BIHAR ELECTIONS

Samir Kumar Mishra

On Bihar Assembly by-election, 1996

 The BJP-Samata Party alliance, which has wrested four out of the ten seats in the October 11 assembly byelections in the state, is being viewed as a viable emerging political combination against the ruling JD. Out of the ten seats, the JD won six but laid down four of its strong-holds to the BJP- Samata Party alliance.

Analysts say the JD's losses are significant. Especially in view of the fact that in last year's assembly elections three of these constituencies had returned JD nominees.

They ascribe the ruling party's defeat to the cracking up of the party's vote bank coupled with the raging storm over the alleged Rs. 950 crore fodder scams. They maintain that by forging a complete alliance the BJP and the Samata Party ensured that the voters of the backward Kurmi-Koeri castes, which until the last Lok Sabha elections rallied behind the Dal, plumped for the combine. The three JD strongholds that fell to the BJP-Samata Party combine were Balsand, Piro and Paliganj. These seats were earlier won by Janata Dal candidates. The fourth to fall to the combine was Navinagar. Out of the four seats that the Samata Party contested, won three Political observers feel that the widening rift between the JD and its Left allies also had its effect on the performance of the Dal at the hustings.

The two main Left parties, the CPI and the CPM, remained largely aloof all along from electioneering. The CPI even supported the Samajwadi Party candidate in Balsand and CPI(ML) nomince in Paliganj seats.

Moreover, the presence of Samajwadi Party candidates in quite a few constituencies further queered the pitch for the JD, as it resulted in split of OBC-Muslim vote-bank of the Dal. Though the performance of the combine as a whole was quite impressive, the BJP, the alliance's major partner, could not repeat its performance during the general elections. Of the six seats the party contested, only Paliganj returned the BJP candidate.

(Source: The Times of India, 18 October, 1996)

Rajeev Ranjan Roy on Congress (1) Prospects in Bihar

The recent by-election to the Bihar Assembly has rung the death knell for the Congress in the State. These by elections have shattered the Congress myth and proved that the party has become hollow from within in Bihar.

The septuagenarian Congress president is aware of the ills having almost eaten into the party's vitals. But many remotely controlled factions are at work in the State party unit, the going may not be easy for Kesri.

Kesri will have to contend with the factional fights of Dr. Jagannath Mishra, Tariq Anwar and Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav to name a few. Furthermore, Kesri himself is said to promote one faction which owes allegiance to the Mandal cause. His political proximity to the beleaguered Laloo Prasad Yadav has earned him a pro-Laloo image.

Even caste factors do not tilt the scale in Kesri's favor. Though himself a Bania, Kesri holds no sway over his castemen who are standing behind Sushil Kumar Modi, the BJP heavyweight and leader of the Opposition in the State Assembly who too is a Bania. The backward castes are either with Laloo Yadav or Nitish Kumar. The Congress is no more the choice of the upper castes who are rallying behind the BJP.

The Congress has lost its grip over the State's Dalits. Of course, Kesri is earning plaudits for his resolve to see the Dalit icon Mayawati as UP's CM. But this will hardly pay any dividends to the Congress Party in Bihar nor will it help him to project himself as the 'messiah' of Dalits in the State given Ram Vilas Paswan's hypnotic hold over them. As the same time his willingness to forge an alliance with the JD may open the floodgates in the Congress. Given this background the task before Kesri of providing a firmer footing to the Congress in Bihar seems to be gargantuan.

(Source: The Pioneer, 4 November, 1996)

Sidharth Mishra on Laloo's Strength in Bihar

Though Mr. Yadav felt rattled after the fodder scam came to light, the by poll results must have given him some amount of assurance that there has been no further erosion in his vote-bank. Victory of (Samata leaders) may personally trouble Mr. Yadav, their success, however, does not show any major swing or undercurrent in Bihar's electoral politics. These by polls have also reflected the fact that BJP has failed to further its base in the State-only one out of six candidates put up by the party has managed to win.

Incidentally, "tainted" JD leaders like former Home Minister Taslimuddin and Mr. Shahabuddin have managed to maintain their sway over the voters. The Janata Dal managed to win both the Jokihat and Jeradci scats, vacated by these two leaders after their election to the Lok Sabha.

