The walls of Hindustani Masjid on Mohammed Ali Road are still dotted by bullet marks. That was where the  then joint commissioner of police, R.D. Tyagi ordered his men to fire on a group of Muslim students on January 9, 1993.

The firing killed nine innocent Muslims including a physically disabled religious instructor ...

That was one of the several incidents during the Mumbai riots in which innocent Muslims were killed by the police. In many other incidents, the police just watched Muslims being killed or helped the Shiv Sainiks in attacking them.

Justice Srikrishna has severely condemned the city police force in his report and named 15 officers and 16 constables from nine police stations in the city. The report says terms these policemen as "derelict" and "delinquent"

In the Hindustani Masjid firing, Justice Srikrishna has observed that Tyagi and his squad were guilty of "excessive and unnecessary firing".

Sub-inspector N.K. Kapse stormed Al-Hilal Masjid at Wadala and resorted to unprovoked firing which killed seven Muslims. At Nagpada, police inspector Dhavale "overreacted" to a stone pelting mob and fired indiscriminately ... A two-year-old child was killed ... In the other incidents of police atrocities, Justice Srikrishna indicts police officers for abetting the rioters and miscreants from the Shiv Sena ..

In some instances, police constables went on the rampage and indulged in marauding and looting. At Mahim, on January 6, constable Sanjay Gawade accompanied Shiv Sena leader Milind Vaidya with a sword ... Sub-inspector V. More, API S. Jadhav and four constables of the Colaba police station were responsible for allowing a violent mob to hack a Muslim to death.

On January 6, constable Sanjay Bhosale of the Nagpada police station led a mob and broke open the shop Cat's Collection and looted while constable Shrirang Pathade of the same police station openly collaborated with the Sainiks in looting and attacking Muslims.

API Kamath of the L.T. Marg police station was regarded "utterly derelict" for not acting against the miscreants in the Diamond Jubilee Compound incident. At antop Hill ... inspector B.B. Shinge, SI S. Patil and six police constables failed to protect the lives and properties of Muslims. And many times, policemen refused to register cases against Hindus and harassed Muslims ...

II

"There was a sudden spurt of attendance at Friday namaaz in mosques (in Mumbai after the first phase of the riots) interpreted by Hindu fanatics as ominous ...They replied with their ingenious maha-aartis ostensibly to protest against namaaz on the streets and the calling of azaan from mosques, though both were going on for years and were, perhaps, no more than minor irritants ... The maha-aartis, begun on December 29, 1992 kept adding to the communal tension and endangering the fragile peace which had been established."

- Report of Srikrishna Commission.

And into this cauldron stepped Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray like "a veteran general leading this troops."  BJP leaders might be relieved that the commission has let them off and fixed the blame squarely on the Sena ..

It was the BJP's idea that maha-aartis be held after the first phase of riots and the commission has held it guilty of helping create the situation for a major conflagration.

"Time and again", says Justice Srikrishna ... "the Hindutvawadis raised a shrill cry for construction of a temple at Ayodhya at the very place where the Babari Masjid stood ... Stoutly resisted by Muslims ... the issue became contentious and landed itself in the courts". It smouldered with he judiciary ... till the '90s "when the BJP revived it to regain lost political mileage".

The commission indicts Union Home Minister L.K. Advani: "The rath yatra of Shri L.K. Advani, leader of the BJP, refocussed attention on the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babari Masjid dispute. The inevitable clashes and minor cases of rioting which took place along the route of the rath yatra' ... were the distant thunderclaps portending the storm to come."

Justice Srikrishna has been as harsh about the BJP's subsequent programmes. "From about July 1992, the BJP orchestrated its campaign for the construction of a temple at Ayodhya by holding Ram Paduka processions, chowk sabhas and meetings ... Not only were these occasions used for exhorting Hindus to unite, but some speeches and slogans on such occasions were downright communal, warning Muslims that dissent ... would be an act of treachery for which they would be banished from the country."

... "Though ostensibly religious, the Ram Paduka processions had less of religion and more of politics. Under the attractive garb of advocating one's own religion, the Hindutvawadis politicised the issue and tried to pre-empt the issue pending in the court of law by their strident clamour for the construction of ... temple at Ayodhya.

Once the mosque was demolished, Justice Srikrishna believes that the BJP should have left it at that. Spontaneous Muslim protests by "leaderless" mobs should have been left to the police to deal with as a law- and-order situation, he says. Instead, "it is unfortunate that even at this stage the activists of the BJP jumped into the fray and escalated communal passions.

III

... When the Babari Masjid was demolished, the sight of the large contingent of Armed Constabulary and Central and State para-military forces (in Ayodhya), clearly shown on television footage repeatedly as standing mutely without raising a finger to protect the mosque being pulled down, and the fact that some of them were even seen to be gleeful over the demolition caused deep hurt and anguish beyond endurance to the Muslims, he says.

