BABARI MASJID
A.G. Noorani
New Light on Babari Masjid Demolition – I
New light on Rao's role in the affairs has just appeared. It shows that what was ever suspected to be murky was, in fact, far worse. It was sordid. The source is of impeccable authority and highest credibility.
It is none other than the Union Home Secretary who did his utmost to prevent the demolition but was thwarted at every single step, from July 1992 onwards, by the Prime Minster and had to suffer the mortification of listening to his lies in the cover-up. Dr. Madhav Godbole's memoirs should be read widely... (Unfinished Innings; Orient Longman; Rs.400).
The 87 pages of the chapter, "The Ayodhya Debacle", prove to the hilt that while the Union Home Ministry had, since July 1992, drawn up detailed contingency plans, Rao rejected them consistently and denied their very existence after the demolition. He denied also that the Centre had power to intervene, despite the fact that he had himself twice agreed to intervene only to back out. The power has been recognized by every commission which considered the subject
Godbole's account confirms authoritatively and in detail the findings of the Citizen's Tribunal on Ayodhya comprising two former Judges of the Supreme Court, Justices O. Chinnappa Reddy and D.A. Desai, and a former Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, Justice D.S. Tewatia: "We are of the view that the Government of India was guilty of culpable negligence and a willful refusal to discharge its obligation as a constitutional Government. The inaction was deliberate and with full knowledge of the likely outcome (italics mine, throughout).
Chandra Shekhar told this paper (The Statesman) on December 12: "It does seem there was deliberate dereliction of duty". He revealed that he had met Rao on November 30 to convey "certain information" on the threat to the mosque. "I personally explained my apprehensions". They were ignored. A fortnight later, he amplified that he had told Rao and his colleagues that "they should prepare for the worst and take preventive measures. Everyone present in the National Integration Council (November 23) was of the same view".
Rao's lies were also as well-known as his culpability for "deliberate" inaction. His speech in the Lok Sabha on December 21, 1992 was an exercise in deception. He said, for instance, that at no point of time did the State Government tell me that they will not use them (paramilitary forces sent by the Centre to U.P.) I have yet to come across a scrap of paper from Shri Kalyan Singhji to say that he refuses to use the paramilitary forces sent by the Centre. The Home Minister will bear me out". On December 9, Home Minister S.B. Chavan had told both Houses of Parliament in a formal prepared statement that "instead of utilizing the force, the Chief Minister criticized our action in stationing the force and demanded its withdrawal. He went to the extent to challenging the constitutional validity of the State Government's action". Kalyan Singh's refusal to use the Central forces could not have been more explicit.
Godbole's first-hand account confirms the impression of Rao's culpability on both counts - deliberate inaction and deception. By exposing his conduct in detail, it provides a damning indictment of Rao. "Sheer travesty of the truth" and "shocking" are his remarks a props Rao's denial, in a Press interval (January 5, 1993), that their was a plan to send forces "under the Central Command by (sic) Article 355". He has good reason to resent this denial; for, he had himself drawn up the plan and Chavan had approved of them. Rao vetoed them. When the worst happened, he pleaded he had no such powers.
But Rao detected a lacuna in Article 356. He told the Lok Sabha on December 21, 1992: "If only one word had been there, in Article 356, which says, 'a situation has arisen - if after that it could have been added 'is likely to arise' then the Governor gets (sic), the President gets a greater leeway". He went so far as to remark: "What happens to Article 356? It lies shattered"
This was no mere legal error. Godbole's book proves that this disclaimer was untrue to Rao's own knowledge; in short, it was a lie. For, Rao himself had approved of imposition of President's rule. Of a piece with this is his persistent trivialization of the tragedy. Rao told foreign correspondents on December 11 "because a few persons going (sic) into the temple does not men the breakdown. of law and order. Only when they started pulling the structure down, one could say something unconstitutional was being done." In January 1993, he said: "Five lakh people come here and collect at the Boat Club. Just because two lakh people have come (at Ayodhya) doesn't mean anything to me".
Godbole's comment on this remark is devastating. "Of course, it is not true that the Prime Minister was not warned. In fact, all implications of not taking a decision Home Minister and the Prime Minister by me personally, early enough were fully and repeatedly impressed on the often in the presence of Naresh Chandra (Rao's adviser on Ayodhya) and Law Secretary P.C. Rao. The Prime Minister was also told that all his options would be closed once the kar sevaks congregated in large numbers at Ayodhya. At no stage had the Prime Minister said that the crowds in Ayodhya were no different from those which collect in rallies at the Boat Club. But if that was his real assessment, then all one can say is that there you have the answer as to why the highest political executive decided not to act but to sit back and let events take their own course".