That the caste factor mattered more than anything else to the voter is also obvious from the victory of Lovely Anand (Samata) from the Rajput-dominated Nabinagar constituency. Anand Mohan Singh has emerged as the strongest leader of the Rajputs in the State.

Mr. Yadav's continued sway over the majority of backward voters and a greater section of the minorities should alarm his detractors in JD like Mr. Sharad Yadav and Mr. Ram Vilas Paswan, who have been angling for the party chief's post and the chief minister ship, in case of Mr. Yadav's fall from grace. The rout of the Congress in the AICC chief's home State should worry Mr. Sitaram Kesri, who is talking about the revival of Congress in the North.

The failure of Congress to make its presence felt in any of the 10 constituencies across the State speaks volumes on the degeneration of the party. It will take a long time, and would be very creditable, if Mr. Kesri is able to restore the Congress to a position of primacy in the State.

With names of BJP leaders also appearing in the fodder scam, and one of their MLAs already under arrest, the party will have to rethink its strategy to strengthen its base in the State, as the by poll results show that mere Laloo-baiting will not help the party.

 (Source: The Pioneer)

Sanjay Kumar on Muslim Voting Pattern in Bihar

If viewed in terms of minority voting and minority representation, the results of the Bihar Assembly elections 1995 are a puzzle. On the one hand the success of a large number of Muslim candidates from non- Muslim constituencies (constituencies having below 20% of Muslim electorate) as compared to their success in Muslim constituencies (constituencies having between 25-45 per cent Muslim electorate) is a pointer to the fact that Bihar politics is not communally polarized. But at the same time the exceptionally high success rate of the BJP in the Muslim constituencies compels one to rethink: is Bihar politics really not polarized on communal lines?

In spite of the fact that a large number of Muslims got elected from non-Muslim constituencies, their representation is as low as 7.1% in the present Bihar Assembly. In a State where Muslims share about 12.5 (sic)% of population, their representation (which otherwise has been as low as 5.6% in 1967, 5.9% in 1969 and 6.1% in 1990) has only once touched the 10.1% mark in 1985. Such a low representation of Muslims in 1990 and 1995 is quite surprising since the ruling Janata Dal in Bihar owes much to the Muslim electorate for its success.

In the Assembly elections (of 1995), out of a total of 23 Muslim legislators, eight were successful from the Muslim constituencies, while the rest 15 won from non- Muslim constituencies. Of these 8 Muslim representatives, three owed their allegiance to the JD, two to the Congress and one to the CPL The Samajwadi Party, which has only two seats, is represented by Muslims from both the constituencies.

There are nearly 40 Assembly constituencies in Bihar where Muslims account for more than 25% of the electorate. Party performance in these constituencies reveals that the BJP, which has a total tally of 41 seats, managed to win 16 of these constituencies followed by the JD which won 12 of them. The CPI and Congress shared and Independents were successful in two constituencies each. The CPI-ML candidate was victorious in one scat and the only Bihar People's Party seat came from among these Muslim constituencies.

The BJP has emerged as a two-faced party in Bihar. But the dilemma is in respect of drawing a conclusion as to whether it reflects a religious or a geographical divide of its support base. Whereas its overall success rate is 12.7 per cent, if looked only in the context of Muslim constituencies its success rate is as high as 40% The contrasting performance of the BJP may lead one to think that even if not visible, the BJP did manage to consolidate the Hindu votes in its favor in the Muslim constituencies. This might be true for constituencies having a communal history but this assumption may not apply for most other constituencies. In a parallel proposition, quite similar to its success in the Muslim constituencies, the BJP did manage to win most of the urban Assembly seats. This points more towards the assumption of urban middle class support for the BJP in particular than to the overall support of Hindus in the Muslim constituencies, as a result of the religious divide created by the BJP. These urban areas certainly have more upper caste population as compared to the rural areas, and this points towards more upper caste support for the BJP.

