J&K Autonomy, Special Status and Kashmir Question: Political Perspectives, Regional Demands and Historical Context

 

 

KASHMIR SITUATION

 

J&K: Views of Karan Singh On Autonomy and Special Status

 

The Autonomy question is incredibly complicated, but, there are two committees handling it. The second committee on the regional demands is headed by Farooq und has Balraj Puri as the working President. The two are inseparable because if you demand more autonomy for J&K vis-a-vis the Centre, you have to be prepared to give autonomy to the regions also. And the people who demand regional autonomy must also be prepared to support autonomy for the state. You cannot have it one way ... For the first time in 50 years a serious effort is being made to solve the dual problems. And the problem is: what is the relationship of J&K with the rest of India and two, what is the relationship between Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh within the state? Both these things have to be sorted out if we have to get an abiding solution. We are going ... to put in advertisements and call for memoranda from people in the state, in India and even abroad. After we get all the memoranda, we will see if we need to personally meet people. Our first task is to identify the present position.

After the 1952 agreement and the Constitution of the state adopted in 1957, some of the points (of the earlier agreement) were incorporated, some were not.  Subsequently, there was a lot of more dilution. Then, came the 1975 agreement and after that too. There was further dilution. In fact, the situation is chaotic. Chaotic because there have been so many changes and amendments. But I would also like to say that not everything that was done was against the interests of the people. For example, the Supreme Court jurisdiction.

The only consistent policy the Government of India has followed is to erode, as far as possible, the autonomy of J&K. Since there has been a steady erosion of autonomy, the committee calls itself the "committee for restoration of autonomy". Autonomy is an idea whose time has come Not only J&K, others are also asking for it. Autonomy is no longer something which is against the mainstream though J&K is still a special case, for instance, the only state, with its own constitution.

Everyone realises that the concept of all authority, ail wisdom and all ability being concentrated in New Delhi ... is no longer valid. We are going to be a billion people by the turn of the century and a billion people cannot be run from South Block. Therefore, this is a good time to re-establish J&K's autonomy, of course, within the framework of the Indian Constitution.

J&K is a national question. After all, if we restore autonomy to J&K; it is going to be in the broader national interest. If the people of the state are satisfied, it strengthens national integrity and the Government of India.

Other important documents like the Sarkaria Commission report on Centre-State relations have been lying on the backburner for years. The Sarkaria Commission report can be a starting point for us. We can use some of its recommendations.

The Prime Minister has been reiterating 'maximum autonomy' to J&K. We have called it restoration of autonomy. I am trying to recreate a good relationship between (Srinagar) and New Delhi and to restore to the people a sense of involvement and dignity.                                                                   

 

Views of Mir Waiz Umer Farooq, Chairman, APHC

The Kashmir Hurriyat Conference leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, is strongly opposed to the bid to find a "military solution" to the Kashmir tangle, as it would prove ruinous to the people of the State on either side of the line of control. He also ruled out the use of the gun, as any viable alternative solution could be found only through political means.

Mirwaiz Farooq added that elections were no solution to the problem, which needed to be tackled at a "trilateral level" with people of the State on either side of the Line of Control playing a major role in finding an acceptable solution. "Our experience" he said has shown that the two countries on their own will not strive for a solution. Only an intervention of Kashmiris will prove decisive and break the impasse".

He was severely critical of the "strong hand" used by New Delhi in dealing with the "movement" in Kashmir. He denied that the armed campaign by militants was directed and backed by Pakistan. "Ours was an indigenous struggle to fulfil the aspirations of the people of the State, irrespective of their religious and regional affiliation".  It is in the national interest of India to fulfil aspirations of Kashmiris and deal with the problem politically, he said. He admitted that the militants had "wrongly used the gun, indulged in extortions, and admitted blackguard in their ranks," with the result "the movement" had developed "negative features"

He, however, added that elements charged with having committed excesses were being marginalised.

Mirwaiz Farooq disclosed that a move was afoot to include representatives from Ladakh and Jammu regions. Steps we also being taken to broad-base the "awareness campaign" to seek popular support in India.

