MUSLIM LEADERSHIP
Aijaz Ahmed on Abul Kalam Azad-Pan-Islamism to Nationalism
The Pan-Islamist anti-colonialism of the Al-Hilal decade was in any case inconsistent on many counts. The characterisation of all Muslims of the world as a single qawm (nation) with a political centre (siyasi markaz) located in Istanbul (Constantinople), with a Caliph of Islam who was also the Sultan, specifically, of Turkey, left the Indian Muslims in a highly ambiguous situation, which was resolved only rhetorically, in the language of metaphor, but never in terms of rational, analytic discourse. How many nations could one belong to simultaneously, with how many political centres? If the sharia enjoined that one always be the subject of the Caliph/Sultan of Turkey, what status would one have if India were independent and there were to be a war between the two countries or, in the less dire case, if the Sultan simply forbade one to obey Indian laws? What happens, in that case, to the concentric circles which appeared on the Khilafat stationery, to dissolve in a metaphor the difficulty of belonging to two nations simultaneously, one territorial and Indian, the other religious and transcontinental?
It is also indicative that Azad always spoke emphatically of the exclusive rights of Muslims in Jazirat-al-Arab - in which he specifically included Palestine, Syria and Lebanon in addition to Peninsular Arabia – while routinely ignoring the indigenous non-Muslim populations of those regions. Did they have no rights? What rights could they have, considering that Azad had explicitly said that theocratic government was the only just form of government? How does one reconcile minority rights – or even majority rights, for that matter - with theocracy? It is doubtless the case, furthermore, that his articles in Al-Hilal and Al-Balagh focused on mobilising Indian Muslims against colonial authority. It is also the case, however, that these same articles have little to say to - or even about – the non-Muslim population inside India. There was doubtless some vague sense that there should be anti-British cooperation; but there are also statements to the effect that Muslims need to learn nothing, and certainly accept no leadership, from Hindu. So, what happens to this Muslim-Hindu cooperation if the British do actually leave, considering that one stands already for theocratic form of government?
Even the idea of Umma Wahida started surfacing in his writings only in 1920 and only as an oppositional unity against the British. What was to be the positive form of this unity if the British did actually leave, and how were the Muslims - with their belief in theocratic government and their loyalty to the Turkish Caliph - to live in an independent polity where non-Muslims were in the majority? Even the basis of this idea of Umma Wahida was problematic. The theological justification which was found in the precedent of the. Treaty of AD 628, whereby the Prophet of Islam had made his peace with Jews, was certainly useful in inducting the pietistic, Pan-Islamic is cadres into a country-wide agitation which spread more or less seamlessly from the mosques to the kisan sabhas and from Gandhian Non-Cooperation to media laid for Turkey. With the help of this precedent from early Islamic history Azad "asserted", as Mushirul Hasan puts it, "that uniting with one category of non-Muslims, the Hindus, against another category of non-Muslims, the British, was obligatory." So, a provisional "unity" was forged, so long as the "treaty" was in effect. But what happens to this” treaty" if the common enemy, the British, disappears, considering that Muslims were a minority in India and could not possibly have an Islamic theocracy? Azad was to resolve these political problems only much later, around1940, when he abandoned the search for a pietistic justification for Hindu-Muslim unity and accepted the secular premise.
H.A. Hafiz on Muslim Religious Politics
Come elections in UP and various Muslim outfits Maulanas and Imams and even priests of dargahs (mausoleums) occupy vantage points in the electoral arena to advocate the "cause and welfare" of the minority community. These outfits, their leaders and even Imams disappear from the scene till the next elections.
The Muslim voters account for roughly 18%of the total electorate even though in some of the constituencies their percentage ranges between 35 to 50. They hold a decisive sway in over 110 of the 425 Assembly constituencies. But they are not a well-knit community and are as divided on political issues as any other community. The only point of agreement among the minority voters is their antipathy for the BJP which, they feel, is bounding their community even on trivial issues. The demolition of the Babari Masjid on December 6, 1992 cemented their unity only against the Sangh Parivar and its political arm the BJP
In pursuit of their vote-bank politics, all the parties believing in the myth of en bloc voting by Muslims in UP chase them for their votes. In this no-holds-barred exercise, they enlist support of Imams, priests and ·Maulanas to swing the minority votes in their favour.
The latest craze for minority vote has overwhelmed the Dalit-based BSP which has enlisted support of Imam Abdullah Bukhari, his deputy and even the priest of the Ala Hazrat Dargah of Bareilly. Some fake Muslim outfitsthriving only on publicity by vernacular press have also
Known their hat in the ring to boost Muslim for the BSP.
In his endeavour to cut into the vote-bank of the SP so as to swell his own vote-bank, Kanshi Ram and Mayawati to secure at least 5% of the minority votes and another 5%of the most backward among the OBCs to secure at least40% votes. The BSP polled 20.60% votes in the recent Lók Sabha elections and its electoral partner, the Congress, secured 8.14% votes (together 29%) vote.
