KASHMIR SITUATION

Charting Paths to Peace - I

Report on the Visit of an Independent Study Team to India and Pakistan

Sponsored by the Kashmir Study Group, New York

Recommendations

The Findings section of this report revealed how widely divergent are the perceptions of the several parties to the Kashmir dispute in respect to the origin and nature of that dispute as well as in respect to the means of resolving it. That section also revealed the depth of emotion with which the dispute is viewed. It follows, therefore, that the path to a just, viable, enduring peace will be both long and arduous and that progress along this path will require creative compromises by all the concerned parties.

This Recommendations Section of the report expresses the Team's beast collective judgement in regard to such compromises. its focus is on compromises that need to be made immediately or in the near future. It does not present the Team's own blueprint for the long-term future of Jammu and Kashmir. Instead, it urges measures to change the circumstances currently prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir, continuation of which will preclude intelligent planning for the area's future. Tie measures recommended emerge directly from the Team's findings; they are for the most part what thoughtful people the Team spoke with said was required to bring about conditions congenial to serious dialogue among the parties to the dispute. They are premised on the belief that such conditions include commitment by all parties not merely to the peaceful but to the just settlement of the Kashmir dispute, and that a settlement on terms falling short of that will simply not endure.

Following are the Team's specific recommendations.

1. Continuation of Normalization Initiative:

The Team commends the governments of India and Pakistan for embarking in the 50th anniversary year of the Kashmir dispute on an historic and promising initiative to normalize bilateral ties and strongly recommends that they press forward with their effort.

This recommendation is premises on the Team's recognition that the various peoples of Jammu and Kashmir state cannot independently determine their fate and that a "solution" to the Kashmir problem has to be found, to an important extent, in improved India-Pakistan relations. The task ahead is to so alter the relationship between these two states so that the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir can live their lives under more secure conditions while at the same time pressing their claims to dignity and self-determination.

The Team recognizes also the formidable barriers that both governments face as they take steps towards complete normalization, and it recognizes too the obligation laid upon the world community to honour the virtue of patience as the two governments strive to surmount these barriers. At the same time, however, the Team is persuaded that the extraordinary statesmanship, political courage, perseverance and resourcefulness that these two government must now summon in order to succeed in this mammoth task of reconciliation are matched in every respect by the degree to which social, economic, ecological, cultural and political conditions will be enhanced for all who dwell in the region of South Asia once this goal is achieved.

2. Strengthening and Institutionalization of Dialogue:

The Team considers it imperative that the dialogue now underway between India and Pakistan be given as soon as possible a strengthened and protected institutional framework. This means, for the present, arrangement of frequent, scheduled and publicity-free meetings of their official representatives in circumstances insulated from the likely stresses and strains of their relationship.

A major step in this direction has been taken, of course, in the decision by the governments of India and Pakistan in June 1997 to establish a mechanism" including working groups, to address outstanding issues of concern to both sides - indulging Jammu and Kashmir - in an integrated manner.

Over the longer term, however, the objective of overcoming the frailty of the South Asian region's conflict-mediating and conflict-resolving institutions might best be achieved by creating a permanent regional framework along the lines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki model), to be charged with developing rules, techniques and organizational formats for peacekeeping in the South Asian region as well as for conduct of routine discussions over such political and security problems as are represented by the Kashmir dispute. This framework would considerably supplement and reinforce - and, at some point, desirably be expanded and formally linked to - the existing South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

3. Restoration of Normal Civil Life:

The Team believes that progress towards the restoration of normal civil life in Jammu and Kashmir is a vital initial step towards an eventual fair and honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. All parties to the dispute need to commit themselves unreservedly to this objective.

