KASHMIR SITUATION

Harish Khare on Kashmir Problem

The Indian State continues to attend to all civic and collective arrangements which constitute the political and constitutional order notwithstanding the daily dose of violence. Anyone who cares to plod through the monotonous publicity material will discover that the Government of J&K continues to find even if fitfully the time and resources for mundane chores like social welfare, rural development, education, mid-deal meal scheme, Integrated Infrastructure Development Projects, etc.

It is this uninterrupted performance by the Indian State infrastructure that gives the political groups (and their armed supporters, in and out of the Kashmir valley). the requisite elbow-room to switch on and switch off the agenda of contentions. This switching called Kashmir problem because the actors in and out of the valley have to necessarily engage others' attention to produce a "crisis" or a "solution".

However, the situation is never entirely "frozen" even in the valley-the snow not withstanding. For one thing, the armed groups keep on clashing among themselves when they are not taking on the security forces. At the other end of the spectrum, the Cong(1) is organizing in Jammu a two-day "political training camp". with an intent to identify and educate potential candidates. Almost half the Union Cabinet - including, Dr. Manmohan Singh, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Dr. Balram Jhakar, Dr. Jagannath Mishra - is slated to be there.

The ruling party's camp is the clearest indication that Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, has not yet given up the hope of going through the election process in Jammu and Kashmir, some time in February. The Election Commission itself is keeping an open mind on the question of the feasibility of a free and fair poll in the troubled State; after it was seen as exercising a veto power over the election process last November, the Commission may be reluctant to say 'no' one more time to the Union Government. What is more, Governor... Krishna Rao, is equally determined to see to it that the electoral process does not suffer from the 1987 precedent, when the ruling National Conference was seen as thoughtlessly and needlessly engaging in rigging

For the record, the Union Government remains committed to the Prime Minister's November 4 statement from Bukina Faso. That statement contains an undertaking that it shall be the endeavor of the Government to strengthen, within the framework of the Indian Constitution, the autonomy of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, mindful of the people's aspirations of the three regions as envisaged in the 1975 agreement.

Not much came out of the November 4 initiative because Dr. Farooq Abdullah, National Conference leader, believed that the President of India was competent to make the change in the nomenclature, without the benefit of advice from an "elected" State Legislature. Dr. Abdullah had the political argument that if the President/Parliament of India had the constitutional competence to erode the autonomy of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, surely the same competence could be availed of in restoring a bit of that autonomy. Behind these conflicting legal arguments was the basic question of trust. Could Dr. Abdullah be trusted? Could Dr. Abdullah trust "New Delhi'"'?

It is here that the international actors become relevant that is, besides Pakistan and its various subversive agents. The intention of the Western countries and the United States, in particular, have to be doubted, especially in the context of the hostages being held by the Al-Faran group. Reports suggest that the Al-Faran is staging a facade to enable the Western experts to gain access to groups and individuals in Srinagar and other parts of the Valley. The hostage crisis has been used to gain a "toe-hold" in the valley. It is widely believed that the American diplomats and "experts" have established extensive contacts with various militant groups as well as other political elements in the valley. Whatever else these Americans may or may not have achieved, their activities have certainly added to the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion. At the same time, both the U.S. and Pakistan have lost credibility in the valley.

It is slowly dawning upon the separatist-activists that Pakistan is in no position to intervene decisively in the standoff between the votaries of Aladi and the security forces. The U.S.'s intentions too are matter of considerable debate within the militant Camps - will the Americans be inclined to jeopardise the economic interests and concessions they have secured from the Narasimha Rao regime just to help the Kashmiris achieve their goal of "Azadi""?

It is in this context of growing suspicion that a part of the Jammu and Kashmir Congress is said to be getting excited about "co-opting" those militants who have "surrendered". Mr. Gulam Rasool Kar, J&K the Congress(T) chief, is said to have argued that if these ex- militants were to provide the "muscle" to the National Conference, what was wrong with the Congress(1) also taking advantage of their capacity to match the militants" guns.

By the reverse logic, the National Conference has also come to entertain considerable doubts about the Congress(1)'s intentions. In Dr. Abdullah's worldview, if the Centre is not going to help him become the chief minister/Wazir-e-Azam then why should he help the Prime Minister/Congress(1) in an enterprise that is likely to yield political dividends at home and diplomatic results abroad? The bane of too much of cleverness is finally catching up with all the actors.

(Source: The Hindu, 24 December, 1995)