KASHMIR SITUATION
Ajit Bhattacharjee on Kashmir Situation
More than six years of insurgency and counter- insurgency has left its grim mark on Kashmir. Killings, rapes, abductions, torture, have been commonplace. Insurgents have paralyzed normal life by burning bridges, schools and public buildings, and by threatening to kill anyone who fails to go along. Some are criminal groups, led by foreigners. The security forces have responded with harsh searches, occasionally providing opportunities for molestation and theft, in which suspect is taken away and interrogated; something he fails to return or his corpse is discovered elsewhere.
Winning the hearts and minds of the people has been given the lowest priority by the insurgents as well as the security forces. Fear is the primary weapon to gain dominance. Casualties have been heavy; some 40,000 according to the insurgents. More than 6,500 of them have been killed, according to official sources. The extent of violence can be gauged from the fact that in six years, the toll has overtaken and far exceeded casualties in the quarter century old insurgency in Northern Ireland. it continues to be pushed higher every day.
It is against this background that the latest proposal for unconditional talks, without the participation of Pakistan, by four Kashmiri militant leaders must be evaluated. Such an offer by leading figures in what were once hardline militant organizations - Hizbul Mujahideen, Muslim Janbaz Force, Al Barq and Muslim Mujahideen - indicates a significant change of attitude.
For several months, there have been indications that the insurgents in the Valley, as well as their supporters, were tiring. In contrast, the security forces were being constantly strengthened.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that they will now embrace an unchanged relationship with India. What has changed is insistence on Pakistan being given equal importance in evolving a settlement. Pakistan has paid for its inability to fulfill the assurances of direct and international help for the insurgency, and of India's inability to counter a prolonged guerrilla campaign. It is, therefore, now seen as an obstacle to talks while in opposition to pressure from India. As the statement itself shows, however, the demand for self-determination has not been given up. Azaadi remains the most popular slogan.
The militant initiative poses a profound challenge to New Delhi. Our own hardliners would like to interpret it as virtual surrender. The first step they would recommend is early elections under the existing system, with no promise of autonomy. This would be based on the assumption that Kashmiris had learnt their lesson. This is the kind of response that will ensure permanent unrest and insurgency in the Valley. Fatigue does not last forever and there will always be neighbors ready to fan discontent. it would throw the militants who are having second thoughts back into the arms of their own hardliners. The Hizb leadership has already threatened punitive action. The Pakistan card remains attractive, as the reactions of the Hurriyat combine and other groups show. The popular moderate, Mr. Shabir Shah, has taken. the same line. But many of them have to be won over if a proper settlement is to be reached.
has told newspersons that any talks would have to be The Union Home Secretary, Mr. K. Padmanabhiah, the militant case and cannot be regarded as the constitutional. Unfortunately, this ignores the essence of unconditional approach demanded by the militants and conceded by the Home Minister. If the deliberations are to be restricted in advance to a relationship limited to what the Constitution permits at present, there is little chance of success.
None of the four militant signatories to the statement -Bilal Lodhi, Syed Imran Rahi, Babar Badar and Ghulam Mohideen Lone are front-rank leaders. Talks with by most Kashmiri leaders. Even independence need not them will carry weight only if the initiative is supported be ruled out for discussion; it may be possible to convince Kashmiri leaders that the economic and defense limitations are insuperable.
The first objective is to convince the people of Kashmir of New Delhi's sincere desire to implement and adhere to a settlement that guarantees maximum autonomy. After what they have suffered, only then may they be willingly persuaded to consider remaining part of the Indian Union. The militant offer provides a small window of opportunity.
It May seem attractive to be able to play off the militants against the Hurriyat, and thus weaken both. This It may seem attractive to be able to play off the is the kind of game that the Home Ministry loves to play. But for a settlement to win the support of enough Kashmiris to make it viable, New Delhi will have to reach out to all groups. Many may respond if convinced that New Delhi means business, except those enmeshed inextricably with Pakistan. There is no reason why New Delhi should not commit itself to seeking Pakistan's recognition of a settlement, if it is reached. More and accept the Line of Control as a border in J&K. The more Pakistanis are agreeing that it would be best to prospect of changing it has become remote and the cost of a continuing military confrontation with India unacceptable. The former Finance Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Mahbub ul Haq's solution was that both India and Pakistan withdraw their: troops and give the Kashmiris a chance to govern themselves. This does not suit New Delhi, but is totally unacceptable to Islamabad.
(Source: The Pioneer, 16 February, 1996)