Progress towards the restoration of normal civil life involves, first and foremost, a commitment to the substantial "demilitarization" of the civilian-inhabited areas of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, in other words, to the imposition of significant curbs on and, if possible, termination of the whole array of insurgent and counter-insurgent "military" activity. Demilitarization, as the Team envisions it, must be defined broadly enough to include the use of draconian measures by Indian security forces to combat insurgency, the infiltration of insurgent forces from across the border, activities by insurgent and counter-insurgent groups against unarmed civilian population, and other forms of armed internecine strife The legitimate security needs of both India and Pakistan must, however, be taken into account. Therefore, demilitarization may well need to be phased in over time. What is essential, however, is that it embody the sincere determination of all parties to the dispute to substitute peaceful forms of political contestation in place of violent and coercive ones.

The Team does not believe that the Kashmir talks themselves can realistically be used to negotiate "compliance" with such a commitment. They could, however, arrange for the creation of mechanisms whereby each party to the talks could register with the others what steps it has taken in this regard. The Indians, for instance, could note that they have reduced their forces by a certain amount, or that they have improved the human rights situation by taking such-and-such steps. Such disclosures, there or elsewhere, would go far in persuading doubters in Pakistan (and Kashmir) that the discussions over Kashmir were more than the sterile and ultimately futile exchanges of the past. They should also encourage the Pakistani to carry on with other aspects of the normalization talks since they could rightly claim to their public that at least some substantive movement was taking place on the "core" issue of Kashmir.

Proceeding in this way would undoubtedly involve some risk to all parties. In particular, by asking the Kashmiri separatists to set aside for some time their aspirations either for independence or for accession to Pakistan, these aspirations - and perhaps those who hold them - might become permanently sidelined. Admittedly, this is not a risk against which there can be any iron-clad guarantee. The Team considers these aspirations, no matter how understandable or justifiable they may be, to be largely unrealizable under present circumstances and, hence, not really in greater jeopardy from postponement than they already are from outright repression.

While it was not a requirement of the Team's study mission either to craft or to propose particular institutional or territorial models for applications to Kashmir, it is the Team's judgement that over the longer term the complexities of the Kashmir conflict may require - and almost certainly would benefit from -innovative, even what may now seem radical, experiments in the region's management of its ethnic and religious minorities. Among such experiments, autonomist schemes for devolving maximum political authority to state to sub-state regimes should certainly be closely examined. Nor would the Team rule out from consideration designs of "co-sovereignty", confederalism, or other power-sharing arrangements as have sometimes been proposed for Kashmir. It should be understood, in any event that the Team's seeming short-term embrace of the political status quo and willingness to set aside temporarily the more far-reaching demands of the separatists is an embrace, in fact, of the essential requirements for the restoration of normal civil life and citizen security. Without this, no matter how earnest the advocates of separatist solutions may be, the present intolerable situation in Kashmir will never the transcended.

4. Inclusion of People's Representative in Talks:

At an appropriate time early in the unfolding of normalization talks between India and Pakistan, the Team believes that the political representatives of the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir should be formally and meaningfully included in the negotiations.

The Team is convinced that the process of normalization will not and should not proceed very far without some agreement having been reached among all principal parties to the Kashmir dispute - the Government of India, the Government of Pakistan, and the political representatives of the peoples of both the Indian and the Pakistani-controlled areas of Jammu and Kashmir – in regard to the restoration of normal civil life in the insurgency-troubled state. All of these parties bear some responsibility for the abnormal conditions currently prevailing in the region. All must cooperate to improve them.

Omission of the representatives of the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir from such negotiations risks the probable disassociation of at least some of them from any agreements that might eventually be reached and, thus, would place in jeopardy the popular legitimacy and long-term durability of these agreements. Moreover, decent respect for the principles of self-determination of peoples clearly demands that the principle not be casually dismissed or so distorted by exercise of some political sleight of hand as to permit relegation of the Kashmir dispute once again - its myriad burning issues essentially untouched - to the regional back burner.

5. Broadening of Representation in Talks:

The Team urges that representation of Kashmiris in normalization talks between India and Pakistan should be broadly defined to include not only representatives of the two governments already established in the area - that in Srinagar as well as that in Muzaffarabad - but also representatives of all other major political, regional, ethnic, and religious groups.