On the evening of December 6, says the report, a large number of Muslims congregated near the Minara Masjid in Pydonhie jurisdiction at about 23.20 hours and came out protesting. According to Justice Srikrishna, "Even at this stage if the mobs had been handled tactfully and with sensitivity by the police and accepted leaders of both communities, the protests would have peacefully blown over".

However, the aggressive posture adopted by the police turned peaceful protests into violent demonstrations during which the first targets of the anger of the mob became the municipal van and the Constabulary "both visible signs of the establishment". He says "It is  significant that the mobs were not armed, not even with stones and sticks, though they were angry and wanting to vent their spleen against anyone in authority. The situation was misdiagnosed, mishandled and turned messier."

From December 7, however, there was a qualitative transformation in the situation. "Large mobs of Muslims came on the streets and there was recourse taken to violence without doubt. This time the Muslim mobs appear to have come out with the intent of mounting violent attacks as noticed from their preparedness with weapons of offence"

By this time, says Justice Srikrishna, the protest had degenerated into a full-scale communal riot between Hindus and Muslims. "Eleven temples in different jurisdictions were damaged, demolished or set on fire. The Hindus did not fall behind and damaged mosques and madrasas in different jurisdictions."

Justice Srikrishna says that while Muslim establishments were being attacked in the second phase of riots in January 1993, there were also several stabbing incidents carried out by professional criminals with the intention of whipping up communal frenzy, in which the majority of the victims happened to be Hindus ... "There is no material on record suggesting that even during this phase any known Muslim individuals or organisations were responsible for riots, though a number of individual Muslims and Muslim criminal elements appear to have indulged in violence, looting, arson and rioting."

What about the Urdu press? ... Justice Srikrishna points out in his report: police stations in Muslim majority areas "did not even have persons knowing Urdu to interact with Muslims or even to read and understand Urdu writings"

IV

Her house was surveyed on January 3, 1993 and an indelible mark was put on her door by the surveying party. On January 9, there was an attack on her house by Shiv Sainiks ... armed with swords, choppers, knives and lathis. Another attack took place on January 11, 1993 by an armed mob of Shiv Sainiks ..

This and other such incidents prompted the Srikrishna Commission to conclude that: "The attacks on Muslims by the Shiv Sainiks were carried out with military precision, with list of establishments and voters list in hand".

In fact, the surveying of houses of Muslims had begun from January 3 when several Shiv Sainiks claiming to be officials of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority went around Pratiksha Nagar in Antop Hill surveying the residences of Muslims there. Such surveys took place in many areas simultaneously,

... On January 1, the Sena mouthpiece Saamna virtually gave a clarion call saying, Hinduni Akramak Vhayla Have (Hindus must become aggressive). From the very next day, violence began. Muslims on streets and also inside their houses came under gruesome attack by Shiv Sainiks. Soon, senior Sena leaders were on streets leading mobs of attackers.

On January 4 a big mob of Hindus led by Gajanan Kirtikar (at present minister of state for home), Ramesh More and other Sena leaders took a morcha to Jogeshwari police station complaining of lack of security for Hindus. Some of the people attacked Chacha Nagar Masjid and the Muslims 'in the vicinity. Several Muslim huts in Magdum Nagar in Mahim were set on fire, the commission noted.

By January 6, the Sena leaders had given up even the pretense of civility. On that day, Hindus led by Sena corporator Milind Vaidya ... carrying sword, attacked a Muslim locality at Mahim. The Commission's description of Bal Thackeray as a "veteran general" ... stems from a graphic description given to the Commission on what was happening inside "Matoshri", the residence of Thackeray when the city was afire.

V

.. Justice Srikrishna has not let off the Congress without a squeak ... His strictures against the Congress are ... very damning. Then chief minister Sudhakarrao Naik comes off the worst while Sharad Pawar, then the Union defence minister, on the other hand, comes out untainted ... "Effete political leadership, vacillation for political reasons and conflicting orders issued to the Commissioner of Police and percolated downwards created a general sense of confusion in the lower ranks of the police, resulting in the dilemma "to shoot or not to shoot". Four precious days were lost for the Chief Minister to consider and issue orders as to the effective use of the Army for controlling the riots".

"Surprisingly ... for a person who holds the office of Chief Minister of a state, Shri Naik displayed ignorance about the proper authority to give orders to the Army unit called in aid of civil authority. (He) said it would be some authority in the Army itself, though he was not able to say what would be the rank of such authority." ...

Naik ... has also had to take the major share of the blame on account of the dissembling he attempted vis-a-vis the role of the Army. While he complained that  Pawar was not responding to calls to bring in the Army, the Constitutional obligation, if the law and order situation goes beyond control, is for the district magistrate (DM) to request the nearest Army authorities to call in the Army and the defence minister does not come into the picture at all.

Then again, the report says, when Pawar asked Police Commissioner Bapat (who could take on the role of DM) why he was not calling for Army support, Bapat replied that for three days he had been trying to impress upon the State Government to do just that ....

