help revive the economy, but these options run counter to the jihadist policy of the state authorities.
Jihad organizations, the Jamaat-e-Islami, Harkat, and … Other armed gangs have acquired some street power but little genuine political clout. They are controlled by the ISI and their activities are conducted under its benign gaze.
Despite the numerous madarsas and terrorist training centres scattered across Pakistan, the country's society—with its large aristocratic upper crust, its highly sophisticated elite, and its progressive younger generation—stands in no danger of being Talibanised. Like in India, in Pakistan also, the people, with all their religious and traditional moorings, are in search of a modern future in a fast-changing world.
The military government's performance thus far has been lacklustre, and return to democratic rule is inevitable. It can happen sooner than the three-year period allowed to General Musharraf by the Supreme Court. For one thing, The military's rise to political power was more a case of happenstance than the result of a well-prepared plan. For another reason, the country's problems are too complex to be resolved without popular participation in governance. Besides, General Musharraf, whom I met for an hour on August 7, did not strike me as a man who would truly relish a military dictator's role. For the time being, though, he is firmly in the saddle and enjoys the loyalty and solid support of the armed forces. New political favourites are coming to the fore.
There is a pretty general feeling of envy for India's democracy and the fact that, except for a brief period of the Emergency in the '70s, no crisis of any kind has been allowed to interrupt its unfettered functioning. Civilian control over the armed forces and the latter's willing submission to the civil authorities also evoke much admiration. The quality and calibre of our leaders are favourably commented upon.(Source: The Pioneer, 24 August, 2000)
