... Even after the Clinton visit, there is no fundamental change in the basic approach in New Delhi to the Kashmir problem: the policy-making elite, political and bureaucratic, refuses to acknowledge that in the first place the 'problem' arose because of indigenous alienation and anger among the Kashmiris with India, or more precisely, with its 'democratic' representatives in Srinagar.

Partisan games played by political leaders of the Congress(I), and the National Conference made a mockery of the Kashmiri regional sentiments; an ' overbearing Centre saw each expression of regional sentiments as an exercise in secession. The gun was used to silence the dissident and the critic; the game changed when the 'dissidents' and 'separatists' also got hold of the gun.

Now there are too many guns on both sides of the dispute; and, if anything, the alienation on the Kashmiri side has remained unaddressed. Hence, the fundamental element in the Kashmir "problem" as it has manifested tself since 1989 has remained unchanged ...

On their part the 'leaders' of Jammu and Kashmir, especially of the 'separatist' school, remain prisoners of their past, rhetoric and the blood that has been shed for over a decade now. No one is sure as to how autonomous the Hurriyat leadership (or some of its sections) are of Pakistani patronage; but the undifferentiated high- handedness of our security forces bestows on all of them a halo of 'leadership' ...

Because the thinking in New Delhi refuses to see the colours of alienation in Kashmir and because there is an insistence on seeing all protests as Pakistan-inspired, there is never any anxiety to break out of the paradigm of violence-for-violence. Blood of young men, whatever the colour of the uniform, produces its own intransigence, stubbornness and anger. The BJP leadership's own past rhetoric of irrational intransigence and aggressive nationalism prevents L.K. Advani from breaking out of the self-inflicted stalemate. Many responsible and concerned citizens entertained that the BJP alone would be able to do "something" about Kashmir ...

To the extent Clinton is presumed to have spoken bluntly in Islamabad, he has only added to the creeping desperation in the Musharraf court. And, this desperation, the argument goes, would compel the self-appointed "saviour" of Pakistan to keep things on the boil in the Valley, if only to compel Clinton to have one more fling at peace-making. The deadlock remains hopelessly unmovable. The voice of civil society is totally lost.

... For now, there are three major identifiable factors that prevent the Vajpayee Government from trying to get out of the quagmire.

First, Farooq Abdullah's political paralysis has acquired a momentum of its own, and now practically pre-empts any attempt to move forward in Kashmir. To the extent the Vajpayee Gover ment, too, concedes the logic of "there is no alternal .. lo Farooq Abdullah", ChiefMinister has no interest in changing his playboyish spots.

He continues to believe and behave as if the Kashmir Valley was part of his ancestral zamindari, providing him With immunity .from such minor democratic inconveniences as governance, accountability and seriousness.

He is more hawkish against Pakistan than any of the RSS ideologues; at the same time, he holds the Centre to a ransom to bail his Government out of financial bankruptcy every so often; and, to complicate things further, he has come out with his own idea about "autonomy" for Kashmir.

Second, since Abdullah has so gallantly absolved himself of the responsibility of meeting the challenge of , terrorism, it is left, to the much-maligned security forces to hold the ground.

And ... no one has the stomach, or the stature, to stand up to the armed forces, their understanding, their demands and their high- handedness.

Third, probably there is a realisation on Advani’s part that he has lost much needed time th being a clever politician rather than a wise Home Minister ...

Not only has Advani squandered his carefully cultivated image of a 'tough' administrator ... he has also squandered his options of expanding the non-separatist democratic space ... Advani ... is reconciled to letting things drift in Kashmir. (Source: The Hindu, 2 April, 2000)

The Kashmir Answer Editorial, The Times of India, 7 April, 2000

... India has an excellent record of opening negotiations with militants of all sorts and there is no reason for Kashmir to be an exception. Kashmir may have an international dimension given Pakistan's involvement and interest but New Delhi should remember that there are diplomatic processes by which even seemingly insurmountable hurdles have been crossed. The once intractable Irish question is heading towards a solution and Turkey and Greece have alsn 'agun to mend fences. What is needed in Kashmir- vocabulary which will allow both India and Pakistan to talk and for all sections of the Kashmiri people to have their concerns addressed. For' years, the country has grappled with what has come to be called the 'Kashmir Question'. It is time the government moved towards finding the answer.