No Kashmiri, he said, was prepared to accept peace with a danda. The Kashmiris were unwilling to accept a solution which did not meet their "aspirations for freedom". He felt that the recent elections for the Legislative Assembly had not brought a political solution. On the contrary militant’s actions had increased.                                                                                                                                                                           

V.M. Tarkunde on Kashmir Problem

What is necessary in this situation is that the Government of India should undertake immediate negotiations with Dr. Farooq Abdullah and his Government on the details of the maximum autonomy which can be granted to J&K in accordance with the terms of the Instrument of Accession of 1947. According to those terms, India's right to legislate in regard to J&K should be confined to the subjects of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. The scope of these subjects must be very narrowly construed in order to fulfil the second condition of the Accession which was that concurrence of the people of the State had to be obtained for the finalisation of the Accession. It is obvious that if the subjects of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications are widely interpreted, the majority of the people of J&K would not only assent to the Accession.

After reaching an agreement with Dr. Farooq Abdullah's Government on the concrete meaning of the “maximum autonomy" to be granted to J&K, the formula so evolved should be placed before the people of the State including those leaders who boycotted the election, particularly the member of the APHC Conference. Some give and take will be required to reach a final settlement. After a settlement is reached, another general election of the State Legislature should be held with the participation of all the parties and groups in the State.

It is necessary to ascertain whether the people of the so-called "Northern Areas" (mainly Baltistan and Gilgit), which are in Pakistan's occupation, are desirous of rejoining the other people of the erstwhile State of J&K in having a common future. For this purpose it is essential that facilities be made available to the leaders of both sides of the Line of Control to meet each other and discuss the questions involved. A limited understanding with the Government of Pakistan will be' required for facilitating such mutual discussions.

After reaching an agreement with the people of J&K, with or without the participation of the people of the so- called "Northern Areas", the Government of India should have a dialogue with the Government of Pakistan for settling the dispute between them in regard to J&K. The dispute should be settled on the principle that in the final analysis the will of the majority of people of the State of J&K must prevail in the settlement of their future.                                                                                                   

 

J&K: Views of Farooq Abdullah

Our secession into India is complete and irreversible. The question of autonomy that will be discussed will include the Delhi agreement of 1952 and the Indira-Abdullah accord of 1975.     (Source: The Times of India, 17 November, 1996)

 

Justice A.S. Anand on J&K and Texas

The accession of Kashmir to India is quite analogous to the annexation of Texas by the United States of America (USA). When Mexico separated from the Spanish Empire and setup as an independent Republic, Texas was an integral part of the new state. Later, Texas revolted against the Mexican authorities and established itself as an independent entity. The independent status of Texas was recognised by the USA and the principal powers of Europe. In 1844, the Government of Texas, threatened by the menace of predatory incursions from Mexico, requested the Government of the USA to annex the state. This proposal was accepted by the American Congress in a joint resolution in March, 1845. After this sanction, America sent an army to defend the western frontiers of Texas. The Government of Mexico strongly protested and alleged violation of the rights of Mexico and even the diplomatic intercourse between the two governments was suspended. The Mexican protest evoked the following reply from the Government of the USA:

"The Government of United States did not consider this joint resolution as a violation of any of the rights of Mexico, or that it offered ay just cause or offence to its government; that the Republic of Texas is an independent power, owing no allegiance to Mexico, and constituting no part of her territory or rightful sovereignty and jurisdiction"

 

Arun Joshi on Autonomy Question

What can this committee do. And what would it recommend? It has to demarcate and make it known that autonomy is not secession and also, why it is necessary to have more autonomy for this State than the others. This argument has to be taken forward in the context of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) for if nothing is done to restore the autonomy; there are always forces ready in Pakistan and PoK to evoke trouble on this side of the Line of Control, to exploit secessionist sentiments. It also needs to be discussed in the realm of "why a Kashmiri identity" and why autonomy is necessary to meet the aspirations of the people of the State and thus silence the always doubting international community.                                                                                                                   

 

RSS Role in J&K's Accession

Mr. K.N. Sahni revealed some interesting information about what happened in the Valley in 1947. He said he had accompanied the late M.S. Golwalkar and Pandit Prem Nath Dogra when they persuaded Maharaja Hari Singh, former ruler of the State, to announce the merger with India. The Maharaja, according to Mr, Sahni, agreed but delayed the announcement at the instance of a few sycophants around him.                                                                                                                                   

 

Balraj Puri on Impact of Election on "Azadi" Movement

Leaders of the "Azadi" movement in Kashmir decided not to participate in the recently concluded elections to the State Assembly and campaigned for their boycott. They argued that elections were no solution to the Kashmir problem. A Hurriyat leader demanded elections under the supervision of the United Nations as a precondition for its participation because they had never been fair and were unlikely to be fair now.

