KASHMIR SITUATION
Rahul Bedi on Kashmir Situation
In Kashmir's cynical, unending cycle of violence which the security forces claim to have brought down to "acceptable levels" to make parliamentary elections possible, a complex and deadly game of Chinese whispers is being played out. On one side in this highly complex charade are the Army and its surrogate, the Rashtriya Rifles, the BSF, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and, to a limited extent, the local police. Ranged alongside are the state-sponsored "renegade militants" or "friendlies": Kashmir's new messiahs and solution-in- making to the 49-year-old crisis.
Pitted against them are Mujahideens from various tanzeems or militant organizations fighting a civil war for over six years for an Islamic homeland, sponsored Pakistan.
In the early years of militancy, the situation was as straight as it can possibly be. The separatist civil war nurtured by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence had to be won... New Delhi's only Indian in Kashmir was the deposed Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, but, sadly, living in South-end-on-Sea in England. Everyone else was either for azaadi or for joining Pakistan, but none were for perpetuating Kashmir's union with India.
But the security forces and the intelligence agencies decided to attempt what had disastrously been tried out in Punjab at the height of Sikh militancy. They "adopted" militants, raising the Ikhwan or Muslim Brotherhood militia, a gaggle of former Mujahideens, and provided them logistic support to "liberate" numerous "occupied" zones across the Kashmir valley. Sponsored by the Rashtriya Rifles, the Ikhwans were covertly also supported by them as candidates in the recently concluded parliamentary elections.
The Ikhwan militia were the only ones openly flaunting their arms around the Kashmir valley. Kuka Parrey is the second important Indian after Abdullah that the authorities have found in Kashmir and are "running" him and his newly-formed Awami League party for all its worth... In short, the State sees Parrey and his men ruling. If the Congress could still take advantage of the Kashmir, officially.
The bottom line, however, unpalatable to Indian officials, is that Kashmir remains disputed territory and it cannot be peaceful until the issue is resolved with Pakistan. Several UN resolutions say as much; so does the Shimla Agreement and so do millions of Kashmiris, however little they count. In short, if Kashmir was not disputed, hysterical statements by federal leaders, constantly reiterating their ownership and the sanguinary conditions prevailing there today would simply not exist. It is also a reality that while India is defensive over Kashmir, Pakistan simply sits back, fuels terrorism and watches New Delhi squirm.
Accepted wisdom has it that all territorial disputes
anywhere are ultimately resolved through negotiation, and Kashmir ultimately will be no exception.
It is obvious that despite all its posturing, the federal Government has no effective strategy to deal either with Kashmir and, by extension, with Pakistan over the dispute, other than feeling "aggrieved" by crying foul whenever Islamabad mischievously mentions Kashmir in international fora, and despatching diplomats to win pyrrhic victories at the UN. India has followed no tangible policy to sort out Kashmir since it erupted in 1989.
To openly stress that Kashmir is disputed and hence needs to be settled is to stand accused of being anti- national. To suggest that we should diplomatically call Pakistan's bluff over Kashmir on a variety of issues is an invitation for further abuse.
Successive governments maintain the military today is the only force disciplined and capable of maintaining peace. Officials openly admit that the civil law enforcement structure, including pars-military units, is either too weak, "aligned" or "battle fatigued" to ensure peace.
(Source: The Pioneer, 1 June, 1996)
The Kashmir Outcome
Editorial, The Hindustan Times, 4 June, 1996
The somewhat surprising victory of the Congress in J&K, which has bagged all the four seats for which results had been declared, must in part be seen as a tribute to the shortsightedness and opportunism of the National Conference in choosing not to participate in this election. The very fact that the Congress could walk away with the Srinagar and Baramulla seats showed that there was so much space waiting to be filled in the political vacuum created in the Valley through the seven- year rule of the militant's gun. The unprecedentedly large number of candidates also confirmed the pent-up desire of the people for the return of the political process.
If the Congress could still take advantage of the changing public mood the National Conference might have done even better.
The National Conference decision could have been. guided by two motives. First, to enlarge its constituency support among the followers of the militant groups who had called for a boycott of the elections. Second, to pressurize the Centre to offer it an economic and political package that would give the party a head-start in any electoral race. The National Conference would be better advised to contest the forthcoming State Assembly elections, establish its representative character and then argue in favor of whatever 'package' it has in mind. Wanting it otherwise would amount to putting the cart before the horse.