Confronted by its own conviction that the "political representatives of the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir" must be included in talks focused on the restoration of civil life in Kashmir, the Team has had to define what it means by that. Meant to be included among such groups, to avoid any misunderstanding, are representatives both of the Kashmiri Muslim-dominated All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference and those of the now largely refugee population of Kashmiri Hindu Pandits. Considering all of the other elements also deserving of representation, this will be an exceedingly diverse assemblage, no doubt, and it will require unusually resourceful institution crafting to manage it effectively. But no other measure, in the Team's judgement, would better ensure the confidence of the Kashmiri people in the ongoing normalization process and their willingness to abide by its outcome.

Determination of appropriate mechanisms both for the fair selection of such representatives and then for joining them to the bilateral India-Pakistan discussions are matters, the Team believes, for the parties themselves to work out.

6. Reduction in Security Forces:

A confidence-building measure to which the Team attaches particular importance would be a significant reduction in the number of security forces that India maintains on internal security duties in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the transfer of these duties to the state's own regular police forces.

It goes without saying that headway towards achieving the objectives set forth in the five recommendations above could not possibly be made without major concessions over Kashmir - or at least a clear indication of willingness to consider them - by the Government of India. The Team is of the view, therefore, that the Government of India should seriously examine and then act to implement so-called confidence-building measures in regard to Kashmir that have been identified by Pakistani and Kashmiris respondents earlier in this report. The most frequent cited of such measures was reduction in the number of security forces in the Valley. As a number of respondents made clear, a "token" force reduction would have little, if any, effect. A massive and unilateral reduction, on the other hand, cannot realistically be expected. What is needed, then, is a phased reduction scaled to symbolize the Government of India's sincerity of intent, with successive force reductions to be undertaken in response to diminutions in insurgent activity and infiltrations across the Line of Control (LOC). The Team believes that India's transfer of internal security duties to irregular forces, such as to the so-called pro-India militants, would in this context be entirely counterproductive.                 

(To be Concluded)

Gandhiji on Kashmir, 5 August, 1947 Authorised Version of Gandhiji's Speech at Wah, August 5, 1947

He also able to see the Maharaja Saheb and the Maharani Saheba and Prime Minister Kak Saheb. He was sorry he was not able to see sheikh Abdullah Saheb, who was undoubtedly the leader of the Kashmiris.

Mahatma Gandhi could say that on August 15, all being well legally the State of Kashmir and Jammu would be independent. But he was sure that the State would not remain in that condition for long after August 15. It had to join either the Union or Pakistan.

Kashmir had predominantly Muslim population. But he saw that Sheikh Saheb had fired the Kashmiris with local patriotism. British paramountcy would terminate on August 15 real paramountcy would then commence. Mahatma Gandhi referred to the paramountcy of the Kashmiris. They had one language, one culture and, so far as he could see, they were one people. He could not distinguish readily between a Kashmiri Hindu and a Kashmiri Mussalman He had no hesitation in saying that the will of the Kashmiris was the supreme law in Kashmir and Jammu. He was glad to say that the Maharaja Saheb and the Maharani Saheba readily acknowledged this fact. He had the good fortune to read what was euphemistically called the Treaty of Amritsar, but which, in reality, was a deed of sale. He supposed it would be dead on August. The seller was the then British Governor-General and Maharaja Gulab Singh. the buyer. The treaty going, would the State revert to the British and, therefore, the England? If to India, to which party?

He held that, without going into the intricacies of law, which he had no right to dilate upon, common sense dictated that the will of the Kashmiris should decide the fate of Kashmir and Jammu. The sooner if was done, the better it was. How the will of the people would be determined was a fair question. He hoped that the question would be decided between the two dominions, the Maharaja Saheb and the Kashmiris. If the four could come to a joint decision, much trouble would be saved. After all Kashmir was a big State. If had the greatest strategic value perhaps in all India. So much for Kashmir".