In order to appreciate the import of Godbole's warnings and the Home Ministry's contingency plans, the background must be borne in mind. Kalyan Singh made no secret of his plans no sooner he became Chief Minister in 1991. As early as May 2, 1992 he threatened to mobilize the people. On July 9 he began the construction of a concrete platform, after acquiring the land adjoining the mosque on false pretexts, and committed various violations of the Court's orders. As the Home Ministry's Annual Report (92-93) records, his government "expressed its inability to enforce the court orders keeping in view the possibility of violence".
July 9 was a dray run for December 6. The Sangh Parivar's strategy was obvious surround the mosque with an enormous crowd and hold it hostage. The BJP's whiz kid K.N. Govindacharya told this paper (The Statesman) (December 30-31) that the plan was to "collect crowds to foil the dismissal plan".
Game Plan
Its organ, Organizer, revealed it in detail on December 7 (when its issue of December 13 hit the stands): "The game-plan was not to allow the Centre to pre-empt the arrival of kar sevaks at Ayodhya by dismissing the UP Government and deploying para- military forces. L.K. Advani and MM. Joshi were asked to set out on yatras commencing from Varanasi and Mathura respectively" as a warning of a widening of the conflict. By December 4, more than two lakhs had been collected near the mosque. Meanwhile, as Organizer admits, precious time was gained by filing reassuring affidavits in the Supreme Court.
There were only 500 men on November 25 near the mosque. They rose to 17,500 on November 30. The decisive days were December 1 to 3. Three events preceding them are of crucial importance. On November 23 the National Integration Council gave Rao a carte blanche - "support and cooperation in whatever step the Prime Minister considers essential in upholding the Constitution and the rule of law, and in implementing the Court's orders." The next day 195 companies of Central para-military forces (20,000 men) were stationed "in the proximity of Ayodhya so that these could be made available at short notice if and when required by State Government for deployment to protect the mosque" - as if that was at all its intent. It lost no time in telling off the Centre.
On November 25, the Attorney-General, Milon Banerji told the Supreme Court Bench considering the case, Justices M.N. Venakatachaliah and G.N. Ray: "The Court must do something today since one or two days may be absolutely vital". He was making the statement "with the fullest sense of responsibility since reports showed that the situation was building to a boiling point". The State was only playing for time to gather men and material for the December 6 "kar seva". He added: "Any further delay might make the situation irreversible in practical terms". Were the gravity and urgency of the situation, so well described by the AG, not evident to the P.M.? The Bench chose to ignore the warning and instead granted time to the State to carry out its orders. During the proceedings it observed "we can't act in aid of the Central Government". The Court's written order pointedly said: "The Central Government is, of course, at liberty to make its own assessment of the matter and take such action on its own as may appear to it proper and permissible." In plain words, the proceedings in court did not bar imposition of President's rule in UP. By November 25 Rao had the Supreme Court's permission, the NIC's mandate and the means to enforce both. In such a context, his persistent veto of the Home Ministry's plan reveals his own game-plan. Godbole writes: "A detailed contingency plan was drawn up, first, for implementation in July 1992. This was later refined in great detail for being put into operation in November 1992. I would underline that this contingency plan involved taking over the BM-RJB complex by invoking provisions of Articles 355 and thereafter imposing President's rule under Article 356, and not merely giving the Government of Uttar Pradesh the assistance of central para-military forces."
Both the procedure for the orders "a late-night meeting of the Cabinet" and the manner of their implementation were worked out thoroughly. Even aerial photographs were ready. "With such a detailed contingency plan worked out, I asked for clearance to put the plan into operation from the Home Minister and the Prime Minister in the second week of November 1992 before the kar sevaks started arriving in Ayodhya. According to the original time-schedule at the official level in the Home Ministry, the whole operation was to be completed on the night of November 22-23, 1992 so that a statement could be made on the opening day of the winter session of Parliament on November 24, that the Centre had taken action under Article 355 and had taken over the state under Article 356". (italics here in the original).
He adds: "However, the Prime Minister changed his mind again and decided to wait for a few days". Since November 15, commandos of the National Security Guard were kept "in readiness to proceed in civilian clothes" to Ayodhya. "Each day the orders used to be countermanded in the evening for want of clearance from the Prime Minister". Both, Chavan and Sharad Pawar, the defense minister, spoke to Rao but to no avail, "I met the Prime Minister several times, but every time I was told to wait".
Rao was in sole command. The Home Ministry had been totally excluded from his talks with the Sadhus and Parivar leaders. The PMO felt that no harm could come to the structure. It was against any action. So, even more enthusiastically, was Cabinet Secretary S. Rajagopal, Naresh Chandra had a touching faith in the discipline of the RSS and the "maturity" of the leadership of the BJP and the RSS.
(Source: The Statesman, 11-13 June, 1996) (To be concluded)
