Communal violence in India has been widely attributed to the general level of communal politics. Consequently, political prescriptions to fight such violence have centred around the need to propagate the virtues of secularism in a pluralistic society. This was to be reinforced by substantial intellectual inputs to underscore our secular history; the revision of textbooks on secular lines; and the encouragement of greater representation of the relatively under-represented communities in the public services through affirmative action.

But the effect of this package in the last four decades appears to be woefully inadequate and, arguably, counter-productive... Hence the need for possible alternative explanations.

The direct casual nexus between communal political and communal violence- both often associated with secessionist proclivities in India appears to be a historical generalisation rooted more specifically in the politics of partition; the unresolved Kashmir dispute... reinforced... by political trends in Punjab and Kashmir in more recent times...

But empirically, in the post-partition era, there is a case for sharp distinction to be made between communal politics and communal violence, as also that between the two phenomena and secessionist politics per se, both conceptually and operationally.

Evidence suggests that the stereotyped generalisation based on the casual nexus between communal politics and/or communal violence with secessionist politics could be a case of over-determination from limited and selective evidence...

At the macro-level, post-partition Indian politics till the mid-1960s, present two different trends: in the former phase, communal politics was not accompanied by any significant level of communal violence, while in the latter phase, both tend to dialectically reinforce each other...

Studies in Indian politics also indicate a sharp increase in the general level of social and political violence in the country from about the mid-1960s, along with an increasing accretion in the strength of the coercive machinery of the state-like the police, para-military agencies, intelligence outfits and repressive legislation-indicating the increasing weakness in the democratic instruments of conflict-resolution. The emergency, in the mid-1970s, has further reinforced the vicious circle of repression, violence, and the atrophy of the democratic institutions irreversibly in many ways. In other words, empirically, the general level of violence in the polity-both at the societal as well as at the state-plane-has been the critical variable determining the level of communal violence.

...Then measures against communal violence should be more pointedly directed at reducing the level of violence in the polity. Such measures involve a greater concern for the autonomy of democratic institutions, and public services, against political subversion, even when motivated by secular goals. It means ensuring the professional efficiency of these institutions, even at the cost of social equity. It requires a closer scrutiny of the use, and misuse, of the massive coercive apparatus of the state and a de-escalation in the language and idiom of secular discourse...

This policy-package will not transform the communal individuals. But it is aimed at the next best option - to contain their propensity for violence.

(Source: The Sunday Observer, New Delhi)