Nobody had claimed that elections were intended to get a verdict of the people for or against the State remaining a part of India. Indeed the official position does not concede the right of secession to any State even if a majority of its people demanded it, through election or otherwise. What was then the difference between the Hurriyat and those who participated in the elections? The aim of these elections was not to seek a solution of the Kashmir problem but to elect a government.

While participation in elections as such does not reflect decline in the strength of the "Azadi" movement, the latter cannot dismiss the pro-India forces, which, during the course of two elections, parliamentary and Assembly, have re-emerged with an active and assertive political role. The movement is further going to be critically affected with the installation of an elected government.

The Urdu world "Azadi" itself has three English equivalents - independence, freedom and autonomy. To the extent civil liberties are restored, the rule of law is re-established, freedom of expression is guaranteed, and independent press and judiciary are effective, and sentiments of freedom would be satisfied. Similarly to the extent the movement for autonomy gains momentum and the credibility of its champions is established and a genuine dialogue is started between them and the Government of India as also with the leaderships of Jammu and Ladakh, it may satisfy the urge for Kashmiri identity to some extent and snatch some more space from the "Azadi" movement. The autonomy might appear to many as a more practical and achievable form of "Azadi" than full independence.

A part of this space was already nibbled by Pakistan when it ruled out the third option of independence in deciding the future of the State and diverted the supply of arms from the JKLF to the Hizbul-Mujahideen and Harkatul Ansar. As the "Azadi movement, which had at one time covered almost the entire political space in the Valley, faces a fresh challenge from pro-India militants and pro-India political parties, the space would further shrink. For meanwhile, its own strength - armed, political and diplomatic - has also declined and some fissures have developed in its ranks. Now when India has won a battle in the proxy war against Pakistan and put the militants and the Hurriyat on the defensive, militarily and politically, it is the most appropriate psychological moment to renew the offer for a dialogue to all groups who did not participate in the elections. For if guns have failed to deliver the goods for the militants, the Indian state, too, has yet to achieve a decisive victory in the battle for the minds of the people of Kashmir.

The options of India are as limited as those of the Hurriyat and other secessionist groups. The latter can either entirely lean on non-Kashmiri pro-Pak foreign militants - and lose their identity - or convert themselves into an indigenous political movement and fill a part of the vast opposition ground which the elections have left vacant. For the three Opposition members of the Assembly, not political stalwarts in any sense - out of 46 in the Valley - cannot be an adequate channel of popular discontent. (The fourth vocal CPM member is an ally of the ruling party). It is, therefore, in the mutual interest of the national leadership and those who boycotted the elections to explore the possible areas of agreement which may lead to a lasting solution of the Kashmir problem and meanwhile end the bloodshed in the Valley.                                                                                                         

 

Erosion of Autonomy since Delhi Agreement, 1954

1954: Financial integration through operation of Customs, Central Excise, Civil Aviation, Posts and Telegraph.

1958: All India Service - IAS and IPS - introduced. Also functions of Comptroller and Auditor General extended to J&K.

1950: Census operations to be conducted under the Centre. Done in the 1961 Census

1960:  a) Supreme Court given the powers to give special leave to appeal from the decisions of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir.

        b) Elections to either House and the resolution of doubts and disputes relating to them placed under the supervision of the Election Commission of India.

1961: Extension of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, to J&K.

1964: Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution relating to dismissal of State Governments and introduction of President's or Governor's Rule extended to the State.

1965: Legislations regarding welfare of labour, trade unions, social security, etc. extended to J&K. Also Central labour laws.

1966: Direct election to Lok Sabha introduced.

1968: Appeals to Supreme Court from the Decisions of the High Court in election petition.

1969: Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 extended to J&K

1971: Article 226 relating to the powers of the High Courts to issue writ made applicable to J&K.

1972: Entry 60 of the Union List relating to sanctioning of cinematograph films applied.

1986: Article 249 of the Constitution applied.

  

Aasha Khosa on Post-Election Scene in State

As the post-election euphoria recedes, the Kashmiri militants are slowly making a tactical comeback to the mainland from their mountain and jungle hideouts. Less than two months after the formation of the National Conference (NC) government, the militants - who are tactfully changing their rough-and-tough image for social acceptability - find it easy to penetrate the villages. The reason: the political vacuum still persists and the security forces are yet to come to terms with this post-election reality.

Wile cases of explosions and arson have increased in towns such as Srinagar, it's the villages where this trend is visible ... Villagers are now welcoming the militants with food once again ... Armed pro-Pakistan militants have been marching through villages. Observers say that one reason militants have started regaining social acceptability is their changing face. "They no longer resort to extortion and anti-social acts", says a Congress leader from Sopore. At some places, the Hizbul Mujahideen militants pay for their stay.