Fear on the Retreat B.G. Verghese on Restoration of Normalcy

Militancy is by no means over, but is ever more clearly in decline. People want peace and are beginning to search for realisable solutions. Disillusionment with Pakistan is coupled with continuing alienation against the Indian state among significant sections in the Valley.

There are visible signs of the return of normalcy almost everywhere. About 80,000 tourists have been reportedly thronging Gulmarg, especially during weekends. The resumption of work at the HMT, ITI and other plants are also indicative of the new winds. The constant demand for employment and development is being made here as anywhere else. The 115 km Valley railway line between Gazigund and Baramulla is being sought to be completed in 30 months Uri power will light up the Valley by the end of the year. The Border Roads Organisation is being entrusted with a crash programme of reconstructing bridges to restore connectivity in the Valley before the onset of winter. Schools are being rebuilt and other action taken to repair the willful damage over the past seven years.

The earlier announced economic package, reiterated and reinforced by the PM includes upgrading the Jammu-Srinagar national highway, taking up the old Mughal Road, speeding work on the 380 MW Dul Hasti project in Doda, expediting the construction of Kargil airport, the setting up of an agricultural university in Jammu and a convention centre at Leh, a Dal Lake and Jhelum basin development programme with international funding, and more. It was, however, emphasised, that the administration and people must exercise vigilance to ensure that allocated funds are properly spent.

These measures are certainly all to the good. Yet, man does not live by bread alone. Panchayat elections are planned in the autumn. Legislation is in place for a two-tier halqa panchayat and block samiti structure in the first instance and the electoral rolls are under revision. This will underpin the local administration and foster a grievance mechanism and community leadership at the grassroots.

The state and regional autonomy committees would, however, be well advised to proceed rather more expeditiously despite the complexities involved. Promises must be kept and not merely flaunted. "Autonomy" must be debated and fed into the talks with those estranged.

The yearning for peace can be fortified by placing the onus of violating it on militant groups. The J&K police and its specialised limbs are becoming more effective and assuming greater responsibility. It should be possible for the security forces gradually and selectively to thin out, adopt a lower profile and encourage local communities to undertake village and mohalla defence.

Some way must be found to avoid the total administrative, political and social vacuum that follows the durbar move from Srinagar to Jammu and vice versa twice a year. This is an extremely sensitive and volatile issue. Nevertheless it, must be faced sooner or later. Meanwhile, there is no reason shy Srinagar should be a deserted city through the long, bleak winter. With Uri power to light it up, the state and Central governments should plan a series of conferences and events that will keep alive some activity. Fear is beginning to lift in the Valley. This is something to celebrate in Kashmir. (Source: The Times of India, 7 August, 1997)

Shahabuddin's Letter to NCHR, 22 September 1997

As you must have seen in the papers, 11 persons including 7 women lost their lives in Village Arin, Bandipora Tehsil, Distt. Baramulla, J&K when 3 mortar shells hits the house of Abdul Aziz Mir on 18 September 1997. 9 others have been injured and are under treatment. Accusing fingers have been raised against the BJP, the Army and the Rashtriya Rifles. Each is blaming the other .. The State Government has deplored the incident and instituted a magisterial inquiry and announced an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 1 lakh for the next of kin of each person killed

However, even by the standards of violence raging in the Valley since 1990, this is an unprecedented occurrence. There have been many occasions of security forces attacking a human settlement in retaliation for firing on a passing convoy and destroy houses suspected of sheltering militants. But in the cases, there was no excuse - no question of hot pursuit; there was no engagement between the militants and the security forces in the vicinity.

I personally think that such occurrences reflect apathy and disdain for Kashmiri life and property by the security forces in the environment created by long drawn.

JKLF: (Yasin Group)'s Statement On Pakistan's Claim to Kashmir

In the map of Pakistan ... Kashmir has been shown as part of Pakistan includes Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan but it does not indicate that these are disputed areas of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian part of Kashmir has been described as disputed territory.