VI

Diplomacy is a quality appreciated in a diplomat; not in police officers.

- Justice Srikrishna in his report on the 1992-93 Mumbai riots.

It's just one among the many strictures passed against then Commissioner of Police ... Bapat. It is apparent that Justice Srikrishna failed to be impressed by Bapat's careful deposition before his Commission and did not buy the senior police officer's reasonings for the manner in which the riots were handled.

Bapat filed a detailed affidavit before the Commission ... Among these is his stand on the Maha aartis: "Bapat considered them to be purely religious activities and, therefore, he had consciously decided that they were exempted from the ban orders, despite knowing that the Maha aartis were intended to pressurise the Government to make the Muslims give up the practice of calling Azaan on loudspeaker and doing Namaaz on the streets". Justice Srikrishna describes this assertion as "amusing".

Bapat maintained that demolitions of unauthorised structures in Muslim-majority areas and continuous pressure on criminal gangs ignited the December riots after the demolition of the Babari Masjid. Moreover, there was no material on record to show that the Shiv Sena as a political party had indulged in any violent activities or supported them. Ditto for Muslim organisations.

Says the report: "There is, however, the curious BC message no. 386 dated December 8, in which the police were specially called upon to take preventive action against the activists and "communal goondas" of the BJP, Shiv Sena and other organisations. Bapat's explanation for giving this message is that the BJP and Sena had given a call for a bandh on December 9 and, therefore, he had issued such instructions. The explanation appears to be tepid."

The term "communal goondas" ... occurs in a Government guideline dated April 30, 1986 on Dealing  with Communal Disturbances, "intended for the knowledge and guidance of police officers. Dealing with it in detail, Justice Srikrishna says, "In Chapter II, para 2.4, the guidelines in no uncertain terms identify 13 parties/organizations  in Maharashtra as communal. Out of  them the only material which has come on record with regard to any communal party are the activities of the RSS and Shiv Sena.

There is no material to suggest that activists of any of the other communal organisations named in para 2.4 in these guidelines had indulged in riotous or violent activity. As far as the RSS is concerned, the evidence only suggests that along with its affiliated organisations like BJP, VHP and Bajrang Dal, it had militantly advocated the building of the Ram temple ... in Ayodhya.

There is no material that any of the activists of the RSS or any other party barring the Shiv Sena had indulged in any violent activity during either phase of rioting."

Chapter III of these guidelines exhort the police stations to maintain a list of communal goondas, but, says Justice Srikrishna, "police officer after police officer" said that their stations had no such lists "and some of them even confessed that they did not understand the meaning of the expression "communal goondas" as used in the Commissioner's message."

The Commission has also rejected Bapat's reason for not slapping TADA on the Sena's Madhukar Sarpotdar and on Vivek Maitra, personal assistant of Gopinath Munde of the BJP. An unlicensed weapon was recovered from Sarpotdar's possession at the height of the communal riots in an area notified under section 3 of the TADA act and Maitra "was also found carrying a fire- arm, for which he possessed no valid license in a communally disturbed area."

Justice Srikrishna also criticises then Joint Commissioner R.D. Tyagi for being similarly diplomatic and has a word of praise only for one police officer: V.N. Deshmukh, then Additional Commissioner of Police of the Special Branch-I CID who was then in charge of the intelligence branch ... Says Justice Srikrishna: "He is one police officer who seems to have been aware of the Communal Riot Scheme under which each police station had to maintain a list of communal goondas"

... "As ACP SB-I he had identified the Shiv Sena and Dalit Panthers as two political parties and the Islamic Seva Sangh as one Muslim organisation with propensity for violence and creation of breakdown of law and order.

After the Sena-BJP government added the probe of the bomb blasts to Justice Srikrishna's terms of reference on January 22, 1997 (eight months tothe day they revived the Commission (in May 1996) after abolishing it a year earlier, in January 1996), it had nothing new to say onthe blasts. There was - and is - already a Designated Court going in detail into the blasts conspiracy. Chief Minister Manohar Joshi expressed a peeved reaction at the blasts probe being dismissed in four pages by Justice Srikrishna while he devoted more than 200 pages to his findings onthe riots. However, Joshi, it is clear, had attempted yet another exercise in misrepresentation.

When the Commission requested you more information from the Home Department on the blasts, "by an affidavit of the Additional Chief Secretary (Homé), dated February 5, 1997, the Commission was informed that all the material which the government had been in possesison of, had been disclosed in the affidavits of (top-ranking police officials) Amarjit Singh Samra, dated August 25, 1995, Vasant Narsingrao Deshmukh, Mahesh Narain Singh, Satish Sawhney, Shivarjrao K. Babar and Rakesh Maria (all dated September 25, 1995) and that there was no other material besides this."                       (Source: The Indian Express, 8 - 14 August, 1998)