However, the most important reason for their resurgence is the severely restricted political activity by the National Conference (NC). For example, the NC has not organised a single political rally in Kashmir after it was elected to power. Its ministers don't even stay in their native places for security reasons. All this has undermined the political process as the people are still alienated from their elected representatives.

"The people in rural areas have once again started looking up to the militants for rescuing them from the red-tape". "The vacuum still exists and the militants are there to fill it". As a result, as Congress Legislative Party leader Mehbooba Mufti puts it, violence is increasing and heavy outflow of youth into Pakistan for armed training has already started. With an elected government in Srinagar, life hasn't changed much for Kashmiris and not even for the militants. However the counterinsurgents find themselves caught between the guns of the militant’s ad an indifferent government.

The former militants have suffered heavily since the installation of the popular government: their camps were attacked at least 15 times by Hizbul Mujahideen and other pro-Pakistan outfits and as many as 35 surrendered militants killed. According to sources, militants have stopped random firings and aimless killings and have started concentrating on "targeted killings of counter-insurgents, political activists and local police officials.

With the government yet to spell out its policy on counter-insurgents, the former militants are feeling increasingly insecure. The pro-Pakistan militants are gaining the edge. Local militants have moved into the villages and foreign mercenaries have moved towards the northern areas bordering Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to play a more pivotal role in monitoring the supplies of arms and trained militants. Army authorities, however, claim the influx of mercenaries has been on the decline. In fact, the number of foreign mercenaries killed and arrested has come down in the past two months.

 

Arun Joshi's Report on J&K, 1990

What appeared like a dream till sometime back became a reality in 1996. The Assembly elections were held in J&K after seven years of Central rule.

For a moment it seemed that nothing had changed since the night of January 18, 1990, when the Farooq Abdullah Government resigned in protest against the reappointment of Jagmohan as the Governor. In October 1996 Farooq was back with most of his men to take up the reins of power. But this time the task was tougher. Apart from the usual problems of unemployment, lack of funds, industrial backwardness etc. the administration had to grapple with militancy.

And to strike at the roots of secessionism, the Government addressed the issue of autonomy, as promised in the manifesto, soon after it took over. Two panels were set up - one to recommend the quantum of autonomy and State can expect from the Union of India and the second to suggest measures for the regional autonomy for Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.

Equal importance was given to social and economic issues - over 26,000 jobs were identified for the unemployed youth and raids conducted on the premises of Government offices to show that the Government meant business. Having been in power for just two months, it is too early to assess the Government's performance. But, to begin with, the Government has done precious little to address the day to day problems of the people. The Ministers, scared of visiting the Valley, spend most of their time in Jammu.

The militancy also seems to be resurfacing after a brief lull. A series of blasts and attempts on the lives of several Ministers have only heightened the uncertainty. The Government (is unable) to define its policy regarding the militants. It is continuing with its flip flop approach, sending confusing signals.

For secessionists, particularly AIIPHC, it was one test after another. Its call for boycott of parliamentary elections went unheeded and it ended up accusing the Government and the Security Forces of resorting to terror tactics to ensure a good voter turnout.

By the time it repeated its boycott call for the Assembly elections, the APHC itself was in turmoil. It expelled one of its charismatic leaders Shabir Shah, once hailed as the Nelson Mandela of Kashmir, for his defiance of the collective decisions of the Conference. The successful completion of the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections was a major setback for the APHC.

However,. What has been bothering the administration lately is the swelling ranks of the pro-Pakistan groups because of the rising infiltration. Desertions from the counter insurgent groups have also come as a shot in the arm for the militancy. The APHC successfully organised demonstrations on the Human Rights day after a long gap signalling its gradual acceptance. Street demonstrations and recurring observance of general strikes have demonstrated that militancy is still around.

 

Amnesty International on J&K Elections (Excerpts)

 During the first stage of elections, held on 7 May in Jammu and Ladakh, little violence and a high voter turnout of about 55% and 80% respectively were reported.