After seeing the map, as a patriotic Kashmiri, a number of questions arouse in my mind. Does it imply that the rulers of Pakistan want to give an impression to the Pakistani people, Kashmiri patriots and the world that the government of Pakistan has accepted the present line of Control as permanent border and conceded the division of the State as a permanent solution.

Your readers would remember that the present line of control used to be called 'cease file' line which meant that the war had not yet ended but it has been suspended. With the separation of East Pakistan, Government of Pakistan headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutoo signed the Shimla Agreement with Indian Prime Minister according to which Cease Fire Line was changed to Line of Control. At that time the impression was that the Pakistan Government had crucified Kashmir in order to get the army prisoners of Pakistan released and Pakistan area occupied by India vacated.

 It was followed by movement to make Azad Kashmir as fifth province of Pakistan. Gilgit and Baltistan were already directly under the control of Pakistan and the government considers it to be northern part of Pakistan and not part of Kashmir. Though according to law, constitution and history they have always been part of state of Jammu and Kashmir. After partition of the country, the attempts to annexe Kashmir forced the Ruler to accede to India (and) resulted in its division between India and Pakistan. The division has divided many Kashmiri families.

'On what basis Pakistan can treat it as its part'. When did Azad Kashmir accede to Pakistan and which ruler of Azad Kashmir had the right to do so. Similarly, who decided the future of Gilgit and Baltistan'.

Thus Pakistan's case is very weak . Mere occupation does not make right of proprietorship. It involves legal, constitutional and historical factors and it is a matter of future and wishes of the people of the State. According to present legal position, Jammu and Kashmir State is disputed. It is neither part of Pakistan nor of India. Their future has to be decided by the people. The attempts of Pakistan agencies to deprive people of J&K with their basic rights exposed their intentions, and amounts to stabbing at the back the freedom movement of Kashmir. People should protest against it and demand that Pakistan should immediately correct its policy.

Sunil Sethi On Kashmir's Need for Good Governance

The revival of an elected government however slow or hesitant, has had a tremendous impact in the Valley in these twelve months. Life has gradually been seeping back into the town of Kashmir.

About a month ago, in the first tentative step towards withdrawal of troops, the BSF was withdrawn from parts of Anantnag and replaced with companies of the CRPF and J&K Police. This week, the Army announced follow-up action with a phased withdrawal of its forces from five towns, starting with Srinagar, and putting similar replacements in place.

If proof were wanting that the restoration of the political process has brought with it a degree of confidence it is to be seen in such moves.

The sheer physical and psychological relief of a reduced military presence in Kashmir's urban centres signals a freedom from fear. The first signs became visible last winter when substantial numbers of skilled but jobless Kashmiris began to migrate to Jammu in search of seasonal employment.

There have been many such signs of loosening reflexes throughout this year that indicate a rapid change in mood since 1989 when central rule was imposed.

This summer half a dozen hotels have reopened their doors and the bazaars are open till long after dark.

On Sundays the Mughal gardens by the Dal Lake throng with thousands of picnickers.

There is even talk of the cinema houses throwing open their doors and the video libraries, once "banned" have long been back in business.

Although Kashmir's main towns have mostly been flushed out of militants and the J&K police to some extent revitalised, neither has terrorist violence been eliminated nor feelings of alienation and discontent wiped out.

An anti-India mood is still perceptible. However an elected government is answerable to people's grievances and responsible for day-to-day governance.

What Kashmiri's now need is better governance. Not the army's presence. This is the moment that Farooq Abdullah National Conference's must seize as a turning point.                           

 (Source: The Times of India, 11 October, 1997)

My struggle is for self-determination and not pre- determination. In working for a world order free from exploitation and strife, I need your help. Please help me fight injustices, social, political, regional, racial, religious and ethnic.                   

- Shabir Shah, APHC Leader