The security Council nominated the prominent Australian jurist and member of the High Court of Justice, Sir Owen Dixon, as the United Nations Representative. The reaction in India and Kashmir was not calculated to inspire him with self-confidence ..

Sir Owen Dixon arrived on the Sub-continent on May 27, 1950 ... He visited the capitals of both countries, travelled extensively in Kashmir, and on July 20 opened a four-day conference in New Delhi with the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan. He did not leave for the record any document about the day-to-day activities, but every scrap of information available and his subsequent report to the Security Council mark him as a great man, a keen observer with a penetrating analytical mind and a sense of justice. .

Upon his arrival in Delhi from Lake Success, ten weeks after the resolution of the Security Council had called on both parties to prepare and execute the demilitarisation of Kashmir within five months. Sir Owen found that nothing had been done ... He asked that the Pakistan troops be withdrawn. This was followed by a request to both sides to demilitarise the territory to a minimum of forces (Azad, state troops Indian army, and local militia) consistent with law and order.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan agreed to take the first step to withdraw the Pakistan army. But Sir Owen's gratification was short-lived. The, plan for demilitarisation was rejected by India.

Then Sir Owen attempted to deal with the problem of the administration of the Azad territory (and) the territory under Sheikh Abdullah's government, making proposals to ensure for the Kashmiri population complete freedom of choice in a plebiscite ... India said "No" ... She objected most vehemently to any proposal which either treated Pakistan as an equal or failed to take into account the violation of Kashmir territory by the Pakistanis.

... Sir Owen Dixon then suggested an alternative procedure. He suggested that for the period of the plebiscite a single government for the whole state – a coalition government composed of the two hitherto hostile parties, or a neutral administration by trusted persons outside politics, or an executive constituted by United Nations representatives - be organised ... India's reply was in the negative. "None of these suggestions commended themselves to the Prime Minister of India," Sir Owen almost plaintively reported to the Security Council. And then he added, "In the end, I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarisation in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation, and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled".

Then Sir Owen came up with another plan, and no one reading his report could doubt either his persistence or his ingenuity. He tried to ascertain the views of both governments on taking a plebiscite region by region, allocating each to Pakistan or India according to the result of voting; or allotting to either of the two countries areas which unquestionably would vote for Pakistan or for India, limiting the plebiscite to the Valley of Kashmir. Here ... he encountered sturdy opposition from the Prime Minister of Pakistan. India, Pakistan insisted, was committed to a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole. On the other hand, India indicated her willingness to consider such a plebiscite, limited to the Kashmir Valley and some adjacent areas. But her suggestions as to which territories should be allotted to Pakistan or India, stated Sir Owen, "appeared to me to go much beyond what according to my conception of the situation was reasonable ... " Pakistan refused to budge from her position, though she indicated her willingness to straight partition if the Valley were allocated to her.

This was unacceptable to India. At a last resort, Sir Owen Dixon presented both governments with another proposal. In broad lines, he called for a partition of the country and a plebiscite for the Valley, itself completely demilitarised, conducted by an administrative body of United Nations officers This proposal Pakistan rejected but reluctantly accepted Sir Owen's further suggestion that the two Prime Ministers meet with him to discuss the issue. However, wrote the now thoroughly frustrated Sir Owen, "The Prime Minister of India answered by telegram expressing an emphatic refusal to agree to any such provision."

All avenues of mediation exhausted, Sir Owen Dixon left the Sub-continent on August 23, 1950. In the concluding part of his report he wrote, patient and thoroughly moderate man that he was, "There is I believe on the side of India a conception of what ought to be done to ascertain the real will of the people which is not that tacitly assumed by me. Doubtless if is a conception which Pakistan does not share.

Sir Owen Dixon's failure was certainly through no fault of his own. His approach had been thoughtful, his alternative proposals many and varied, his authority unquestionable. But the method of mediation in this dispute had revealed its own aridity ... There was no hope, it indicated, of solving the problem of Kashmir by agreement. So perhaps all that could now be done was the division of the country along the cease-fire line ..

One cannot criticise Sir Owen's motives in his concluding recommendation. He appeared skeptical of the ability of the United Nations to force upon India any just solution. On the other hand, he felt strongly that the United Nations could not be a party to any  compromise which would cast any doubt on its integrity. Any solution short of a completely free plebiscite would, in his opinion, be such a compromise. Unable to achieve agreement on a plebiscite, he wearily concluded that the only course open was for the United  Nations to toss the responsibility for any further development in Kashmir back to the parties concerned, India and Pakistan ..

... With the very authority of the United Nations at  stake the Security Council did not follow Sir Owen Dixon's advice of "hands off" and wearily decided to resume its study of the Kashmir dispute.                                                          (Source: Danger in Kashmir by Joseph Korbel)