The JD won 12 of these Muslim constituencies, but only three of them are represented by Muslims. The remaining 10 Muslim representatives elected on the JD ticket have won from constituencies other than those 40 seats. The success of non-Muslims on the Janata Dal ticket from the Muslim constituencies indicates that the Muslims voted for the JD in the Muslim constituencies even if it mattered voting for a non-Muslim. Vice-versa the success of 10 Muslims from the non-Muslim Assembly constituencies on the JD ticket, points to the Yadav's support for the JD even if it led to voting a Muslim in a non-Muslim constituency. By putting more non-Muslim candidates from the Muslim constituencies and vice-versa, Laloo Yadav tried to make the Muslims as well as Yadavas depend upon each other for their success. This master strategy, the "MY alliance", which accounts for nearly 23.5% of votes, led to the commendable victory of the JD in Bihar. Muslim support for the Congress like its overall support in Bihar is very low. The overall success rate of the Congress is as low as 9.0% which goes down further to 7.5% in the Muslim constituencies. This gives an indication of the eroding support base of the Congress in Bihar.

In spite of the tall claims of different political parties as the protectors of minority interests, it is quite evident that political representation of the Muslims has always been very low in the Bihar Assembly. While taking shelter under the umbrella of one or the other political party on flimsy issues. Muslims as a community must put pressure on the government to ensure a better socio- economic and political status

(Source: The Mainstream, 7 September, 1996)

Shahabuddin's Response

I see nothing puzzling about the results, if one makes a micro-analysis, constituency-by-constituency, of the candidates of major parties.

Muslim Biharis initially reacted favorably to the Samata upsurge but in the distribution of tickets, while Cong () and BJP favored the Brahmins and the other higher castes and the Janata Dal favored the Yadavs, the Samata Party had its Kurmis. No party put up adequate number of Muslim candidates and some Muslim candidates were no more than tokens whose purpose was to get the favored caste (belonging to the other party) elected! Thus, a Muslim candidate put up by Samata against a Kurmi or Koeri of Congress/Janata Dal was forced to fend for himself. Similarly, a Muslim candidate put up by Janata Dal against a Yadav candidate of any other party was on his own. Ultimately this meant a net fall in the number of Muslim MLAs.

The fact is that Bihar politics is more caste-oriented then communal oriented. And in the political equation the Muslims figure as yet another "caste". Thus, the political battle is being waged with the participation of the Brahmins, the Bhiahans and the Rajputs and to a lesser degree the Vaishyas, the Yadavs, the Kurmis, the Koeris and lastly, the Muslims. The Kayasthas do not figure in the equation, because of their small population and wide dispersal. Each party has one of the castes as the "core". Thus, the core of the Congress is the Brahmins, of the JD, the Yadavs, of the Samata, the Kurmis-Koeris. The SC and the ST operate in their own fields. The BJP is no longer an urban party or a Bania party, it has penetrated the Brahmins and other high castes, the Kurmis and other 'forward' Shudras, the Kayasthas and even the SC and ST.

Muslim under-representation in legislature is due to: 1) both to the unwillingness of the secular parties to put up Muslim candidates from Muslim concentration constituencies and the division of Muslim votes among the Muslim candidates, so that BJP can easily get through on a solid 'Hindu' vote. In 'non-Muslim' constituencies generally the Muslims have no chance to win, even if they are put up by secular parties because the latter are unable or unwilling to transfer their "core" votes to their own Muslim candidates. Sometimes, a Muslim candidate may win, even a marginal seat (just below 20%) because of a balance among the "core" castes of rival parties.

Whatever their claim, every political party builds itself around a core-group and the seeks support of secondary groups. This explains the poor representation of Muslims not only in the Bihar Legislature but in the composition of the state government.

Janata Dal's 1995 victory was due to the return of the Muslim voters to the JD, followed by the return of the high-caste votes towards the Congress/BJP and the consequent failure of Samata assault.

No doubt, there is a limit to Hindu consolidation and mobilization when there is no, Muslim threat and the fragmentation of the "Hindu" vote follows the caste cleavage lines.

The BJP has won "Muslim" seats in urban areas but it has to contend with the caste struggle within the Hindu society. If the Brahmins (read high castes) dominance was reseated, so is Yadav or Kurmi dominance. The other Shudras which form 30% of the population but who are today ill-organized and leaderless, may come into their own. In fact, the Muslims are not the most deprived and under-represented group in Bihar, it is the other Shudras, the MBCs. Who knows they may combine and out-vote the high castes as well as their successors, the Yadav, the Kurmis and the Koeris.

Fair and equitable representation of all social groups can be secured only through proportional representation or through reservation.

Bihar: 1995 Assembly Election:

Muslim Candidates, Ist and 2nd Position