During the next stage of elections, on 23 May in Baramulla and Anantnag. Independent Indian and foreign correspondents and human rights monitors reported witnessing the Indian army, the paramilitary, Rashtriya Rifles, and renegades coercing people at gunpoint from their homes to participate in elections. Officials claimed a turnout of 35% in Baramulla and of 43% in Anantnag, compared with less than 5% in parliamentary elections in 1989. A team of Indian human rights activists, including representatives of the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights, Lokshahi Hakk Sanghatana and A.P. Civil Liberties Committee, reported that "the Indian army went from house to house on 23 May, forcibly evicting people from their houses at gunpoint, scuttling them like cattle towards the polling booths. The army had threatened them that if they returned without a mark on their finger, they would be considered sympathizers or militants." Renegades belonging to the Ikhwan-ul Muslim on reported threatened people in Pampore that they would be beheaded if they could not show the ink mark on their finger. Demonstrators in Baramulla and Sopore towns and village Muchpora in Anantnag constituency, protesting against the army’s coercive methods, as well as journalists covering the demonstrations, were subjected to heavy lathi-charges bythe army, the human rights activists reported.

Srinagar, where the last stage of elections took place on 30 May, was relatively quiet during the elections in Anantnag and Baramulla due to prolonged strikes (20 to 23, 26 to 30 May) called by several opposition groups protesting against the elections. However, some incidents were reported. Armed opposition groups repeatedly tried to disrupt election preparations and elections and especially targeted government officials.

Armed opposition groups were reportedly responsible for some bomb attacks outside J&K. As in the pre-election phase, some abuses including targeted killings were committed by unknown persons or groups.

Several people were arbitrarily detained and ill-treated by security forces, apparently to intimidate whole neighbourhoods to participate in the elections or to put pressure on political leaders. On 13 May, Ghulam Hassan Mukhdoomi, the son-in-law of APHC leader Syed Ali Shah Gilani was arbitrarily arrested by the paramilitary Rashtriya Rifles who acted in conjunction with a group of renegades in Tujjar Sharif, Sopore, and detained for three days in Bomai camp, Sopore. No charges were brought against Mukhdoomi, a medical assistant, who had no apparent political affiliation. His arrest was widely seen as intended to put pressure on the APHC leadership. On the day before the elections in Srinagar, most APHC leaders, including Chairman Umar Farooq, Yasin Malik, Syed Ali Shah Gilani, Shabir Ahmad Shah and Abdul Gani Bhat were placed underhouse arrest, apparently to prevent them from making public speeches against the elections ... The house arrest was lifted after the election. JKLF leaders Javed Mir and Shakeel Bakhshi were arrested on 30 May while holding demonstrations against the elections, but were released later in the day. Like residents of Baramulla and Anantnag, people living in Srinagar’s outlying areas reported that troops had threatened them on 29 May that their hands would be chopped off it their fingers did not bear the blue mark proving that they had participated in elections; similar complaints were made in Udhampur. Some Srinagar residents told foreign correspondents that security personnel had threatened them with "dire consequences" if they did not go to vote!.

Officials later claimed a 37% turnout in Srinagar and 55% participation in Udhampur while independent observes touring the Srinagar area were quoted as estimating the turnout to be less than half this figure. Invalid votes according to official sources, were some 10% of votes cast in Srinagar, compared to 7.5% in Baramulla; this percentage was considered low by officials and an indicator that people were not coerced hence did not see the need to invalidate their ballot papers Three people were killed in Srinagar on 30 May and dozens injured as hundreds of people demonstrated in the streets shouting anti-Indian slogans. Indian authorities have denied the truth of eye-witness accounts of coercion and the use of threat of force against people unwilling to participate in the elections J&K Chief Secretary Ashok Kumar, who acknowledged that he had not been to the relevant districts during the election process, stated in a press conference that what reporters had seen was troops offering protection to voters against reprisals by insurgent groups: "I am speaking the truth" there was no herding of people". A spokesperson of the federal government home ministry asserted on 24 May that complaints of coercion were a "defense mechanism" of people against possible reprisals by militants who had called for a boycott and that the heavy army presence was needed "to protect candidates, voters, and government officials conducting the polls". Lieutenant-General Jagjit- Singh Dhillon declared that army officers may have asked people to vote, but that they had not been ordered to coerce anyone to do so. Similarly Director General of Police Manohar Nath Saberwal after the conclusion of elections in Srinagar dismissed reported of coercion as part of a "disinformation campaign". Governor K.V. Krishna Rao stated that "The people are fully aware that these elections have been absolutely free and fair"'; Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan in response to allegation of coercion during a press conference said that no written complaint had been received by the commission. Despite these protestations, the overwhelming weight of evidence available to Amnesty International suggests that the electoral process was marred by intimidation and threats of human rights violations and abuses.

 






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